本文選題：人大監(jiān)督　切入點：現(xiàn)狀缺陷　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：人大監(jiān)督制度是我國人民代表大會制度的重要組成部分。人大的監(jiān)督權(quán)是指各級人民代表大會及其常委會為全面保證國家法律的實施和維護(hù)人民的根本利益，防止行政、司法機關(guān)濫用權(quán)力，通過法定的方式和程序，對由它產(chǎn)生的國家機關(guān)實施的檢查、調(diào)查、督促、糾正、處理的強制性權(quán)力。充分發(fā)揮人大的監(jiān)督作用，是健全和完善人民代表大會制度，實現(xiàn)依法治國的重要內(nèi)容。我國人大監(jiān)督具有權(quán)威性、民主性、全局性、事后性和間接性等特點。人大監(jiān)督的主體是各級人民代表大會及其常委會，客體是由它產(chǎn)生、對它負(fù)責(zé)、受其監(jiān)督的同級國家機關(guān)及國家機關(guān)組成人員。人大監(jiān)督可以分為法律監(jiān)督和工作監(jiān)督。人大監(jiān)督與法治精神相統(tǒng)一的，體現(xiàn)了對分權(quán)制衡原則的借鑒，其核心是人民民主。 憲法與民主制度緊密相關(guān)，我國憲法規(guī)定了人民代表大會的性質(zhì)和地位。我國地方人大在行使監(jiān)督權(quán)方面進(jìn)行了積極的實踐和探索，取得了有目共睹的顯著成績，積累了寶貴的經(jīng)驗，監(jiān)督工作逐步走向規(guī)范化、制度化。但我們應(yīng)該看到，當(dāng)前我國人大監(jiān)督權(quán)還沒有充分的發(fā)揮出來，與憲法和法律的規(guī)定和群眾的期望存在較大差距。人大監(jiān)督面臨政治體制障礙：黨政不分導(dǎo)致監(jiān)督尷尬，我國選舉制度有欠缺，提名和確定代表候選人方式?jīng)]有嚴(yán)格依法，代表構(gòu)成和代表比例規(guī)定的過死，差額選舉和介紹候選人實行不夠。憲法監(jiān)督制度存在不足：監(jiān)督主體模糊，監(jiān)督對象不明確，監(jiān)督內(nèi)容不全面，監(jiān)督程序不健全。人大常委會監(jiān)督機制弱化：組成人員履職積極性不高；人大代表履職存在官僚化傾向；代表素質(zhì)有差距，，代表意識欠缺；參選動機不純，責(zé)任意識缺乏；對人大常委會履職監(jiān)督缺乏硬性措施。人大監(jiān)督的政治文化土壤欠缺，監(jiān)督對象缺乏接受監(jiān)督的自覺性，監(jiān)督主體的主動監(jiān)督意識不強，導(dǎo)致人大監(jiān)督手段往往存在避硬就軟、剛性不足的傾向。 人大監(jiān)督在建立社會主義民主政治，實現(xiàn)依法行政,保障我國公民的基本權(quán)利方面發(fā)揮重要推動作用。但從總體上來看，人大監(jiān)督表現(xiàn)出抽象性監(jiān)督多，實質(zhì)性監(jiān)督少;彈性監(jiān)督多，剛性監(jiān)督少;一般性監(jiān)督多，跟蹤監(jiān)督少;事后監(jiān)督多，事前事中監(jiān)督少等特點。監(jiān)督工作仍是人大工作的薄弱環(huán)節(jié)。究其原因,主要在于人大監(jiān)督面臨政治體制障礙；憲法監(jiān)督制度不完備；人大常委會運行監(jiān)督機制弱化；人大監(jiān)督的政治文化還沒有真正形成。要完善我國人大監(jiān)督的途徑必須深化政治體制改革；強化對憲法實施的監(jiān)督；增強人大自身監(jiān)督機能；培植強化人大監(jiān)督的法治土壤。
[Abstract]:The supervision system of the people's Congress is an important part of the system of the people's Congress of our country. The supervisory power of the people's Congress refers to the people's congresses at all levels and their standing committees to comprehensively guarantee the implementation of national laws and safeguard the fundamental interests of the people, and prevent administration. The judicial organs abusing their power and exerting the compulsory powers of inspection, investigation, supervision, correction and handling of the state organs created by the judicial organs through legal means and procedures, and giving full play to the supervisory role of the people's congresses, It is an important content to improve and perfect the system of people's congresses and to realize the rule of law. The supervision of the people's congresses in our country is authoritative, democratic, and comprehensive. The main body of supervision by the people's Congress is the people's congresses at all levels and their standing committees, and the object is produced by it and is responsible for it. The supervision of the people's Congress can be divided into legal supervision and work supervision. The unity between the supervision of the people's Congress and the spirit of the rule of law embodies the reference to the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances, the core of which is people's democracy. The constitution is closely related to the democratic system, and the constitution of our country stipulates the nature and status of the people's congresses. The local people's congresses have carried out active practice and exploration in exercising their supervisory power, and have made remarkable achievements that are obvious to all. We have accumulated valuable experience, and the supervision work has gradually moved towards standardization and institutionalization. However, we should see that at present, the supervisory power of the people's congresses in our country has not been brought into full play. There is a big gap with the provisions of the Constitution and laws and the expectations of the masses. The proportion of deputies and the proportion of representatives is too dead, the election of deputies and the introduction of candidates are not enough. The constitutional supervision system has some shortcomings: the subject of supervision is vague, the object of supervision is not clear, the content of supervision is not comprehensive, The supervision procedure is not perfect. The supervision mechanism of the standing Committee of the NPC is weakened: the enthusiasm of the members is not high; the deputies to the people's Congress have bureaucratism tendency; the representative quality is different, the representative consciousness is deficient, the motive of running for election is not pure, the responsibility consciousness is lacking; There is a lack of rigid measures for the NPC standing Committee to carry out its duties and supervision. The political and cultural soil of the NPC supervision is lacking, the object of supervision lacks the consciousness to accept supervision, and the active supervision consciousness of the main supervisory body is not strong. As a result, the means of the NPC supervision often exist to avoid being hard and soft. A tendency to lack rigidity. People's Congress supervision plays an important role in establishing socialist democratic politics, realizing administration according to law and safeguarding the basic rights of Chinese citizens. But on the whole, people's Congress supervision shows more abstract supervision than substantive supervision. More flexible supervision, less rigid supervision, more general supervision, less tracking supervision, more supervision after the event, less supervision in advance, etc. The work of supervision is still a weak link in the work of the people's Congress. The main problems are that the supervision of the NPC is facing the obstacles of the political system, the system of constitutional supervision is not complete, the mechanism of the operation of the NPC standing Committee is weakened; The political culture of NPC supervision has not really formed yet. In order to perfect the ways of NPC supervision in our country, we must deepen the political system reform, strengthen the supervision over the implementation of the constitution, strengthen the supervision function of the NPC itself, and cultivate and strengthen the rule of law soil of NPC supervision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D622;D921.11

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本文編號：1583719