E-M產學合作創(chuàng)新的知識產權權益分配機制研究
發(fā)布時間:2018-02-24 12:31
本文關鍵詞: 產學合作創(chuàng)新 知識產權 權利歸屬 利益分配 機制設計 出處:《電子科技大學》2014年碩士論文 論文類型:學位論文
【摘要】:隨著社會經濟的發(fā)展,持續(xù)的技術創(chuàng)新已經成為企業(yè)尋找和維持其競爭優(yōu)勢的重要來源。通過技術創(chuàng)新,企業(yè)可以實現產品和服務的差異化,降低生產成本并生產出不同的產品來滿足不同消費者的需求。而技術創(chuàng)新也有由原來的應用研究向應用基礎研究和基礎研究延伸的趨勢,其難度越來越大。大學是知識的發(fā)源地,具有知識發(fā)現的優(yōu)勢。企業(yè)和大學合作進行應用研究和應用基礎研究,可以有效彌補企業(yè)缺乏技術研發(fā)能力的不足,在企業(yè)的技術創(chuàng)新中起到了重要作用,已經成為大學服務于社會的重要方式,成為國家創(chuàng)新體系的重要組成部分。產學合作創(chuàng)新的順利開展依賴于產學合作創(chuàng)新成果的合理分配,需要良好的分配機制規(guī)范、激勵雙方的合作。在我國的產學合作創(chuàng)新中,大約有50%的合作由于利益分配不合理而失敗了。研究產學合作創(chuàng)新的技術成果的權益分配機制,對于促進產學合作創(chuàng)新的順利開展有著積極的理論和現實意義。本文應用了博弈論的理論分析和案例分析的方法,對產學合作創(chuàng)新進行研究。具體而言,論文的主要工作如下:(1)歸納了產學合作創(chuàng)新、知識產權權益分配的研究現狀,分析了產學合作創(chuàng)新的階段劃分,即研究開發(fā)階段、商業(yè)化階段;(2)結合博弈論、委托代理理論等理論基礎,根據產學合作創(chuàng)新的過程和階段劃分,分析了產學合作創(chuàng)新中的動態(tài)博弈行為,也就是大學和企業(yè)在產學合作過程中其地位、作用在發(fā)生變化,在合作的不同階段扮演不同的角色;(3)利用委托代理理論和博弈論,構建了產學合作創(chuàng)新的知識產權權益分配的博弈模型,分析和求解了研究開發(fā)、商業(yè)化2個階段的均衡解和最優(yōu)解,得出了研究開發(fā)、商業(yè)化階段的知識產權權利歸屬及應用科技成果的收益分配的理論解;(4)對E大學和M集團的產學合作進行分析,發(fā)現理論求解的研究結論比較符合實際情況,驗證了理論研究結論,同時企業(yè)的實踐也豐富、擴展了理論研究。本文利用博弈論、委托代理理論,對產學合作創(chuàng)新的知識產權權利歸屬和利益分配進行了模型構建、理論求解、案例分析,希望能為產學合作創(chuàng)新的利益分配提供有益的借鑒。
[Abstract]:With the development of social economy, continuous technological innovation has become an important source for enterprises to find and maintain their competitive advantage. Through technological innovation, enterprises can realize the differentiation of products and services. Reducing production costs and producing different products to meet the needs of different consumers, and technological innovation also has a trend from the original applied research to applied basic research and basic research. Universities are the birthplace of knowledge and have the advantages of knowledge discovery. Cooperation between enterprises and universities in applied research and applied basic research can effectively make up for the lack of technological R & D capability of enterprises. It has played an important role in the technological innovation of enterprises and has become an important way for universities to serve society. As an important part of the national innovation system, the smooth development of the cooperation innovation depends on the rational distribution of the achievements of the industry-learning cooperation innovation, which requires a good distribution mechanism to encourage the cooperation between the two sides. About 50% of the cooperation has failed because of the unreasonable distribution of benefits. It has positive theoretical and practical significance for promoting the smooth development of industry-learning cooperative innovation. This paper applies the theoretical analysis of game theory and the method of case analysis to study the innovation of industry-learning cooperation. The main work of this paper is as follows: (1) the paper summarizes the current situation of the research on the innovation of industry-learning cooperation and the distribution of intellectual property rights and interests, and analyzes the division of the stages of the industry-learning cooperative innovation, that is, the stage of research and development, the stage of commercialization, and the game theory. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the dynamic game behavior in the innovation of industry-learning cooperation based on the division of the process and stages, that is, the role of universities and enterprises in the process of industry-learning cooperation is changing. Based on the principal-agent theory and game theory, this paper constructs a game model of intellectual property rights and interests distribution of industry-learning cooperation and innovation, and analyzes and solves the research and development. The equilibrium solution and optimal solution of the two stages of commercialization, and the theoretical analysis of the ownership of intellectual property rights in R & D, and the distribution of income from the application of scientific and technological achievements in the commercial stage. (4) the analysis of the industrial and academic cooperation between E University and M Group. It is found that the conclusion of theoretical solution is more in line with the actual situation, which verifies the conclusion of theoretical research, and at the same time, the practice of enterprises is also rich, expanding the theoretical research. This paper uses game theory, principal-agent theory, This paper sets up a model, theoretical solution and case analysis of intellectual property right ownership and benefit distribution of industrial and academic cooperation innovation, hoping to provide a useful reference for the benefit distribution of industrial and academic cooperation innovation.
【學位授予單位】:電子科技大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F204
【參考文獻】
相關期刊論文 前1條
1 刁麗琳;朱桂龍;許治;;國外產學研合作研究述評、展望與啟示[J];外國經濟與管理;2011年02期
,本文編號:1530248
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