本文選題：銀行　切入點：信息披露　出處：《中南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：摘要：市場約束與最低資本金約束,以及外部監(jiān)管一起,共同成為新巴塞爾資本協(xié)議的三大支柱。市場約束的具體表現(xiàn)形式之一就是信息披露,銀行向社會公開披露的信息會反映銀行的經(jīng)營狀況和風(fēng)險程度,投資者可以根據(jù)銀行披露的信息做出不同的投資決策,對于承擔(dān)風(fēng)險較高的銀行,投資者要求的回報也較高,所以均衡狀態(tài)下銀行會傾向于降低承擔(dān)風(fēng)險的水平來降低融資成本。這表明銀行向市場披露信息越多,市場約束效應(yīng)越強。 然而,信息披露最終能充分發(fā)揮市場的約束效應(yīng)存在一定前提條件,即只有當(dāng)投資者對銀行信息披露保持較高的敏感性時才有動力采取市場約束行動。我國政府曾對銀行實施的多次救助顯示,雖然我國尚未建立專門的存款保險制度,但是在我國,政府作為最后擔(dān)保人的“隱性”存款保險制度已經(jīng)存在,這勢必會影響投資者對于銀行風(fēng)險信息的敏感度。我國實行的是一種不完全的隱性存款保險制度,即銀行的類別不同,發(fā)生危機時獲得政府救助的概率也不同。本文從博弈分析的視角探究銀行與投資者之間的行為范式,深刻認(rèn)知在隱性存款保險制度下信息披露與銀行風(fēng)險承擔(dān)行為間的相互作用機理與機制,發(fā)現(xiàn)信息披露程度足夠大時,發(fā)生危機時不一定得到國家全額本金救助的銀行傾向于選擇穩(wěn)健的風(fēng)險承擔(dān)策略；隱性存款保險制度下,銀行傾向于承擔(dān)較大的風(fēng)險且隱性存款保險程度會削弱信息披露對于銀行風(fēng)險承擔(dān)的約束效應(yīng),并且本文通過實證分析證明了相關(guān)結(jié)論,具有重要的理論意義和應(yīng)用價值,并據(jù)此提出政策建議：監(jiān)管部門應(yīng)提高銀行強制信息披露水平,從而達到約束銀行風(fēng)險承擔(dān)的目的；同時為了加強信息披露的作用,政府應(yīng)逐步變革隱性存款保險制度為顯性存款保險制度。這樣不僅可以保障投資者的利益,也讓銀行明確自己的責(zé)任,同時也有利于提高投資者關(guān)注銀行信息披露的積極性,為監(jiān)管部門的政策制訂提供重要的理論基礎(chǔ)與決策支持。
[Abstract]:Absrtact: market constraint, minimum capital constraint and external supervision together become the three pillars of the new Basel Capital Accord.One of the specific forms of market constraints is information disclosure. The information disclosed by banks to the public will reflect the operating conditions and risk levels of banks. Investors can make different investment decisions according to the information disclosed by banks.For banks with higher risks, investors demand higher returns, so in equilibrium banks tend to lower the level of exposure to lower financing costs.This indicates that the more information banks disclose to the market, the stronger the market restraint effect.However, there are some preconditions for information disclosure to give full play to the market constraint effect, that is, only when investors maintain a high sensitivity to bank information disclosure can they take market restraint actions.Our government has carried out many rescues to the bank, although our country has not yet established a special deposit insurance system, but in our country, the "recessive" deposit insurance system, which the government acts as the last guarantor, already exists.This will inevitably affect the sensitivity of investors to bank risk information.What our country implements is an incomplete hidden deposit insurance system, that is, different types of banks and different probability of obtaining government assistance in the event of crisis.This paper explores the behavioral paradigm between banks and investors from the perspective of game analysis, and deeply recognizes the interaction mechanism and mechanism between information disclosure and risk-bearing behavior of banks under the implicit deposit insurance system.When it is found that the degree of information disclosure is large enough, the banks that do not necessarily get the state's full principal rescue in the event of a crisis tend to choose a sound risk-bearing strategy; under the implicit deposit insurance system,Banks tend to bear larger risks and the extent of implicit deposit insurance will weaken the constraint effect of information disclosure on banks' risk-taking, and this paper proves the relevant conclusions through empirical analysis, which has important theoretical significance and application value.On the basis of this, the author puts forward some policy suggestions: the regulatory authorities should improve the level of compulsory information disclosure of banks, so as to achieve the purpose of restraining banks from taking risks; at the same time, in order to strengthen the role of information disclosure,The government should gradually change the implicit deposit insurance system into the explicit deposit insurance system.This can not only protect the interests of investors, but also make banks clear of their own responsibilities, but also help improve the enthusiasm of investors to pay attention to bank information disclosure, and provide an important theoretical basis and decision support for the policy formulation of regulatory authorities.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.1

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本文編號：1721713