發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-30 18:34

  本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板 + 大股東與高管　； 參考：《遼寧大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：創(chuàng)業(yè)板大股東與高管限售股解禁以來，遭受輪番減持，“三高”發(fā)行是其重要原因；但創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)不完善、業(yè)績(jī)不穩(wěn)定、部分公司高成長(zhǎng)性名不副實(shí)等也是減持的重要原因。創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)大股東與高管等內(nèi)部人減持的動(dòng)機(jī)與影響因素、減持過程中是否利用內(nèi)部人的信息優(yōu)勢(shì)選擇更佳的交易時(shí)機(jī)進(jìn)行減持，，以及大規(guī)模減持所造成的市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)等問題一直是理論與投資實(shí)踐界關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。為此，本文對(duì)上述減持表現(xiàn)、動(dòng)機(jī)、時(shí)機(jī)與市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)四個(gè)方面的問題進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)、深入的研究。 在創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)上減持的各類高管與法人股東中，由于其在公司治理中所處的位置、持股份額和減持力度等諸多方面存在的差異，減持的市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)也不盡相同。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管作為重要的內(nèi)部人，高管由于其持股比例、職務(wù)與相關(guān)人員的減持不同，其減持過程、對(duì)市場(chǎng)的沖擊也不盡相同；而對(duì)于創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)上的法人類大股東（如風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資、券商直投類的私募股權(quán)基金和產(chǎn)業(yè)資本），其持股份額雖不及實(shí)際控制人，但由于其減持退出的意愿較強(qiáng)，減持力度較大，因而對(duì)市場(chǎng)也有重要的沖擊。針對(duì)不同類型的高管和大股東，本文第三章從多角度剖析了高管相關(guān)減持的狀況。 大股東與高管減持具有多重動(dòng)機(jī)。文獻(xiàn)研究表明影響大股東與高管減持存在五大理論假說，即：控制權(quán)、宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)、市場(chǎng)趨勢(shì)、估價(jià)估值與財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效。根據(jù)理論假說，本文第四章提出了創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司大股東與高管減持動(dòng)機(jī)實(shí)證分析的研究假設(shè)，并在此基礎(chǔ)上構(gòu)建了一個(gè)計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)分析模型，模型以減持股份占自身持股比例作為被解釋變量，用公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)、企業(yè)的估值水平、企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)、市場(chǎng)行情、董事會(huì)治理等一系列變量對(duì)其進(jìn)行擬合，模型估計(jì)的結(jié)果較好的驗(yàn)證了所提出的研究假設(shè)。為了確保本文構(gòu)建的計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)模型的穩(wěn)定性，論文分別對(duì)兩個(gè)解釋變量進(jìn)行了更換替代檢驗(yàn)，結(jié)果證明模型具有較好的穩(wěn)定性。 內(nèi)部人信息優(yōu)勢(shì)與創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)信息披露及減持之間存在重要關(guān)系。文獻(xiàn)研究表明，大股東與高管等內(nèi)部人具有內(nèi)幕信息和價(jià)值判斷兩方面的信息優(yōu)勢(shì)。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市規(guī)則對(duì)信息披露與減持等有較為明確的規(guī)定，為了更清楚的了解限售股解禁后減持交易發(fā)生的時(shí)間，論文對(duì)限售股份解禁日期與減持日期進(jìn)行了比較，發(fā)現(xiàn)高管與大股東具有不同的減持特征。通過總結(jié)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司信息披露問題及內(nèi)部人違規(guī)行為發(fā)現(xiàn)，存在高管層或其配偶在敏感期買賣股票、高管參與新股發(fā)現(xiàn)等一系列問題。為深入研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司大股東與高管是否存在信息操縱，進(jìn)而選擇減持時(shí)機(jī)的問題，論文構(gòu)建了一個(gè)基于logistic的計(jì)量分析模型，該模型主要用于檢驗(yàn)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)的大股東與高管是否存在著在減持前發(fā)布利好消息或在減持交易后披露利空消息的問題。實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示，他們減持前后的異常收益滿足倒V型，內(nèi)部人減持獲得了較高的異常收益，具有精準(zhǔn)的減持時(shí)機(jī)把握能力。最后，為了深入研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)大股東與高管是否存在利用盈余管理策略進(jìn)行減持時(shí)機(jī)選擇問題，論文構(gòu)建了一組基于Jones模型的計(jì)量分析模型，模型估計(jì)結(jié)果顯示，上市前一年創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的可操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)較高，存在顯著的正向盈余管理行為，在限售股解禁減持較多年份的前一年，盈余管理程度大幅上升，之后的年份盈余管理程度明顯下降。由此可見，正向的盈余管理也是大股東減持能夠獲得較高超常收益的原因。 創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)大股東與高管的解禁與減持形成了廣泛而深遠(yuǎn)的市場(chǎng)影響。但需要注意的是限售股的解禁與減持雖然是一個(gè)整體，但卻是兩個(gè)不同的過程。限售股只有解禁才可減持，但解禁并不一定馬上減持。論文第六章綜合考慮限售股解禁和減持的市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)，并分別運(yùn)用事件研究法進(jìn)行分析。一方面，在限售股解禁的市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)研究過程中，論文系統(tǒng)梳理了限售股解禁相關(guān)規(guī)定，并分析了限售股解禁的總體市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)；為深入研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司原始股東限售股解禁的市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)，本部分運(yùn)用事件研究法計(jì)算了原始股東解禁前后平均異常收益率和平均累積異常收益率的變化情況，發(fā)現(xiàn)解禁事件對(duì)上述指標(biāo)有明顯的市場(chǎng)沖擊效應(yīng)。另一方面，也對(duì)限售股減持市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)進(jìn)行了六個(gè)層面的深入分析，具體包括：總體減持、不同股東減持、不同規(guī)模減持、不同業(yè)績(jī)公司的減持、不同估值水平公司的減持與不同成長(zhǎng)能力公司的減持。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)上述不同側(cè)面，減持的市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)均有所不同。
[Abstract]:Since the large shareholders of the GEM and the high - tube restricted - sale unit have been released , the issuance of " three high " is the important reason .
However , the corporate governance structure of the GEM is not perfect , the performance is unstable , some of the company ' s high - growing reputation and so on are also the important reasons for the reduction . Whether to use the information advantage of the inner person to choose the better trading opportunity and the market effect caused by the large - scale reduction are always the focus of the theory and investment practice . In this paper , the thesis systematically and deeply researches the above - mentioned problems of the reduction performance , motivation , opportunity and market effect .

Among all kinds of executive and legal person shareholders reduced in the GEM market , the market effect is different because of the differences in the position , the share of the shares held by the company in the corporate governance , the holding force and so on .
For the big shareholders of the law in the GEM market ( such as venture capital , private - equity funds and industrial capital of securities firm ' s direct investment ) , the shareholding fraction is less than that of the actual controller , but because of its strong willingness to withdraw , it has an important impact on the market . In view of the different types of executive and large shareholders , the third chapter analyzes the state of the high - tube related reduction from the multi - angle .

On the basis of the theory hypothesis , the paper puts forward the research hypothesis of the empirical analysis of the large shareholder and the executive incentive mechanism of the GEM listed company , and then constructs a measurement economic analysis model . The model is based on the theory hypothesis . The paper proposes the research hypothesis of the model based on the theory hypothesis . In order to ensure the stability of the measurement economic model , the paper also replaces the two explanatory variables and verifies the result .

The paper constructs a quantitative analysis model based on Jones model .

There are broad and far - reaching market effects on the restraining and reducing of the big shareholders and executives in the GEM market . However , it is important to note that the restraining and reducing of the limited - selling stocks is a whole , but it is two different processes . However , it is not necessary to reduce them immediately . The sixth chapter of the paper comprehensively considers the market effect of the limited - sale unit and applies the event research method . On the one hand , in the research of the market effect of the restricted - sale unit , the paper systematizes the relevant regulations of the restriction of the restricted - sale unit , and analyzes the general market reaction of the restriction of the restricted - sale unit ;
In order to study the market effect of the stock market effect of the original shareholders of the GEM listed company , this part uses the event research method to calculate the average abnormal rate of return and the average cumulative abnormal return rate before and after the original shareholder , and finds out that there is a clear market impact effect on the above - mentioned indexes .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F224;F275;F832.51

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條

1 周焯華;樊家秀;;創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司大股東減持內(nèi)幕交易案例研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)月刊;2014年18期

2 徐昭;;上市公司內(nèi)部人減持行為的內(nèi)在機(jī)制綜述[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)理論與經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2014年03期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 張?jiān)圃?股東大量減持與創(chuàng)業(yè)板牛市并存現(xiàn)象研究[D];廈門大學(xué);2014年

2 趙冠飛;會(huì)計(jì)信息透明度對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管減持信息優(yōu)勢(shì)的影響研究[D];安徽大學(xué);2014年

本文編號(hào)：1825697