本文選題：銀行關(guān)聯(lián) + 民營企業(yè)�。� 參考：《南開大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：國有企業(yè)改革以來,民營經(jīng)濟(jì)在國民經(jīng)濟(jì)中所占比重逐漸增大,但民營企業(yè)可獲得的信貸資源卻十分有限。不僅小微企業(yè),大中型民營企業(yè)也不同程度地反映出對外部資金的旺盛需求、對銀行貸款的依賴和實際融資中的困難。這種困境很大程度上是由中國的金融體制安排造成的,中國的金融體制以銀行間接融資為主,資本市場等直接融資渠道發(fā)展緩慢,更為關(guān)鍵的是,政府對信貸資源有很強(qiáng)的控制力。 從工業(yè)化進(jìn)程的角度看,上述制度安排有其合理性和必要性,對金融資源的控制使這些國家在工業(yè)化的道路上,得以快速追趕并實現(xiàn)超越。當(dāng)然,這種金融安排的弊端就是銀行偏好國有企業(yè),對民營企業(yè)存在信貸歧視,抑制了對民營企業(yè)的信貸供給。雖然2006年之后以四大國有銀行為代表的國有企業(yè)改革取得階段性成功,國內(nèi)銀行的市場化程度得到了提升,但仍未完全擺脫地方政府的干預(yù)、央行信貸額度的控制,銀行的信貸決策過程中仍存在著較多的非市場化因素。 可見,現(xiàn)行金融體制下,民營企業(yè)易受銀行的信貸歧視,較難從正規(guī)的融資渠道獲得足夠的信貸支持,且融資成本較高,常常受到融資約束的困擾。在此背景下,本文將探尋其他替代機(jī)制,能夠緩解民營企業(yè)因所有權(quán)性質(zhì)差異而受到的信貸歧視,探究規(guī)模以上民營企業(yè)與銀行建立的銀行關(guān)聯(lián),是否可以幫助民營企業(yè)從正規(guī)的融資渠道中獲得穩(wěn)定足夠的信貸支持,從而緩解外部融資約束,為民營企業(yè)進(jìn)一步的做大做強(qiáng)奠定基礎(chǔ)。 文章首先利用全國工商聯(lián)對規(guī)模以上民營企業(yè)的調(diào)查統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù),從收入、資產(chǎn)規(guī)模、利潤和員工人數(shù)四個維度對上市民營企業(yè)、上市中小板民營企業(yè)與規(guī)模以上民營企業(yè)做了對比,發(fā)現(xiàn)三者間具有較高的相似性。以上市民營企業(yè)為例,采用國內(nèi)研究者較少使用的自然實驗法,以2008年出臺的《關(guān)于修改上市公司現(xiàn)金分紅若干規(guī)定的決定》作為外生沖擊,對比研究了國有上市公司和民營上市公司在《新規(guī)》出臺前后的現(xiàn)金分紅差異,通過對比驗證了規(guī)模以上民營企業(yè)的融資約束。 然后重點研究了銀行人事關(guān)聯(lián)對民營企業(yè)融資約束的影響。從社會資本和信息兩個角度展開分析。一方面非正式制度的出現(xiàn)可以在一定程度上彌補(bǔ)正式制度的空隙和不足,幫助減少信貸市場上的信息不對稱程度,減輕市場摩擦。另一方面,中國的傳統(tǒng)文化使得人們在從日常生活到企業(yè)經(jīng)營等各種活動中非常重視人際關(guān)系的建立和運(yùn)用,人情、面子和關(guān)系成為了人們獲取稀缺資源的一種重要資本。采用對中小板民營上市公司招股說明書中手工搜集的數(shù)據(jù),就銀行人事關(guān)聯(lián)對民營企業(yè)融資約束的影響作用進(jìn)行了經(jīng)驗研究。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),銀行人事關(guān)聯(lián)可以顯著緩解民營企業(yè)受到的融資約束,政治關(guān)聯(lián)也具有類似的效果,兩種關(guān)聯(lián)方式具有替代效果。有銀行人事關(guān)聯(lián)的民營企業(yè),在整體負(fù)債和銀行短期借款方面,均顯著高于無銀行人事關(guān)聯(lián)的民營企業(yè)。而在銀行長期借款上則沒有表現(xiàn)出顯著的差異。在融資成本方面,并未發(fā)現(xiàn)銀行人事關(guān)聯(lián)對融資成本有降低作用。 與銀行人事關(guān)聯(lián)這種非正式制度相比,銀行股權(quán)關(guān)聯(lián)則完全是一種市場化關(guān)聯(lián)行為,隨著國內(nèi)銀行不斷改革,內(nèi)部治理和外部法律法規(guī)體系不斷完善,正式制度將不斷發(fā)揮更多的作用,企業(yè)與銀行間的交易行為將主要以市場為基礎(chǔ)。因此,文章接著對銀行股權(quán)關(guān)聯(lián)做了探討,現(xiàn)階段我國只允許企業(yè)參股銀行,所以重點分析和評價了企業(yè)參股銀行這種關(guān)聯(lián)方式對民營企業(yè)融資約束的影響。 本文先構(gòu)建了一個理論框架,討論了企業(yè)參股銀行對企業(yè)融資成本和要素投入偏好的影響。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),企業(yè)持有銀行的股份,無論是否能夠影響銀行的信貸決策,對企業(yè)資金需求的影響結(jié)果都相同,這類企業(yè)對從銀行借入的資本價格敏感度降低。在任意的資本和勞動力價格組合下,持有銀行股權(quán)的企業(yè)會更多的使用資本進(jìn)行生產(chǎn),偏好資本密集型的生產(chǎn)方式。然后以上市民營企業(yè)為例,就銀行股權(quán)關(guān)聯(lián)對民營企業(yè)融資約束的影響作了經(jīng)驗檢驗。結(jié)果證實了民營企業(yè)持有銀行股份對企業(yè)融資約束的緩解作用。參股銀行后,民營企業(yè)在整體負(fù)債水平、銀行借款方面都有顯著增加,企業(yè)的銀行借款期限結(jié)構(gòu)顯著縮短,同時財務(wù)風(fēng)險也有所增加,但并不顯著。此外,由于國內(nèi)銀行業(yè)屬壟斷行業(yè),存在著較豐厚的壟斷利潤,多元化經(jīng)營、分享銀行業(yè)壟斷利潤也是現(xiàn)階段民營企業(yè)參股銀行的考慮之一。 雖然目前國內(nèi)商業(yè)銀行法禁止銀行持有非金融企業(yè)股權(quán),文章還是從理論上探討了銀行持有企業(yè)股權(quán)這種銀行股權(quán)關(guān)聯(lián)形式。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),銀行持股企業(yè)以直接和間接兩條渠道幫助民營企業(yè)獲得貸款。直接影響是持股增強(qiáng)了企業(yè)的資本實力,增加了企業(yè)的可抵押資產(chǎn),與增加銀行監(jiān)督資本投入的效果相同。同時,企業(yè)項目成功后銀行獲得的收入增加,彌補(bǔ)了監(jiān)督所付出的成本,改善了銀行的激勵機(jī)制。間接影響是銀行持股降低了與民營企業(yè)的信息不對稱程度,節(jié)省了銀行監(jiān)督成本的投入,間接增加了民營企業(yè)獲得信貸的可能性。
[Abstract]:Since the reform of state owned enterprises, the proportion of private economy in the national economy has increased gradually, but the credit resources available by private enterprises are very limited. Not only small and micro enterprises, but also large and medium-sized private enterprises also reflect the exuberant demand for external funds, the dependence on bank loans and the difficulties in actual financing. To a great extent, it is caused by the financial system arrangement in China. China's financial system is dominated by indirect bank financing, and the direct financing channels such as the capital market are slow to develop, and the key is that the government has strong control over the credit resources.
From the point of view of the process of industrialization, the above system arrangement has its rationality and necessity. The control of financial resources makes these countries fast catching up and Surpassing in the road of industrialization. The disadvantage of this financial arrangement is that the banks prefer state-owned enterprises, credit discrimination to private enterprises and restrain private enterprises. Credit supply. Although the reform of state-owned enterprises, represented by the four state-owned banks after 2006, has achieved a stage success, the degree of marketization of domestic banks has been improved, but it is still not completely free from the intervention of local governments, the control of the central bank credit line, and there are still many non market factors in the process of bank credit decision-making.
It can be seen that under the current financial system, private enterprises are vulnerable to the credit discrimination of the banks, and it is difficult to obtain sufficient credit support from the regular financing channels, and the financing costs are high and are often plagued by financing constraints. In this context, this paper will explore other alternative mechanisms to alleviate the credit of private enterprises due to the difference of ownership nature. Discrimination, exploring the relationship between the private enterprises and banks above the scale, whether it can help the private enterprises obtain stable sufficient credit support from the regular financing channels, thus relieving the external financing constraints and laying the foundation for the further development of the private enterprises.
The article first makes use of the survey statistics of the private enterprises above the scale by the National Federation of industry and commerce, and compares the listed private enterprises with the private enterprises on the listed private enterprises from four dimensions of income, asset scale, profit and employee number, and finds that there is a higher similarity between the listed private enterprises and the private enterprises above the scale. Using the natural experimental method which is less used by domestic researchers, the difference of cash dividend difference between state-owned listed companies and private listed companies before and after the introduction of the new regulations was compared. The financing of private enterprises above the scale was verified by comparison. Constraint.
Then it focuses on the impact of bank Personnel Association on financing constraints of private enterprises. From two perspectives, social capital and information. On one hand, the appearance of the informal system can make up the gap and deficiency of the formal system to a certain extent, and help to reduce the asymmetric degree of credit in the credit market and reduce the market friction. On the other hand, Chinese traditional culture makes people attach great importance to the establishment and application of human relations in various activities from daily life to enterprise management. Human feelings, face and relations have become an important capital for people to obtain scarce resources. The effect of association on the financing constraints of private enterprises is studied. The results show that the bank personnel association can significantly alleviate the financing constraints of the private enterprises, and the political connections have similar effects. The two related ways have the substitution effect. In terms of funds, all of them are significantly higher than those with no bank Personnel Association, but there are no significant differences in long-term bank borrowing.
Compared with the informal institution of bank Personnel Association, the bank equity connection is completely a kind of market-based association behavior. With the continuous reform of the domestic banks, the internal governance and the external law and regulations system are constantly perfected, and the formal system will continue to play more role. The transaction behavior between the enterprise and the silver line will be mainly based on the market. Then, the article then discusses the bank equity connection. At the present stage, our country only allows the enterprises to participate in the share bank, so the impact of this connection mode on the financing constraints of the private enterprises is analyzed and evaluated.
This paper first constructs a theoretical framework, and discusses the influence of the enterprise participating banks on the financing cost and the factor input preference of the enterprise. The results show that the stock of the banks, whether or not it can affect the bank's credit decision, has the same effect on the capital demand of the enterprise. Under any combination of capital and labor price, the enterprises holding bank shares will use more capital to produce and prefer capital intensive production. Then take the listed private enterprises as an example, the empirical test on the effect of bank equity Association on the financing constraints of private enterprises is tested. The results confirm the private enterprises. After the share bank, the private enterprises have significantly increased the overall debt level, the bank loan, the bank loan term structure significantly shortened, and the financial risk increased, but not significant. In addition, because the domestic banking industry is a monopoly industry, there is a lot of existence. Thick monopoly profits, diversified operation and sharing the monopoly profits of banks are also considered as one of the private banks' participation in banks at this stage.
Although the domestic commercial bank law prohibits banks from holding non financial enterprise shares, the article theoretically discusses the bank ownership form of holding corporate equity in the bank. As a result, the bank shareholding enterprises help private enterprises to obtain loans directly and indirectly. The direct influence is to enhance the capital of the enterprise by holding the stock. At the same time, the increase of the bank's capital input is the same. At the same time, the increase of the bank's income after the success of the enterprise project makes up for the cost of the supervision and the incentive mechanism of the bank. The indirect effect is that the bank shares have reduced the information asymmetry with the private enterprises and save the silver. The cost of supervision has indirectly increased the possibility of obtaining credit for private enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南開大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.4

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