本文關(guān)鍵詞：市場化程度、公司治理與債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)研究　出處：《北京交通大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：我國上市公司債務(wù)以流動負(fù)債為主,而流動負(fù)債又主要來源于短期銀行借款和商業(yè)信用,債務(wù)期限與資產(chǎn)期限不匹配,普遍存在短期借款長期化的現(xiàn)象。而作為我國公司債務(wù)資金的主要提供者,銀行提供資金的意愿和期限長度很大程度上取決于政企之間的關(guān)系。同時(shí),公司治理水平較低的公司很可能采用較多的短期債務(wù),以抑制管理層的機(jī)會主義行為。因此,本文選取2007至2011年我國A股上市公司為研究樣本,考察了市場化程度、公司綜合治理水平對債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)選擇的影響,并同時(shí)考慮市場化程度對公司治理與債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)的影響。 國內(nèi)外現(xiàn)有關(guān)于公司治理與債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)關(guān)系的研究,都是從公司治理的單一機(jī)制出發(fā),且沒有結(jié)合我國特有的制度背景。事實(shí)上,公司在做出債務(wù)融資決策以及投資者做出相關(guān)投資決策時(shí),考慮的都是整體層面的公司治理水平,而不是考慮某一方面的治理機(jī)制是否發(fā)揮作用。因此,結(jié)合我國的制度背景,研究公司綜合治理水平對債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)選擇的影響具有理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文理論分析認(rèn)為,市場化程度較低的省份,政府干預(yù)程度較高,政企關(guān)聯(lián)現(xiàn)象較嚴(yán)重,而銀行更愿意為這些具有政治背景的公司提供長期債務(wù)資金。而市場化程度較高的省份對借款標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的要求更加嚴(yán)格,公司有著更短的債務(wù)期限；而且較高的投資者保護(hù)水平和發(fā)達(dá)的金融市場,為公司提供了長期權(quán)益資金和其他長期融資方式和種類,從而減少對長期借款的依賴。另一方面,公司治理水平較高時(shí),管理層受到有效監(jiān)督,公司較少需要利用短期債務(wù)來抑制管理層的機(jī)會主義行為,因此選擇的債務(wù)期限可能更長。同時(shí),投資者也更愿意為公司治理水平高的上市公司提供長期的債務(wù)資金。 本文實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)市場化程度越低,公司傾向使用更高的債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)水平。(2)公司綜合治理水平越高,公司傾向使用更高的債務(wù)期限。(3)市場化程度越低,公司治理水平提升債務(wù)期限的效應(yīng)越大。(4)公司股權(quán)集中度較高時(shí)傾向于選用更短的債務(wù)期限來保護(hù)債權(quán)人的利益,而較高的股權(quán)制衡度會減少對短期債務(wù)的使用。本文構(gòu)建了衡量公司內(nèi)部治理水平的綜合變量,研究其與債務(wù)期限的關(guān)系；同時(shí)考慮市場化程度對公司治理與債務(wù)期限之間關(guān)系的影響,豐富了現(xiàn)有的研究視角和研究成果,使得研究結(jié)論更能體現(xiàn)我國的實(shí)際情況。 本文研究公司治理水平與債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系,有助于為完善公司治理機(jī)制優(yōu)化公司債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)提供實(shí)證證據(jù)。而關(guān)于市場化程度與債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)的研究,有利于政策制定者掌握宏觀環(huán)境對公司債務(wù)期限選擇的影響,從而推動債務(wù)融資的規(guī)范化進(jìn)程以及公司外部融資環(huán)境的優(yōu)化。
[Abstract]:The current liabilities of listed companies in China are mainly current liabilities, which are mainly derived from short-term bank loans and commercial credit, and the maturity of debt and the maturity of assets do not match. As the main provider of corporate debt funds in China, the willingness and maturity of banks to provide funds depend to a large extent on the relationship between government and enterprises. Companies with low corporate governance level are likely to use more short-term debt to restrain the opportunistic behavior of management. Therefore, this paper selects China A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2011 as the research sample. The influence of marketization and the level of comprehensive corporate governance on the choice of debt maturity structure is investigated. At the same time, the influence of marketization on corporate governance and debt maturity structure is considered. The existing research on the relationship between corporate governance and debt maturity structure at home and abroad is based on the single mechanism of corporate governance and has not combined with the unique institutional background of China. In fact. When the company makes the debt financing decision and the investor makes the related investment decision, the overall level of corporate governance is considered, not whether the governance mechanism in a certain aspect plays a role. Combined with the institutional background of our country, it is of theoretical and practical significance to study the influence of the level of comprehensive corporate governance on the choice of debt maturity structure. Government intervention is high, government and business linkages are more serious, and banks are more willing to fund long-term debt for these politically connected companies. Provinces with a higher degree of marketization require stricter borrowing standards. Companies have shorter debt maturities; And the high level of investor protection and developed financial markets provide long-term equity funds and other long-term financing methods and types, thus reducing the dependence on long-term borrowing. On the other hand. When the level of corporate governance is high, the management is subject to effective supervision, the company less need to use short-term debt to restrain the opportunistic behavior of management, so the debt period may be longer. At the same time. Investors are also more willing to provide long-term debt funds to listed companies with high corporate governance. The empirical study shows that the lower the degree of marketization, the higher the level of corporate governance. Companies tend to use higher debt maturities.) the lower the degree of marketization. The greater the effect of raising debt maturity in corporate governance level is, the higher the concentration of equity is, the shorter debt maturity is preferred to protect the interests of creditors. Higher equity checks and balances will reduce the use of short-term debt. This paper constructs a comprehensive variable to measure the level of corporate governance and studies its relationship with debt maturity; At the same time, considering the influence of marketization degree on the relationship between corporate governance and debt maturity, it enriches the existing research perspective and research results, and makes the research conclusions more representative of the actual situation in China. This paper studies the correlation between corporate governance level and debt maturity structure. It is helpful to provide empirical evidence for perfecting corporate governance mechanism and optimizing corporate debt maturity structure. And the research on marketization degree and debt maturity structure. It is helpful for policy makers to grasp the influence of macro environment on the choice of corporate debt maturity, thus promoting the standardization of debt financing and the optimization of external financing environment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F271;F832.51

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