本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板 + 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)��； 參考：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國(guó)的創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)于2009年10月開(kāi)板,截至2013年1月4日,共有355家公司先后在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市交易,成為了繼主板與中小板市場(chǎng)之后中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的另一支生力軍。隨著創(chuàng)業(yè)板快速發(fā)展,創(chuàng)業(yè)板逐漸吸引了媒體與股民的關(guān)注目光。公司在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市之后,隨著時(shí)間的推移,使得公司的股權(quán)集中度逐漸降低,進(jìn)而公司所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)也逐漸分離,這就導(dǎo)致了委托代理問(wèn)題的產(chǎn)生。因此,如何解決委托代理問(wèn)題以及如何合理地評(píng)價(jià)公司績(jī)效就成為了目前亟待解決的問(wèn)題。同時(shí),不斷有學(xué)者開(kāi)始關(guān)注影響創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司績(jī)效的因素有哪些,根據(jù)以往學(xué)者的研究經(jīng)驗(yàn),股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響是學(xué)者們研究的-個(gè)熱點(diǎn)問(wèn)題。 關(guān)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系的研究,國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者對(duì)這一課題的研究大多集中于滬深主板與中小板上市公司,而針對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的研究相對(duì)較少。相對(duì)于主板市場(chǎng)的上市公司,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)上最大的特點(diǎn)就是公司管理層的持股比例很高,第一大股東都是自然人股東或者最終由自然人控股的法人股東,且這些自然人股東大多在公司管理層任職,公司的大股東與公司的管理層利益是一致的。 本文選取深圳證券交易所創(chuàng)業(yè)板2011年底前上市的281家公司作為研究樣本。整篇文章分為兩大部分：文章的前半部分,首先從上市門(mén)檻、監(jiān)管制度、信息披露、交易者條件、投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等方面介紹了創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)與滬深主板和中小板市場(chǎng)的異同點(diǎn),并通過(guò)創(chuàng)業(yè)板與主板以及中小板上市公司之間的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)比,分析出創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特點(diǎn)。接下來(lái)通過(guò)國(guó)內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)綜述,從股權(quán)屬性、股權(quán)集中度與股權(quán)制衡度以及內(nèi)部人持股比例三個(gè)角度分別回顧總結(jié)了過(guò)往文獻(xiàn)。之后,闡述了公司治理理論的理論基礎(chǔ)——兩權(quán)分離理論、委托代理理論與利益相關(guān)者理論,以及股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效關(guān)系的理論基礎(chǔ),從理論上闡釋股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)如何影響公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)而對(duì)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效產(chǎn)生影響。文章的后半部分采用實(shí)證分析的方法,根據(jù)總結(jié)出的創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特點(diǎn)選取股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的替代指標(biāo)作為解釋變量,選取公司績(jī)效的替代變量作為被解釋變量,收集281家上市公司的數(shù)據(jù),通過(guò)構(gòu)建多元線性模型進(jìn)行描述性分析、相關(guān)性分析和回歸分析,分析出創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效存在著怎樣的相關(guān)關(guān)系,并在文章最后根據(jù)前文分析的結(jié)果總結(jié)結(jié)論,同時(shí),針對(duì)結(jié)論提出相關(guān)建議并指出文章存在的不足之處與今后的研究方向。 本文圍繞創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效進(jìn)行研究,主要內(nèi)容包含以下幾個(gè)章節(jié)： 第一部分,緒論。本章主要分析了研究的背景及意義,首先分析我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)與主板以及中小板市場(chǎng)在上市門(mén)檻、監(jiān)管制度、信息披露、交易者條件、投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等方面上的不同,其次通過(guò)創(chuàng)業(yè)板與主板以及中小板上市公司之間的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)比,分析出創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特點(diǎn)。目的是了解創(chuàng)業(yè)板的基本特征,為后面結(jié)論分析以及對(duì)策建議部分提供依據(jù)。接下來(lái)介紹了本文的研究方法、論文結(jié)構(gòu)以及本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)。 第二部分,文獻(xiàn)綜述。本章在對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行綜述的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)研究成果進(jìn)行了比較系統(tǒng)的總結(jié)與論述,為實(shí)證研究部分提供研究基礎(chǔ)和理論依據(jù)。 第三部分,理論基礎(chǔ)與研究假設(shè)。本章首先對(duì)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行總結(jié)分析,在此基礎(chǔ)上與前文創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特點(diǎn)分析相結(jié)合提出了本文的主要研究假設(shè)。 第四部分,研究設(shè)計(jì)。本章確定了變量并進(jìn)行了樣本選擇。 第五部分,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效的實(shí)證研究。本章主要對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。首先通過(guò)對(duì)樣本的描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)結(jié)果分析,找出創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和公司績(jī)效的基本特點(diǎn),然后分別從股權(quán)屬性、股權(quán)集中度與制衡度和內(nèi)部人持股比例等三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行相關(guān)性分析,最后用實(shí)證分析的方法著重考察了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的各個(gè)要素對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司績(jī)效的影響,從而對(duì)假設(shè)進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。 第六部分,研究結(jié)論與政策建議。本章首先依據(jù)前文回歸結(jié)果得出結(jié)論并對(duì)其進(jìn)行分析,然后在前文理論分析、現(xiàn)狀分析和回歸分析的基礎(chǔ)上提出優(yōu)化股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、提高公司績(jī)效的建議,最后指出了本文的研究不足與今后研究的方向。 本文以股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)三個(gè)方面的指標(biāo)分別與托賓Q值進(jìn)行回歸,檢驗(yàn)本文在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效方面的假設(shè),得出了以下結(jié)論：(1)國(guó)有股比例對(duì)公司績(jī)效有著正面影響,但這種影響并不顯著。(2)法人股比例與公司績(jī)效存在正相關(guān)關(guān)系。(3)流通股比例與公司績(jī)效存在負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。(4)機(jī)構(gòu)持股比例與公司績(jī)效高度正相關(guān)。(5)股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)制衡度與公司績(jī)效正相關(guān)。(6)內(nèi)部人持股比例對(duì)公司績(jī)效有著正面影響,但是這種影響并不顯著。(7)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率、公司規(guī)模與公司績(jī)效負(fù)相關(guān)；公司成長(zhǎng)性與公司績(jī)效正相關(guān)。
[Abstract]:China's GEM board in October 2009, as of January 4, 2013, a total of 355 companies listed on the gem has become after the transaction, the motherboard and small plates Market Chinese capital market of another force. With the rapid development of the gem, gem has gradually attracted media attention and investors in companies. After the listing, with the passage of time, the company's ownership concentration decreased gradually, and the ownership and management right is separated, which leads to the principal-agent problems. Therefore, how to solve the principal-agent problem and how to reasonably evaluate the company's performance has become an urgent problem to be solved. At the same time. There have been scholars began to concern about the factors affecting the performance of GEM listed companies which, according to the scholars of the past experience, the influence of ownership structure on corporate performance is A hot issue that the people study.
The research on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance, the research on this topic of domestic scholars mostly focus on the Shanghai and Shenzhen main board and small board listed company on GEM listed companies is relatively small. Compared with the main board listed companies, the shareholding ratio of the largest GEM listed companies in the equity structure is characterized by the company the management is very high, the first major shareholder is a natural person shareholder or by the natural person holding corporate shareholders, and most of these individual shareholders in the company's management office, large shareholders and the company's management benefit is consistent.
This paper selects 281 companies in the Shenzhen stock exchange gem listing by the end of 2011 as the research sample. The whole article is divided into two parts: in the first part, first from the listing threshold, supervision system, information disclosure, traders conditions, investment risk and introduces the GEM market and the Shanghai and Shenzhen Main board and small board market differences comparison between ownership structure, and through the gem and the main board and small board listed companies, analysis of the characteristics of GEM listed company's ownership structure. Then through literature review at home and abroad, from the ownership property, ownership concentration and equity balance degree and the three aspects of insider ownership were reviewed and summarized the past literature. And expounds the theoretical basis of the theory of corporate governance, the separation of the two rights theory, principal-agent theory and stakeholder theory, and ownership structure and corporate performance The relationship between the theoretical basis, the paper illustrates how ownership structure influences the corporate governance structure influence the corporate performance. The second part is the empirical analysis method, according to the characteristics of alternative indicators as explanatory variables of gem summed up the ownership structure of listed companies from the ownership structure, selection of corporate performance as the proxy is the explanatory variables, collected the data of 281 listed companies, were analyzed by constructing multivariate linear model, correlation analysis and regression analysis, analysis of ownership structure and corporate performance of GEM listed companies is related to, and at the same time at the end of this paper, based on the above mentioned analysis conclusion, according to the conclusion and put forward some suggestions and pointed out the inadequacies of this paper and the future research direction.
This paper focuses on the stock ownership structure and corporate performance of the GEM listed companies. The main contents include the following chapters:
The first part is introduction. This chapter mainly analyzes the background and significance of the study, the first analysis of China's GEM market and the main board and the small board listed on the threshold, supervision system, information disclosure, traders conditions, investment risk and so on the different ownership structure, followed by the contrast between the gem and the main board and small board listed the analysis of characteristics of GEM listed companies ownership structure. The aim is to understand the basic characteristics of the gem, provides the basis for the conclusion analysis and some countermeasures and suggestions. Then introduce the research methods of this paper, the structure and innovation of this paper.
The second part is literature review. Based on the review of domestic and foreign literature, this chapter makes a systematic summary and discussion of the research results, and provides the research basis and theoretical basis for the empirical part.
The third part, the theoretical basis and the research hypothesis. Firstly, the related theories of ownership structure are summarized and analyzed. Based on the above analysis, the main research hypotheses of this paper are put forward.
The fourth part, research design. In this chapter, the variables are determined and sample selection is carried out.
The fifth part, the empirical research on ownership structure and corporate performance of GEM listed companies. This chapter focuses on the gem equity structure and corporate performance of listed companies empirically. First, through descriptive statistical analysis results of samples, and find out the basic characteristics of the structure and the performance of the company shares of companies listed on gem, and then separately from the equity property, three aspects of ownership concentration and balance degree and insider shareholding proportion correlation analysis, finally using empirical analysis focused on the effects of various elements of the ownership structure on the performance of Chinese listed companies, and to test the hypothesis.
The sixth part, the research conclusions and policy recommendations. Firstly, on the basis of the above regression results concluded and analyzed, and then the previous theoretical analysis, the basic situation analysis and regression analysis on the optimization of ownership structure, improve the performance of the company, finally points out the deficiencies and future research direction.
In this paper, three aspects of ownership structure index and Tobin's Q value regression, test the hypothesis on ownership structure and corporate performance, draws the following conclusions: (1) the proportion of state-owned shares has a positive impact on corporate performance, but this effect is not significant. (2) there is a positive correlation between the proportion of corporate shares and the performance of the company. (3) there is a negative correlation between the proportion of tradable shares and corporate performance. (4) the proportion of institutional ownership and corporate performance are highly relevant. (5) the ownership concentration, equity balance degree is positively correlated with corporate performance. (6) the internal shareholder has a positive impact on corporate performance, but this the impact is not significant. (7) the asset liability ratio, the company size is negatively correlated with corporate performance; the company growth is positively correlated with corporate performance.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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