本文選題：退出機(jī)制　切入點(diǎn)：進(jìn)入規(guī)制　出處：《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)動態(tài)》2017年07期

【摘要】：大量雙低企業(yè)的存在是導(dǎo)致某些行業(yè)產(chǎn)能過剩的一個(gè)重要原因。本文基于這類企業(yè)主要參與者的"成本——收益"簡化模型,分析了其"空轉(zhuǎn)"或"不退出"行為發(fā)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)理。本文以我國汽車行業(yè)"雙低企業(yè)"數(shù)據(jù)庫為基礎(chǔ),使用零膨脹負(fù)二項(xiàng)回歸模型的計(jì)量分析發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)經(jīng)營績效的高低不是導(dǎo)致低效企業(yè)空轉(zhuǎn)時(shí)間長短的關(guān)鍵要素,即市場競爭對企業(yè)退出決策沒有實(shí)質(zhì)性影響;(2)在受規(guī)制的汽車行業(yè),地方政府保護(hù)是"雙低企業(yè)"長期存在的體制性誘因;(3)進(jìn)入和退出政策在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)與實(shí)施機(jī)制上的不對稱,延長了企業(yè)的空轉(zhuǎn)時(shí)間。從企業(yè)實(shí)際退出或者失敗角度進(jìn)行的Probit檢驗(yàn)也部分佐證了經(jīng)營績效和產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的相關(guān)性。本文還分析了汽車行業(yè)"特別公示制"這一退出機(jī)制的實(shí)施困境:進(jìn)入規(guī)制導(dǎo)致了對在位者的過度保護(hù),使得低效企業(yè)更易獲得政府"父愛主義"保護(hù)的同時(shí),也面臨著更高的行政性退出壁壘。就供給側(cè)結(jié)構(gòu)性改革中的"去產(chǎn)能"問題而言,只有實(shí)現(xiàn)低效產(chǎn)能企業(yè)的有序退出,才能破除政府直接干預(yù)企業(yè)微觀行為的體制基礎(chǔ),從而使市場在企業(yè)退出決策中發(fā)揮決定性作用。
[Abstract]:The existence of a large number of double-low enterprises is an important cause of overcapacity in some industries. This paper analyzes the economic mechanism of "idling" or "not withdrawing" behavior. This paper is based on the "double low enterprise" database of automobile industry in China. The econometric analysis of zero expansion negative binomial regression model shows that the level of performance is not the key factor leading to the idle time of inefficient enterprises, that is, market competition has no substantial influence on the decision of enterprise exit. The protection of local governments is a long-standing institutional incentive for "double low enterprises" to be asymmetric in terms of standards and implementation mechanisms of entry and exit policies. The Probit test from the point of view of actual exit or failure also partly proves the correlation between business performance and industrial policy. This paper also analyzes the retreat of "special publicity system" in automobile industry. The dilemma of the implementation of the exit mechanism: entry regulation leads to excessive protection of the incumbent, While making inefficient enterprises more easily protected by the government's "fatherhood", they are also facing higher administrative exit barriers. In terms of "deproductivity" in supply-side structural reforms, only an orderly withdrawal of inefficient productive capacity enterprises can be achieved. Only when the government directly interferes with the microcosmic behavior of the enterprise can the system foundation be broken, and the market can play a decisive role in the decision of enterprise exit.
【作者單位】： 復(fù)旦大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目“價(jià)值鏈不對稱嵌入情景下本土轎車企業(yè)優(yōu)化縱向組織結(jié)構(gòu)的戰(zhàn)略研究與應(yīng)用”(71372114) 教育部人文社科一般項(xiàng)目“本土轎車制造企業(yè)自主產(chǎn)品開發(fā)的多案例比較研究”(12YJA630003)的資助
【分類號】：D630;F426.471
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本文編號：1660059