基于實(shí)物期權(quán)的PPP項(xiàng)目政府最低產(chǎn)品需求量擔(dān)保與收益限制水平?jīng)Q策研究
本文選題:PPP項(xiàng)目 + 政府最低擔(dān)保水平; 參考:《西南交通大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文
【摘要】:公私合作(Public-Private-Partnership, PPP)即公私合營(yíng)的投資合作模式,即政府和私營(yíng)投資方在某一項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行合作(一般是基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目)。由于存在多方利益體的參與,那么如何對(duì)利益進(jìn)行合理的劃分是至關(guān)重要的。而政府最低擔(dān)保水平和限制水平是PPP項(xiàng)目中利益劃分最重要的參數(shù)。 在PPP項(xiàng)目中,因?yàn)槠湮磥?lái)購(gòu)買(mǎi)量不確定性的影響,其收益的現(xiàn)金流是有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的。因此,除非政府提供相應(yīng)的擔(dān)保措施,例如政府擔(dān)保最低購(gòu)買(mǎi)量,否則私人投資者是不愿意投資這樣高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的項(xiàng)目的。一般來(lái)說(shuō),利用NPV方法求解PPP項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)值具有局限性,很難準(zhǔn)確估計(jì)出項(xiàng)目的真實(shí)價(jià)值,并且政府的擔(dān)保和限制水平的確定通常也是靠決策者的經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)確定的,并沒(méi)有一個(gè)行之有效的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。上述原因會(huì)導(dǎo)致政府的擔(dān)保和限制水平具有比較強(qiáng)烈的主觀性,這對(duì)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的合理分配是不利的,所以建立政府最低擔(dān)保水平模型和收益限制上限模型,是有必要的。本文主要做了以下研究: 首先,系統(tǒng)總結(jié)現(xiàn)階段關(guān)于政府最低擔(dān)保水平和收益上限水平的國(guó)內(nèi)外的研究成果,分析PPP項(xiàng)目政府最低擔(dān)保水平及限制水平的影響因子。識(shí)別出PPP項(xiàng)目中存在的各類風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和與之對(duì)應(yīng)的實(shí)物期權(quán)種類。在此基礎(chǔ)上,建立在實(shí)物期權(quán)基礎(chǔ)上的政府最低擔(dān)保水平模型及收益上限水平模型。其次,在結(jié)合案例的基礎(chǔ)上,通過(guò)構(gòu)建了與案例中所存在的實(shí)物期權(quán)種類相對(duì)應(yīng)的政府最低擔(dān)保水平模型和收益上限水平模型,并指出傳統(tǒng)NPV法在估計(jì)項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)值上的不足,并說(shuō)明實(shí)物期權(quán)方法估計(jì)項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)值上的優(yōu)越性。最后,根據(jù)案例中所給出的數(shù)據(jù),利用蒙特卡洛模擬解算出政府最低擔(dān)保水平和收益上限水平。 將實(shí)物期權(quán)運(yùn)用到PPP項(xiàng)目政府最低擔(dān)保水平及限制水平的確定,此類研究在國(guó)內(nèi)外都比較少,本文通過(guò)識(shí)別出PPP項(xiàng)目中存在的各類風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和與之對(duì)應(yīng)的實(shí)物期權(quán)種類,建立在實(shí)物期權(quán)基礎(chǔ)上的PPP項(xiàng)目最低擔(dān)保及限制水平?jīng)Q策模型,希望通過(guò)本文的研究,能為PPP基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施行業(yè)的政府最低擔(dān)保水平和收益上限水平?jīng)Q策提供相關(guān)理論依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) is the investment cooperation mode of public-private partnership, in which the government and private investors cooperate in a certain project (usually infrastructure project). Because of the participation of multi-stakeholders, it is very important to divide the interests reasonably. The minimum guarantee level and limit level of government is the most important parameter of interest division in PPP project. In a PPP project, the cash flow of its earnings is risky because of the uncertainty of its future purchase volume. So private investors are reluctant to invest in such risky projects unless the government provides guarantees such as guaranteed minimum purchases. Generally speaking, using NPV method to solve the value of PPP project has limitations, it is difficult to accurately estimate the true value of the project, and the level of government guarantee and restriction is usually determined by the experience of the decision maker. There is no effective standard. The above reasons will lead to the strong subjectivity of the guarantee and restriction level of the government, which is disadvantageous to the reasonable distribution of the risk, so it is necessary to establish the model of the minimum guarantee level and the upper limit model of the income restriction of the government. This paper mainly does the following research: Firstly, this paper systematically summarizes the research results of the government minimum guarantee level and the income upper limit level at present, and analyzes the influence factors of the government minimum guarantee level and the limit level of the PPP project. Identify all kinds of risks in PPP projects and the corresponding types of real options. On this basis, the government minimum guarantee level model and the income upper limit level model are established on the basis of real options. Secondly, on the basis of the case, this paper constructs the government minimum guarantee level model and the income upper limit level model corresponding to the real option types in the case, and points out the shortcomings of the traditional NPV method in estimating the value of the project. The superiority of real option method in estimating project value is also explained. Finally, according to the data given in the case, the minimum guarantee level and the income upper limit level are calculated by Monte Carlo simulation. It is rare to apply real option to the determination of minimum guarantee level and limit level of government in PPP project. This paper identifies all kinds of risks and types of real options in PPP project. The decision model of minimum guarantee and limit level of PPP project based on real option is established. It is hoped that the research in this paper can provide relevant theoretical basis for the decision of minimum guarantee level and income ceiling level of government in PPP infrastructure industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2013
【分類號(hào)】:F284;F832.48;F542
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