本文選題：A公司　切入點(diǎn)：股權(quán)激勵(lì)　出處：《北方工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著中國資本市場的發(fā)展,以及企業(yè)擴(kuò)張加速,企業(yè)對專業(yè)管理者的需求越來越多,逐漸出現(xiàn)管理者派駐或雇傭?qū)I(yè)經(jīng)理人,企業(yè)所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)分離。為降低代理成本,防止管理者損害股東利益,許多公司采用股權(quán)激勵(lì)。股權(quán)激勵(lì)經(jīng)過美國等國家優(yōu)秀企業(yè)的實(shí)踐推廣,在全球得以應(yīng)用。我國股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制的引入較晚,在2005年頒布的《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法(試行)》,標(biāo)志著股權(quán)激勵(lì)正式進(jìn)入我國。2016年8月13日實(shí)施的《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法》對我國上市公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)踐發(fā)揮指導(dǎo)意義。本文對股權(quán)激勵(lì)及其相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行闡述,采用對比分析和案例分析相結(jié)合的方法,對A公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施效果從財(cái)務(wù)維度、經(jīng)營維度和競爭維度三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行了分析和評(píng)價(jià)。通過對A公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)前后在盈利、償債、營運(yùn)以及研發(fā)等方面的分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)A公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)后,其經(jīng)營業(yè)績相比之前確有提高。將A公司與行業(yè)平均值橫向?qū)Ρ确治?發(fā)現(xiàn)A公司的經(jīng)營業(yè)績在實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制階段明顯比行業(yè)均值要好。在對比其他實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)醫(yī)藥企業(yè)的經(jīng)營業(yè)績后,發(fā)現(xiàn)A公司在盈利等方面略低于這些企業(yè)的平均值,這表明股權(quán)激勵(lì)對A公司管理層和特定員工的激勵(lì)效果相比這些企業(yè)可能略低。對A公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施效果進(jìn)行分析和評(píng)價(jià)后,發(fā)現(xiàn)盡管在盈利、營運(yùn)、研發(fā)投入和產(chǎn)出等方面取得了一定效果,但其在激勵(lì)對象選擇和業(yè)績考核指標(biāo)方面表現(xiàn)出某種高管福利傾向。針對影響A公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施效果的原因進(jìn)行深入分析,本文認(rèn)為如果A公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案中設(shè)置更長的有效期、將研發(fā)人員納入激勵(lì)對象、合理設(shè)置業(yè)績考核標(biāo)準(zhǔn)等,可能會(huì)取得更為顯著的激勵(lì)效果。
[Abstract]:With the development of Chinese capital market and the acceleration of enterprise expansion, the demand for professional managers is increasing. In order to prevent managers from harming the interests of shareholders, many companies adopt equity incentive, which has been applied in the world through the practice of excellent enterprises in the United States and other countries. In 2005, the "measures on Stock incentive Management of listed companies" (for trial implementation) marked the formal entry of equity incentives into China. The "measures on Stock incentive Management of listed companies", which was implemented on August 13, 2016, stimulated the equity of listed companies in China. Incentive practice plays a guiding role. This paper expounds the equity incentive and its related theory. By using the method of comparative analysis and case analysis, this paper analyzes and evaluates the effect of equity incentive in company A from three aspects: financial dimension, management dimension and competition dimension. Through the analysis of debt service, operation and research and development, it is found that after company A has implemented equity incentive, its operating performance has indeed improved compared with that before. It is found that the operating performance of Company A is obviously better than that of the industry average in the stage of implementing the equity incentive mechanism. After comparing the operating performance of other pharmaceutical enterprises with equity incentive, it is found that Company A is slightly lower than the average of these enterprises in terms of profit, etc. This indicates that the incentive effect of equity incentive to management and specific employees of company A may be slightly lower than that of these enterprises. After analyzing and evaluating the effect of equity incentive implementation in company A. R & D input and output have achieved some results, but they have shown some executive welfare tendency in incentive object selection and performance evaluation index. The reasons that affect the effect of equity incentive implementation in company A are analyzed in depth. This paper holds that if the equity incentive scheme of Company A has a longer period of validity, the R & D staff will be included in the incentive object, and the performance appraisal standard can be set reasonably, which may result in more significant incentive effect.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北方工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F426.72

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