WTO報復水平之仲裁研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-12-18 18:44
【摘要】：隨著國際經(jīng)濟交往的日益擴大和深入，國際貿(mào)易摩擦也接踵而至。世界貿(mào)易組織的爭端解決機制在解決成員方貿(mào)易糾紛實踐中的重要作用日益凸顯。而作為維護爭端解決機制有效運作的支柱之一，報復制度一直是被廣泛關(guān)注的焦點。WTO框架下的報復制度不同于傳統(tǒng)國際法上的報復和雙邊貿(mào)易中的報復，其表現(xiàn)之一是對報復水平的嚴格控制。報復水平的高低直接關(guān)系到成員方的利益是否得到WTO法律的有效保護，關(guān)系到世界貿(mào)易組織是否沿著貿(mào)易自由化的目標健康發(fā)展。 《關(guān)于爭端解決規(guī)則與程序諒解》中涉及報復水平仲裁的條文非常有限，具體案例中往往依賴仲裁員對條文作出解釋。本文試圖將散見于仲裁員的報告和相關(guān)領(lǐng)域?qū)＜抑鲋械囊庖�，加以歸納梳理，最終形成系統(tǒng)性的結(jié)論，并在此基礎(chǔ)上提出針對性的完善建議。本文由引言、正文和結(jié)語三部分組成，引言部分重點分析了選題的意義本文研究的重點，結(jié)語部分主要是對作者觀點的總結(jié)，正文分為四個部分： 第一部分“WTO報復水平仲裁概述”。該部分首先從報復水平仲裁的歷史沿革入手，，介紹了報復水平仲裁如何由GATT時期演變至今。然后著重介紹報復水平仲裁的原則和具體程序。為下文從理論方面分析報復水平仲裁程序所存在的爭議奠定了基礎(chǔ)。 第二部分“關(guān)于WTO報復水平仲裁的理論爭議”。重點從實體和程序兩個方面深入剖析了報復水平仲裁存在的爭議，在此基礎(chǔ)上作者進行了簡要的評述。實體方面，報復制度本身存廢以及通過報復制度所要達成何種目的都深刻影響著報復水平的高低，涉及具體操作層面上，損害水平的計算方法歷來備受爭議。而在程序方面，報復水平仲裁中的舉證責任分配問題有別于DSU的其他仲裁程序，加之DSU條文規(guī)定的模糊性，執(zhí)行監(jiān)督程序與報復水平仲裁程序之間的銜接問題尚未有定論。 第三部分“WTO報復水平仲裁案例分析”。該部分從實證的角度，選取了兩則具有代表性的案例——歐共體第三香蕉案和巴西訴美國陸地棉花案。前者作為WTO爭端解決就運行以來第一例報復水平仲裁的案例，仲裁員在本案中的做法無疑為后來同類案件提供了標桿。而后者則在一定程度上代表了WTO爭端解決機制在報復水平仲裁方面的新動向。 第四部分“WTO報復水平仲裁程序完善建議”。該部分是在前文基礎(chǔ)之上，針對報復水平仲裁程序在理論和實踐上存在的問題，結(jié)合DSU制度設計的原則和特點，提出了完善建議，希望報復水平仲裁程序能藉此擺脫目前的窘境。
[Abstract]:With the increasing expansion and deepening of international economic exchanges, international trade frictions also follow one after another. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism plays an increasingly important role in the practice of resolving trade disputes among its members. As one of the pillars to maintain the effective operation of the dispute settlement mechanism, retaliation system has always been the focus of widespread attention. The retaliation system under the framework of WTO is different from the retaliation in traditional international law and in bilateral trade. One of its manifestations is strict control of the level of retaliation. The level of retaliation is directly related to whether the interests of the members are effectively protected by the WTO law and whether the WTO develops healthily along the goal of trade liberalization. The provisions on dispute settlement rules and procedural understandings concerning the level of retaliation arbitration are very limited, and in specific cases arbitrators are often relied on to interpret the provisions. This paper attempts to sum up and sort out the opinions scattered in the report of arbitrators and the works of experts in related fields, and finally form a systematic conclusion, and on this basis put forward some suggestions for perfection. This paper is composed of three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The introduction mainly analyzes the significance of the topic, and the conclusion is a summary of the author's views. The text is divided into four parts: the first part, "WTO retaliation level arbitration overview". This part begins with the history of the level of retaliation arbitration and introduces how the level of retaliation arbitration evolves from the period of GATT to the present. Then introduces the principle and concrete procedure of retaliation level arbitration. It lays a foundation for the theoretical analysis of the disputes existing in the arbitration procedure of retaliation level. The second part is the theoretical dispute about the level of WTO retaliation arbitration. On the basis of this, the author makes a brief comment on the dispute of retaliation level arbitration from the aspects of entity and procedure. In the aspect of substance, the system of revenge itself and the purpose to be achieved through the system of revenge have a profound impact on the level of retaliation, involving the specific operational level, the calculation method of damage level has always been controversial. In the aspect of procedure, the distribution of burden of proof in retaliation level arbitration is different from other arbitration procedures of DSU, in addition to the fuzziness of the provisions of DSU, the connection between executive supervision procedure and retaliation level arbitration procedure has not been concluded. The third part is the case Analysis of WTO retaliation level Arbitration. In this part, two representative cases, the third Banana case of EC and the case of Brazil v. American Upland Cotton, are selected from an empirical point of view. The former is the first case of WTO dispute settlement arbitration on the level of retaliation since the operation of the case, the arbitrators in this case undoubtedly provided a benchmark for the subsequent similar cases. The latter, to some extent, represents the new trend of WTO dispute settlement mechanism in retaliation level arbitration. The fourth part is the suggestion of perfecting the arbitration procedure of WTO retaliation level. This part is based on the above, aiming at the problems existing in the theory and practice of the arbitration procedure of retaliation level, combined with the principles and characteristics of the design of the DSU system, the author puts forward some suggestions to perfect it. It is hoped that the level of retaliation arbitration procedures will thus be able to get rid of the current predicament.
【學位授予單位】：西南政法大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D996.1
本文編號：2386330
[Abstract]:With the increasing expansion and deepening of international economic exchanges, international trade frictions also follow one after another. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism plays an increasingly important role in the practice of resolving trade disputes among its members. As one of the pillars to maintain the effective operation of the dispute settlement mechanism, retaliation system has always been the focus of widespread attention. The retaliation system under the framework of WTO is different from the retaliation in traditional international law and in bilateral trade. One of its manifestations is strict control of the level of retaliation. The level of retaliation is directly related to whether the interests of the members are effectively protected by the WTO law and whether the WTO develops healthily along the goal of trade liberalization. The provisions on dispute settlement rules and procedural understandings concerning the level of retaliation arbitration are very limited, and in specific cases arbitrators are often relied on to interpret the provisions. This paper attempts to sum up and sort out the opinions scattered in the report of arbitrators and the works of experts in related fields, and finally form a systematic conclusion, and on this basis put forward some suggestions for perfection. This paper is composed of three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The introduction mainly analyzes the significance of the topic, and the conclusion is a summary of the author's views. The text is divided into four parts: the first part, "WTO retaliation level arbitration overview". This part begins with the history of the level of retaliation arbitration and introduces how the level of retaliation arbitration evolves from the period of GATT to the present. Then introduces the principle and concrete procedure of retaliation level arbitration. It lays a foundation for the theoretical analysis of the disputes existing in the arbitration procedure of retaliation level. The second part is the theoretical dispute about the level of WTO retaliation arbitration. On the basis of this, the author makes a brief comment on the dispute of retaliation level arbitration from the aspects of entity and procedure. In the aspect of substance, the system of revenge itself and the purpose to be achieved through the system of revenge have a profound impact on the level of retaliation, involving the specific operational level, the calculation method of damage level has always been controversial. In the aspect of procedure, the distribution of burden of proof in retaliation level arbitration is different from other arbitration procedures of DSU, in addition to the fuzziness of the provisions of DSU, the connection between executive supervision procedure and retaliation level arbitration procedure has not been concluded. The third part is the case Analysis of WTO retaliation level Arbitration. In this part, two representative cases, the third Banana case of EC and the case of Brazil v. American Upland Cotton, are selected from an empirical point of view. The former is the first case of WTO dispute settlement arbitration on the level of retaliation since the operation of the case, the arbitrators in this case undoubtedly provided a benchmark for the subsequent similar cases. The latter, to some extent, represents the new trend of WTO dispute settlement mechanism in retaliation level arbitration. The fourth part is the suggestion of perfecting the arbitration procedure of WTO retaliation level. This part is based on the above, aiming at the problems existing in the theory and practice of the arbitration procedure of retaliation level, combined with the principles and characteristics of the design of the DSU system, the author puts forward some suggestions to perfect it. It is hoped that the level of retaliation arbitration procedures will thus be able to get rid of the current predicament.
【學位授予單位】：西南政法大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D996.1
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