本文選題：資本市場(chǎng) + 公司治理　； 參考：《南開大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：全球經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化、國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)軌和新興市場(chǎng)并存背景下,中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)在我國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革中具有重要的戰(zhàn)略地位和意義。但近幾年資本市場(chǎng)的大幅波動(dòng)和持續(xù)低迷嚴(yán)重挫傷了廣大投資者的信心和投資積極性。究其原因,業(yè)界分析多數(shù)歸咎于國(guó)內(nèi)、國(guó)際的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境和政策,而作為資本市場(chǎng)微觀基礎(chǔ)的公司治理卻經(jīng)常被忽視。基于我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)資源配置效率低、上市公司與外部投資者信息嚴(yán)重不對(duì)稱和我國(guó)上市公司整體治理水平不高的現(xiàn)狀,本文旨在從獨(dú)立第三方和監(jiān)管者的視角,探討和驗(yàn)證資本市場(chǎng)中是否存在一種公司治理信息的傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制,在驗(yàn)證這種機(jī)制存在性與穩(wěn)定性的基礎(chǔ)上,從機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)的角度提出對(duì)資本市場(chǎng)中現(xiàn)有公司治理信息第三方顯示機(jī)制的設(shè)計(jì)和優(yōu)化思路。理論分析發(fā)現(xiàn),該機(jī)制可實(shí)現(xiàn)公司治理信息在上市公司與投資者之間的有效傳遞,在降低信息不對(duì)稱程度和促進(jìn)上市公司整體治理水平提高的同時(shí),有助于提高資本市場(chǎng)的有效性。為此,本文主要進(jìn)行了以下五方面的研究： 首先,假設(shè)資本市場(chǎng)中存在公司治理信號(hào)機(jī)制,并將其界定為公司治理自發(fā)傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制和第三方顯示機(jī)制兩種。分析發(fā)現(xiàn),公司治理的自發(fā)傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制是資本市場(chǎng)中自然存在的信息傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制,它主要通過(guò)投資者異質(zhì)信念這一中介變量實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)股票超額收益和投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響,但在抗干擾性、可控性和自我實(shí)施性等方面存在明顯不足。為解決這一機(jī)制存在的不足,我們提出構(gòu)建公司治理股價(jià)指數(shù)這一公司治理信息第三方顯示機(jī)制的設(shè)想,即運(yùn)用公司治理專業(yè)評(píng)價(jià)機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)上市公司治理水平的評(píng)價(jià)結(jié)果作為主要選股依據(jù),根據(jù)國(guó)際慣例和指數(shù)設(shè)計(jì)規(guī)則,編制和公開發(fā)布公司治理股價(jià)指數(shù),以實(shí)現(xiàn)公司治理信息的在資本市場(chǎng)中的有效傳遞。 其次,基于上市公司與廣大投資者之間的信息不對(duì)稱特征,我們對(duì)兩種公司治理信號(hào)機(jī)制構(gòu)建了動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,通過(guò)模型求解和機(jī)制有效性分析發(fā)現(xiàn)：公司治理自發(fā)傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制不滿足博弈主體的參與約束和激勵(lì)相容,不具有信息傳遞的有效性,無(wú)助于促進(jìn)上市公司整體治理水平和資本市場(chǎng)有效性的提高；公司治理第三方顯示機(jī)制能夠滿足有效機(jī)制的條件,能激勵(lì)和約束上市公司主動(dòng)提高治理水平和真實(shí)披露信息,有助于降低市場(chǎng)中信息的不對(duì)稱程度和促進(jìn)市場(chǎng)中上市公司整體治理水平的提高,從而有利于促進(jìn)資本市場(chǎng)有效性的提高。 第三,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了資本市場(chǎng)中公司治理自發(fā)傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制的存在性與穩(wěn)定性。借鑒投資者異質(zhì)信念理論,我們將其界定為公司治理信息通過(guò)投資者異質(zhì)信念這一中介變量影響股票超額收益和投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制。運(yùn)用中國(guó)滬深兩市A股上市公司7年(2004-2010)的數(shù)據(jù),實(shí)證分析發(fā)現(xiàn)：我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)中存在公司治理的自發(fā)傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制,但這種傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制是非常不穩(wěn)定和不可控的,更不具有自我實(shí)施功能。 第四,分析驗(yàn)證了資本市場(chǎng)中現(xiàn)有公司治理第三方信息顯示機(jī)制的不足。通過(guò)對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)現(xiàn)有的5種公司治理股價(jià)指數(shù)分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)它們?cè)诠局卫硇畔鬟f方面存在諸多不足,在此基礎(chǔ)上,采用上證公司治理股價(jià)指數(shù)3年的成分股數(shù)據(jù),實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了這一第三方顯示機(jī)制對(duì)公司治理信息傳遞的有效性,結(jié)果顯示,現(xiàn)有公司治理股價(jià)指數(shù)無(wú)法在資本市場(chǎng)中形成有效的公司治理傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制。 第五,公司治理第三方顯示機(jī)制的設(shè)計(jì)優(yōu)化。基于公司治理自發(fā)傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制和現(xiàn)有第三方顯示機(jī)制的不足,我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)迫切需要一個(gè)有效的公司治理第三方顯示機(jī)制,即重新編制和發(fā)布一個(gè)公司治理股價(jià)指數(shù)。為此,我們根據(jù)國(guó)際慣例和一般股價(jià)指數(shù)設(shè)計(jì)原則,通過(guò)選用國(guó)內(nèi)獨(dú)立第三方、權(quán)威公司治理評(píng)價(jià)機(jī)構(gòu)的評(píng)價(jià)結(jié)果作為主要選股依據(jù),對(duì)公司治理股價(jià)指數(shù)的設(shè)計(jì)框架和方案進(jìn)行了優(yōu)化。分析發(fā)現(xiàn),通過(guò)對(duì)公司治理治理評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)的動(dòng)態(tài)調(diào)整和指數(shù)間特征值的比較分析,可對(duì)選股依據(jù)和成分股數(shù)量進(jìn)行控制,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)這一機(jī)制的控制。從優(yōu)化后指數(shù)歷史數(shù)據(jù)的市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)來(lái)看,優(yōu)于大盤指數(shù)和現(xiàn)有公司治理股價(jià)指數(shù),非常適合在我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)中形成有效的公司治理信息傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制。 根據(jù)本文的研究結(jié)論,我們提出和設(shè)計(jì)優(yōu)化的公司治理第三方顯示機(jī)制,在豐富公司治理應(yīng)用研究的同時(shí),有助于引導(dǎo)廣大投資者樹立理性投資和價(jià)值投資理念,相對(duì)于加強(qiáng)政府監(jiān)管和懲處違法、違規(guī)行為力度等措施,它是資本市場(chǎng)中信息傳遞缺陷的有益補(bǔ)充,有利于創(chuàng)造一個(gè)有效、穩(wěn)定的資本市場(chǎng),讓投資者把資金投向具有更高效率的企業(yè),這對(duì)促進(jìn)實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)具有重要意義。同時(shí),本文的研究結(jié)論可為管理層、市場(chǎng)組織者提供理論借鑒和決策啟示。
[Abstract]:On the basis of analyzing the existence and stability of capital market in China , this paper aims to explore and verify the existence of a company governance information third - party display mechanism from the perspective of independent third parties and regulators .

Firstly , it is assumed that the company governance signal mechanism exists in the capital market , and it is defined as two types of corporate governance spontaneous conduction mechanism and third party display mechanism . It is found that the spontaneous conduction mechanism of corporate governance is the information transmission mechanism in capital market .

Secondly , based on the asymmetric information between listed companies and investors , we constructed a dynamic game model for two corporate governance signal mechanisms , and found that the self - conduction mechanism of corporate governance does not satisfy the participation and motivation of the game principal , and does not have the validity of information transmission , and does not help to promote the overall governance level of listed companies and the improvement of capital market effectiveness ;
The third - party display mechanism of corporate governance can meet the conditions of effective mechanism , can stimulate and restrain listed companies to actively improve the governance level and real disclosure information , help reduce the asymmetry of information in the market and promote the improvement of the overall governance level of listed companies in the market , thus contributing to the improvement of the effectiveness of capital market .

Third , we empirically test the existence and stability of corporate governance spontaneous conduction mechanism in capital market . Based on the theory of investor ' s heterogeneous belief , we define it as the transmission mechanism of corporate governance information through investors ' foreign belief .

Fourthly , the deficiency of the third party information display mechanism in the capital market is verified and verified . Based on the analysis of the stock price index of the existing five companies in China , it is found that there are many deficiencies in the transfer of corporate governance information . On the basis of this , the validity of the third party display mechanism on the transfer of corporate governance information is verified empirically . The results show that the existing corporate governance index cannot form effective corporate governance conduction mechanism in the capital market .

Fifth , the company manages third - party display mechanism design optimization . Based on the lack of corporate governance spontaneous conduction mechanism and existing third - party display mechanism , China ' s capital market urgently needs an effective third - party display mechanism for corporate governance , which is to reformulate and publish a company ' s governance index .

According to the research conclusion of this paper , we propose and design the optimized third - party display mechanism of the company , while enriching the application of corporate governance , it is helpful to guide the general investors to set up rational investment and value investment idea , which is beneficial to strengthen the government supervision and punishment and punish the violation . It is beneficial to create an effective and stable capital market . It is beneficial to create an effective and stable capital market .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：南開大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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