本文選題：信用風險 + 產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)　； 參考：《華南理工大學》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著美國2007年金融危機的傳播和蔓延，信用風險越來越受到學術(shù)界的關(guān)注。信用交易的產(chǎn)生與信用制度的建立加速了市場經(jīng)濟下的商品流動，促使了多種金融工具的誕生和發(fā)展。企業(yè)作為現(xiàn)代市場經(jīng)濟的重要組成部分，是信用最主要的載體之一，與各個市場主體存在多個契約關(guān)系。當這些契約不能如期履行時就產(chǎn)生了信用風險。信用風險被定義為交易對手未能履行約定契約中的義務而造成經(jīng)濟損失的風險，有關(guān)文獻也稱之為違約風險。不管是企業(yè)的經(jīng)營活動、籌資活動還是投資活動，契約行為構(gòu)成了這些經(jīng)濟活動的主要內(nèi)容。所以將信用風險由金融領(lǐng)域拓展開到企業(yè)各個契約活動中非常必要。 影響企業(yè)信用風險的因素有很多，如企業(yè)經(jīng)營業(yè)績、盈利能力以及宏觀經(jīng)濟的影響等都會對企業(yè)信用風險產(chǎn)生不同程度的影響。對企業(yè)信用風險問題的研究也越來越受到學術(shù)界和實務界的關(guān)注。然而，目前學術(shù)界大多圍繞信用風險度量方法適用性、合理性進行相關(guān)研究，實證研究的成就相對較少，尤其是考慮企業(yè)會計監(jiān)督和產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)等方面影響。在企業(yè)不同產(chǎn)權(quán)背景下，提高會計監(jiān)督效用能否為企業(yè)降低信用風險水平提供一定的幫助成為我們目前關(guān)注的問題。同時，在我國獨特的轉(zhuǎn)型經(jīng)濟制度背景下，政府在社會經(jīng)濟運行中發(fā)揮的作用非常顯著，國有與民營企業(yè)的經(jīng)營活動受到政府的影響程度不同，兩類企業(yè)受到會計監(jiān)管的程度也因此有差異�；谶@些因素，本文將外部會計監(jiān)督效用與產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)結(jié)合起來，綜合考察兩者對企業(yè)信用風險的影響。 本文利用中國證券市場1211家上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)，研究不同所有制性質(zhì)的公司信用風險以及企業(yè)會計監(jiān)督程度對信用風險的影響。具體而言，主要針對以下三個問題進行回答：（1）外部會計監(jiān)督效果對企業(yè)信用風險有沒有影響？（2）國有企業(yè)和民營企業(yè)的信用風險水平是否有差別？（3）對國有與民營企業(yè)兩類產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)不同的企業(yè)，會計監(jiān)督對不同企業(yè)信用風險的影響是否存在顯著差異？換言之，會計監(jiān)督的改善對哪類企業(yè)的信用風險改善作用更大？若能解決以上問題，既能豐富國內(nèi)外學術(shù)學者對信用風險問題研究的成果，又能幫助銀行和其他債權(quán)人降低發(fā)放貸款的違約風險，降低違約帶來的成本和損失。 最終實證結(jié)果顯示，，會計監(jiān)督水平與企業(yè)信用風險水平成負相關(guān)；與民營企業(yè)相比，國有企業(yè)具有更高的信用風險水平；與國有企業(yè)相比，會計監(jiān)督對民營企業(yè)信用風險的影響程度更明顯，均與假設(shè)一致。論文最后給上市公司提出了一些建議，認為完善上市企業(yè)的會計治理結(jié)構(gòu)、加強第三方的監(jiān)督力度有利于降低企業(yè)的信用風險水平。企業(yè)應該建立預警機制，降低信用風險帶來的成本和損失。
[Abstract]:With the spread and spread of American financial crisis in 2007, credit risk has been paid more and more attention by academic circles. The emergence of credit transaction and the establishment of credit system accelerate the flow of goods under the market economy and promote the birth and development of various financial instruments. As an important part of modern market economy, enterprise is one of the most important carriers of credit. Credit risks arise when these contracts are not fulfilled as scheduled. Credit risk is defined as the risk of economic loss caused by the failure of counterparty to fulfill the obligations in the contract, which is also called default risk. Whether it is the business activity, the financing activity or the investment activity, the contract behavior constitutes the main content of these economic activities. Therefore, it is necessary to expand the credit risk from the financial field to the various contract activities of enterprises. There are many factors that affect the enterprise credit risk, such as the business performance, the profit ability and the macroeconomic influence, all of which will affect the enterprise credit risk to different degrees. The research on enterprise credit risk has been paid more and more attention by academic and practical circles. However, at present, the academic circles mostly focus on the applicability and rationality of credit risk measurement, and the achievement of empirical research is relatively few, especially considering the influence of enterprise accounting supervision and property structure. Under the background of different property rights, whether we can improve the effectiveness of accounting supervision to help enterprises reduce the level of credit risk has become a problem that we pay attention to at present. At the same time, under the background of our country's unique transition economy system, the government plays a very significant role in the social and economic operation, and the operating activities of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises are affected by different degrees of government. The degree of accounting supervision of the two types of enterprises is therefore different. Based on these factors, this paper combines the utility of external accounting supervision with the nature of property rights, and comprehensively examines the impact of the two on the credit risk of enterprises. Based on the data of 1211 listed companies in China's securities market, this paper studies the credit risk of companies with different ownership and the influence of the degree of accounting supervision on the credit risk. Specifically, Main answer to the following three questions: 1) does the effect of external accounting supervision have an impact on the credit risk of enterprises? (2) is there a difference in the level of credit risk between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises? 3) there are two types of property rights for state-owned and private enterprises Enterprises of different natures, Is there a significant difference in the impact of accounting supervision on the credit risk of different enterprises? In other words, the improvement of accounting supervision plays a more important role in improving the credit risk of which kind of enterprises? If the above problems can be solved, it can not only enrich the research achievements of scholars at home and abroad on credit risk, but also help banks and other creditors reduce the default risk and reduce the cost and loss caused by default. The final empirical results show that the level of accounting supervision is negatively correlated with the level of enterprise credit risk; compared with private enterprises, state-owned enterprises have a higher level of credit risk; compared with state-owned enterprises, The influence of accounting supervision on the credit risk of private enterprises is more obvious and consistent with the hypothesis. At the end of the paper, some suggestions are put forward to the listed companies, that perfecting the accounting governance structure of the listed enterprises and strengthening the supervision of the third parties are conducive to reducing the credit risk level of the enterprises. Enterprises should establish early warning mechanism to reduce the cost and loss of credit risk.
【學位授予單位】：華南理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F271

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