本文選題：企業(yè)控制權(quán)　切入點(diǎn)：控制權(quán)變更　出處：《哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著國(guó)有企業(yè)改革的推進(jìn),民營(yíng)資本的進(jìn)入,具有較大參與公司管理意愿的民營(yíng)股東與掌管著公司控制權(quán)的原國(guó)企高管之間易發(fā)生對(duì)公司控制權(quán)的爭(zhēng)奪。公司控制權(quán)對(duì)公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)、經(jīng)營(yíng)戰(zhàn)略及業(yè)績(jī)等方面具有重大影響。所以,針對(duì)我國(guó)控制權(quán)變更績(jī)效問(wèn)題展開(kāi)研究有著重大的理論意義與實(shí)踐價(jià)值�，F(xiàn)有的與上市公司控制權(quán)變更對(duì)于公司業(yè)績(jī)的影響相關(guān)的研究很多,但大都是采用實(shí)證分析的方法,沒(méi)有對(duì)于治理結(jié)構(gòu)、公司經(jīng)營(yíng)戰(zhàn)略及管理績(jī)效等方面進(jìn)行綜合的分析。因此,有必要實(shí)施更進(jìn)一步的分析與探索,從而有助于厘清對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司的績(jī)效和公司控制權(quán)的關(guān)系,進(jìn)而有針對(duì)性的提出有效解決方案,提高企業(yè)發(fā)展水平,更高效地完善我國(guó)控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)。同時(shí),對(duì)我國(guó)股票市場(chǎng)與上市公司的可持續(xù)發(fā)展有所助益,對(duì)整個(gè)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展形成巨大的推動(dòng)作用。在研究過(guò)程中,運(yùn)用了文獻(xiàn)研究的方法,全面、系統(tǒng)的梳理、歸納分析與研究客體有關(guān)的文獻(xiàn)資料。同時(shí),從整體上梳理國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者所提出的意見(jiàn)與建議;采取案例分析法的方式對(duì)SJ公司的控制權(quán)變動(dòng)對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響分析;運(yùn)用規(guī)范研究方法,以委托代理理論、差別效率、協(xié)同效應(yīng)等為主要理論基礎(chǔ),通過(guò)分析上市公司控制權(quán)變更對(duì)公司的影響,結(jié)合ZP集團(tuán)控股SJ公司后的控制權(quán)之爭(zhēng)的案例,深入分析SJ公司控制權(quán)變更對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響,從理論到實(shí)際案例進(jìn)行研究。最后通過(guò)深入分析SJ公司控制權(quán)變動(dòng)對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響,得出控制權(quán)變更對(duì)企業(yè)的管理績(jī)效產(chǎn)生正面影響,但對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效易產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響的結(jié)論,并認(rèn)為保險(xiǎn)資金對(duì)上市公司的收購(gòu)應(yīng)注重長(zhǎng)期財(cái)務(wù)投資,審慎干預(yù)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)。進(jìn)而得出我國(guó)上市公司應(yīng)不斷加強(qiáng)自身建設(shè),并引導(dǎo)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者進(jìn)行合理的財(cái)務(wù)投資后審慎參與公司治理的啟示。
[Abstract]:With the reform of state-owned enterprises and the entry of private capital, it is easy to compete for corporate control between the private shareholders who have a greater willingness to participate in the management of the company and the former executives of state-owned enterprises who are in charge of the control of the company.Corporate control has a significant impact on corporate governance structure, business strategy and performance.Therefore, it is of great theoretical significance and practical value to study the performance of the change of control rights in China.There are a lot of researches on the influence of the change of control rights on the performance of listed companies, but most of them adopt the method of empirical analysis, and there is no comprehensive analysis on governance structure, company management strategy and management performance and so on.Therefore, it is necessary to carry out further analysis and exploration, so as to help clarify the relationship between the performance and corporate control rights of listed companies in China, and then propose effective solutions to improve the level of enterprise development.Improve the control market of our country more efficiently.At the same time, it is helpful to the sustainable development of the stock market and listed companies in China, and plays an important role in promoting the development of the whole market economy.In the course of the research, the method of literature research is used, comprehensive and systematic combing, and the literature related to the research object is summarized and analyzed.At the same time, from the overall combing of the domestic and foreign scholars put forward the opinions and suggestions; take the method of case analysis of SJ company control change on corporate performance analysis; use of normative research methods, principal-agent theory, differential efficiency,By analyzing the influence of the change of control right of listed company on the company, combined with the case of the dispute of control right after ZP group holding the SJ company, this paper deeply analyzes the influence of the change of control right of SJ company on the performance of the company.From the theory to the actual case study.Finally, through the in-depth analysis of the influence of the change of control rights on the corporate performance, the conclusion is drawn that the change of control rights has a positive impact on the management performance of the enterprise, but it has a negative impact on the financial performance.The purchase of insurance funds for listed companies should pay attention to long-term financial investment and prudently interfere with the business activities of enterprises.Then, it is concluded that our listed companies should constantly strengthen their own construction and guide institutional investors to participate in corporate governance prudently after reasonable financial investment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F426.72;F271;F406.7

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