本文關(guān)鍵詞： 不完美資本市場(chǎng) 融資約束 企業(yè)投資 投資-現(xiàn)金流敏感性　出處：《山東大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：經(jīng)典的MM理論認(rèn)為在資本市場(chǎng)完美的條件下,企業(yè)投資決策與融資決策無關(guān)。然而現(xiàn)實(shí)的資本市場(chǎng)并不完美,大多存在信息不對(duì)稱、代理問題以及交易成本等缺陷,這些問題導(dǎo)致企業(yè)投資行為與融資行為緊密相連。這為在資本市場(chǎng)不完美條件下,檢驗(yàn)資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展對(duì)企業(yè)投融資行為的影響提供了契機(jī)。 我國資本市場(chǎng)伴隨著市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)改革逐步建立起來,在資源配置中起到越來越重要的作用,并取得了前所未有的發(fā)展。我國資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展是否克服了自身存在的缺陷,緩解了我國企業(yè)融資約束現(xiàn)象,改善了企業(yè)投資行為?這有待于檢驗(yàn)。本文從這個(gè)思路出發(fā),主要研究資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展通過信息不對(duì)稱以及企業(yè)代理問題對(duì)我國企業(yè)投融資行為產(chǎn)生的影響。 本文對(duì)我國資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展過程進(jìn)行了梳理,并從理論角度出發(fā),研究了資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展對(duì)企業(yè)投融資行為的影響機(jī)制。資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展主要通過信貸可得性原理、市場(chǎng)分割原理、交易成本以及信息不對(duì)稱影響企業(yè)的外部融資能力,信息不對(duì)稱對(duì)企業(yè)融資能力影響最持久。而企業(yè)融資約束主要通過債務(wù)積壓原理以及代理成本影響企業(yè)的投資行為,代理成本理論是其中的主要因素。在以上理論分析基礎(chǔ)之上,本文建立了資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展影響企業(yè)融資約束、企業(yè)投資行為的一個(gè)分析框架。 本文采用美國梅肯研究院(Milken Institute)公布的指標(biāo)Capital Access Index衡量我國資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展程度。選擇了2000年至2010年滬深兩市470家制造業(yè)公司平衡面板數(shù)據(jù),采用系統(tǒng)廣義矩(GMM)估計(jì)方法檢資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展對(duì)企業(yè)投融資行為的影響。在按照所有權(quán)進(jìn)行分組的情況下,得出了一些有益的結(jié)論。結(jié)論認(rèn)為：中央國有企業(yè)(央企)和地方國有企業(yè)都表現(xiàn)出了較強(qiáng)的公司代理成本問題,使企業(yè)投資對(duì)內(nèi)部現(xiàn)金流敏感,表現(xiàn)為人為的融資約束。央企的代理問題導(dǎo)致企業(yè)過度投資,地方國有企業(yè)代理問題導(dǎo)致企業(yè)經(jīng)營者為個(gè)人以及領(lǐng)導(dǎo)集團(tuán)謀利。受資本市場(chǎng)投資者不斷成熟以及地方國企經(jīng)營能力不足的影響,資本市場(chǎng)更傾向于為央企而不是地方國企融資,進(jìn)而表現(xiàn)出央企過度投資要比地_方國有企業(yè)嚴(yán)重。經(jīng)過檢驗(yàn),資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展并沒有顯著的緩解國有企業(yè)的代理問題,過度投資行為沒有得到改善。民營企業(yè)投資對(duì)內(nèi)部現(xiàn)金流敏感的主要原因在于民營企業(yè)與外部融資環(huán)境的信息不對(duì)稱,信息不對(duì)稱導(dǎo)致了民營企業(yè)外部融資溢價(jià),產(chǎn)生了融資約束,進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致民營企業(yè)投資不足。經(jīng)檢驗(yàn)資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展通過降低信息不對(duì)稱有效的緩解了民營企業(yè)的融資約束,改善了民營企業(yè)的投資不足。 最后,本文根據(jù)研究結(jié)果給出了相應(yīng)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:The classical MM theory holds that under the perfect condition of capital market, the enterprise investment decision has nothing to do with the financing decision. However, the real capital market is not perfect, and most of the information asymmetry exists. The problems of agency and transaction cost lead to the firm's investment behavior being closely related to the financing behavior, which is under the imperfect condition of the capital market. It provides an opportunity to examine the influence of the development of capital market on the investment and financing behavior of enterprises. With the reform of market economy, China's capital market is gradually established and plays an increasingly important role in the allocation of resources. And has achieved unprecedented development. Has the development of China's capital market overcome its own shortcomings, ease the phenomenon of corporate financing constraints, and improve enterprise investment behavior? From this perspective, this paper mainly studies the influence of capital market development on the investment and financing behavior of Chinese enterprises through asymmetric information and agency problems. This paper combs the development process of our country's capital market, and studies the influence mechanism of the capital market development on the enterprise's investment and financing behavior from the angle of theory. The capital market development is mainly through the principle of credit availability. The principle of market segmentation, transaction cost and information asymmetry affect the external financing ability of enterprises. Asymmetric information has the most lasting effect on the financing ability of enterprises. Financing constraints mainly affect the investment behavior of enterprises through the principle of debt overstocking and agency costs. Agency cost theory is one of the main factors. On the basis of the above theoretical analysis, this paper establishes an analytical framework for the influence of the development of capital market on the financing constraints and investment behavior of enterprises. This paper adopts Milken Institute, Macken Research Institute, USA. Published indicators Capital Access. Index measures the development of China's capital market. It selects the balance panel data of 470 manufacturing companies from 2000 to 2010 in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. The system generalized moment GMMs (GMMM) estimation method is used to examine the influence of the development of capital market on the investment and financing behavior of enterprises. In the case of grouping according to ownership. Some useful conclusions are drawn. It is concluded that both central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have shown a strong corporate agency cost problem, which makes enterprise investment sensitive to internal cash flow. Performance of human financing constraints. The agency problem of central enterprises leads to overinvestment. The agency problem of the local state-owned enterprises leads the business operators to profit for individuals and leading groups. It is influenced by the maturity of the investors in the capital market and the insufficiency of the management ability of the local state-owned enterprises. The capital market is more inclined to finance central enterprises than local state-owned enterprises, which shows that the overinvestment of central enterprises is more serious than that of local state-owned enterprises. The development of capital market has not significantly alleviated the agency problem of state-owned enterprises. Excessive investment behavior has not been improved. The main reason that private enterprises are sensitive to internal cash flow is the asymmetric information between private enterprises and external financing environment. Asymmetric information leads to the external financing premium of private enterprises, resulting in financing constraints. By reducing information asymmetry, the financing constraints of private enterprises are effectively alleviated, and the insufficient investment of private enterprises is improved. Finally, according to the research results, this paper gives the corresponding policy recommendations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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