本文關鍵詞：正規(guī)金融機構與農(nóng)業(yè)龍頭企業(yè)合作的風險研究　出處：《中國海洋大學》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 正規(guī)金融機構 農(nóng)業(yè)龍頭企業(yè) 合作 風險評價 風險控制

【摘要】：正規(guī)金融機構與農(nóng)業(yè)龍頭企業(yè)的合作,其與一般性的公司貸款不同,資金的真正使用者是農(nóng)戶,因此合作中的風險控制也存在差別。論文的研究旨在評價正規(guī)金融機構與農(nóng)業(yè)龍頭企業(yè)合作的風險狀況,提出適合雙方合作的風險控制措施。 本文以信貸補貼理論、農(nóng)村金融市場理論、不完全競爭市場理論等農(nóng)村金融理論為基礎,以龍頭企業(yè)在合作中發(fā)揮的作用為標準,提出合作可以劃分為統(tǒng)貸統(tǒng)還模式、訂單質押模式以及龍頭企業(yè)擔保模式。其次,提出正規(guī)金融機構通過客戶篩選、信貸額度控制、貸后監(jiān)督,龍頭企業(yè)通過生產(chǎn)技術指導,政府通過合同履行監(jiān)督等措施控制合作風險。 通過分析發(fā)現(xiàn),風險主要來自于農(nóng)戶、農(nóng)業(yè)龍頭企業(yè)、訂單合同以及外部環(huán)境,以此為基礎設立指標：農(nóng)戶層面的信譽狀況、文化水平、生產(chǎn)技術水平、抵押擔保情況,龍頭企業(yè)層面的信譽情況、生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營情況、風險控制情況、抵押擔保情況,訂單合同層面的合同條款、仲裁方式、違約成本、契約的不完備性,外部環(huán)境層面的價格風險、自然風險、政策風險以及風險保障。其后,通過模糊層次分析法得出指標的權重值。 依據(jù)農(nóng)業(yè)龍頭企業(yè)風險控制措施差異最大化的原則,本文選取了山西亨哈山珍公司和遼寧宏達牛業(yè)有限公司與正規(guī)金融機構的合作為例,運用建立的風險評價體系對風險狀況進行評價。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),正規(guī)金融機構在與后者的合作中,風險系數(shù)值僅有0.398,遠遠小于與前者合作的0.722.風險狀況出現(xiàn)明顯差異的原因在于后者采取了一些有效控制信貸風險的手段：宏達公司參與農(nóng)戶調查降低了正規(guī)金融機構信息不對稱的程度；公司要求農(nóng)戶基地集中飼養(yǎng)能夠高效地監(jiān)控農(nóng)戶的行為；公司要求農(nóng)戶提供與貸款價值相符的實物作為反擔保。 本文提出通過構建三道風險控制防線來降低正規(guī)金融機構所面臨的風險：第一道風險控制,農(nóng)戶應當加強自我技術知識水平學習且增強保險意識,農(nóng)業(yè)龍頭企業(yè)要提高生產(chǎn)技術水平并加強對農(nóng)戶的培訓,保險公司應創(chuàng)新農(nóng)業(yè)保險品種加強為農(nóng)業(yè)服務的力度,政府應積極發(fā)揮引導作用；第二道風險控制,由農(nóng)業(yè)龍頭企業(yè)實施,包括建立農(nóng)戶風險評價體系、引入中介組織、加強與農(nóng)戶合作中激勵與約束機制的建立、幫助農(nóng)戶管理自然風險等；第三道風險控制,農(nóng)業(yè)龍頭企業(yè)運用期貨期權等工具控制市場風險,運用風險基金控制擔保風險,保險公司為企業(yè)提供全方位的保險,擔保公司為企業(yè)提供再擔保,政府對正規(guī)金融機構的風險損失給予補償。 本文的創(chuàng)新點主要有兩個：第一,以正規(guī)金融與農(nóng)業(yè)龍頭企業(yè)合作中的風險問題作為選題,關注了農(nóng)村金融產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新過程中的風險問題。第二,通過具體案例分析和比較,發(fā)現(xiàn)正規(guī)金融與農(nóng)業(yè)龍頭企業(yè)合作中,控制龍頭企業(yè)風險的主要手段：公司直接全面參與農(nóng)戶調查,運用基地集中飼養(yǎng)高效監(jiān)控農(nóng)戶,建立實物抵押,借助農(nóng)戶之間的自我篩選機制控制風險。
[Abstract]:The formal financial institutions and agricultural leading enterprises cooperation, and general corporate loans, real users of funds is farmers, so the risk control in the cooperation are different. The thesis aims to cooperate with the leading agricultural enterprises to evaluate the formal financial institutions risk situation, put forward the suitable risk control measures of cooperation between the two sides.
In this paper, the credit subsidy theory, rural financial market theory, imperfect competition theory, rural financial theory, the leading enterprises play a role in the cooperation as the standard, the cooperation can be divided into system credit system also mode orders pledge mode of leading enterprises and guarantee model. Secondly, the formal financial institutions through customer screening, credit control, credit supervision, leading enterprises through production and technical guidance, the government through the contract supervision and other measures to control the risk of cooperation.
The analysis found that the risk is mainly from farmers, agricultural leading enterprises, the contract and the external environment, on the basis of the establishment of index: farmers credit status, cultural level, the level of production technology, collateral, credit level leading enterprises, production and management, risk control, mortgage guarantee, contract terms order, contract level arbitration, the cost of default, the contract is not complete, the level of external environment price risk, natural risk, policy risk and risk protection. Then, through the fuzzy AHP method to get the weights of index value.
According to the difference of agricultural leading enterprise risk control measures of maximum principle, this paper selects the Shanxi hengha mountain company and Liaoning HTC cattle industry Co. Ltd and the formal financial institutions cooperation as an example, using the risk assessment system to evaluate the risk status. The study found that the formal financial institutions in cooperation with the latter, and risk coefficient only 0.398 reasons, 0.722. is far less than the risk status and the cooperation of the obvious difference is that the latter has taken some effective control of credit risk means: Htc CO to participate in the household survey reduces the formal financial institutions, the degree of information asymmetry; the company requires farmers base concentrated feeding can efficiently monitor the behavior of households; the company requires farmers to provide counter guarantee and the value of loans with real actions.
This paper through the construction of three risk control defense to reduce the risk faced by formal financial institutions: the first risk control, farmers should strengthen self knowledge learning and enhance the awareness of insurance, agricultural leading enterprises to improve the level of production technology and to strengthen the training of farmers, insurance companies should strengthen the innovation of agricultural insurance for agricultural services efforts, the government should actively play a guiding role; second risk control, the implementation of the agricultural leading enterprises, including the establishment of farmers' risk evaluation system, the introduction of intermediary organizations, strengthen the establishment of incentive and restraint mechanism and farmers cooperation, help farmers management of natural risks; third risk control, control the market risk using futures and options of agricultural leading enterprises other tools, the use of risk control risk guarantee fund, the insurance company provides a full range of insurance companies, Guarantee Corporation Enterprises provide re guarantee, and the government compensates for the risk loss of regular financial institutions.
There are two main innovations of this paper: first, the risk problem in the formal finance and agricultural leading enterprises in cooperation as a topic, attention to the risk of rural financial product innovation process. In second, through the comparison and analysis of specific cases, found the formal financial and agricultural leading enterprise cooperation, the main means to control the risk of leading enterprises the company directly to fully participate in the household survey, the use of base concentrated feeding and efficient monitoring of farmers, the establishment of physical collateral, between farmers by means of self selection mechanism of risk control.

【學位授予單位】：中國海洋大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F324;F832.43

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