【摘要】：大規(guī)模毀滅性武器以其巨大破壞能力,將人類戰(zhàn)爭的殘酷性和毀滅性推向極致。冷戰(zhàn)期間,大規(guī)模毀滅性武器的擴散主要集中在兩大陣營的范圍之內,基于對立的兩大陣營固有的遏制力,擴散的范圍和路徑均相對狹窄。但是,冷戰(zhàn)結束后,隨著對立的雙邊主義演化成單極主義,大規(guī)模毀滅性武器的擴散非但沒有得到有效的控制,相反卻出現了擴散范圍、擴散路徑不斷擴大的發(fā)展趨勢。也就是說,為了控制擴散的蔓延,冷戰(zhàn)期間的國際軍控領域曾以“大國均勢”的理論模型構筑起傳統的防擴散機制,兩個超級大國和兩大軍事陣營在尖銳的對抗中逐步建立起了一種核威懾和核恐怖的平衡,避免了核戰(zhàn)爭的爆發(fā),維護了世界武器戰(zhàn)略的穩(wěn)定。然而,從20世紀90年代開始,國際恐怖主義所追求的最大化殺傷效果與大規(guī)模毀滅性武器的巨大殺傷能力相互交集,恐怖組織控制或滲透的一系列跨國有組織犯罪集團,甚至跨國公司和自然人,都參與到了大規(guī)模毀滅性武器技術、零部件、設備和原材料的交易之中。這一現象致使恐怖組織與恐怖武器結合的趨勢愈加明顯清晰�；谕晟频慕M織結構、強大的財力和融資能力、多元武器購買渠道,核生化恐怖主義引發(fā)出的巨大的現實危險,影響到了世界絕大部分國家。在此意義上,當代人類生活可謂構建在文明與火山之間。大規(guī)模毀滅性武器私有化擴散表現出的參與主體多元、融資渠道多元、交易方式多元、武器來源多元等一系列全新特點規(guī)律,表現出完全不同于主權國家間的武器擴散狀況。傳統軍控政策,無論是基本理論還是條約實踐都受到了強烈的質疑。傳統防擴散機制的核心理論——“確保相互摧毀”在核生化恐怖主義猖獗泛濫的后冷戰(zhàn)時代,其“雙邊”、“對稱”、“威懾”的控制邏輯喪失了基本的落實空間,迅速變得不堪一擊,甚至于被徹底顛覆。究其原因,非國家行為體不同于主權國家,沒有穩(wěn)定居民和固定領土,無需擔心實施恐怖襲擊后會遭到無法承受的報復性打擊。對于這種游離于傳統軍控機制范圍之外的威脅,核國家乃至整個國際社會都無從威懾、無從談判、無從應對。在防擴散條約體系上,傳統軍控條約的締約方均為主權國家,義務主體均為主權國家,控制措施也僅著眼于以主權國家為單位的國與國之間,這就為從主權國家到非國家行為體之間的縱向、交叉的武器擴散留下了交易余地和規(guī)范空白,大規(guī)模毀滅性武器的私有化擴散在相當程度上無法受到有效的遏制。加之越來越多的國家在大國“核威懾”的陰影下“擁核自�！�,成為恐怖武器的“潛在擴散源”,使得“國際核黑市已經達到了無所不包的程度”,①核技術和核武器走私的嚴重程度遠遠超出了人們的想象。所有這些,使得本來就是一種權宜之計的傳統軍控思想方法,在原料、技術、零部件的交易門檻越來越低,且呈現“組織化”、“全球化”的形勢下,尤其顯得捉襟見肘、蒼白無力。從控制與反控制的角度看,與傳統軍控政策難以遏制武器私有化擴散現象一樣,傳統刑事政策在遏制犯罪上也面臨著同樣的難題與困境。當代社會的犯罪,與傳統刑事政策的目的往往呈相反的發(fā)展趨勢,刑罰的強度越高,犯罪的惡性程度就越嚴重；刑法懲罰的范圍越是擴大,犯罪所涉及的領域就越是廣泛；有利于犯罪的因素被控制得越是嚴密,犯罪的增長速度就越是加快。當前,“全球平均犯罪率已上升至3000/100000以上”,而部分北美國家的犯罪率較長時間內一直保持在7000/100000以上。②這一特殊的社會現實,對傳統刑事政策的社會效果也提出了強烈的質疑。然而,自20世紀80年代以來,刑事政策及時提出了轉換政策導向、改變政策路徑的設想,重新定位了控制目標,找到了新的出路——反洗錢�；趯σ呀洝敖M織化”、“全球化”的販運毒品、走私人口、恐怖融資等以謀取巨額利益為目的或需要巨額資金來實施的犯罪不斷惡化蔓延的擔憂,刑事政策敏銳意識到,對于國際社會的特定犯罪而言,其真正的破壞力不在于犯罪行為本身,而在于年均逾3萬億美元洗錢總額背后所隱匿的巨大的破壞力量。于是,在短短的20多年中,反洗錢將傳統刑事政策打擊犯罪的重心由犯罪人、犯罪行為轉向犯罪收益,再從監(jiān)控非法資金來源拓展至監(jiān)控特定資金流向和特定受益人。反洗錢的演進過程告訴我們,國際社會締結大量的反洗錢公約,包含著明確的政策目的——以犯罪收益和犯罪融資為第一層次目標,以打擊和控制衍生此類經濟利益的上位犯罪為第二層次目標,以此削弱、瓦解和摧毀犯罪組織的經濟能量。這一政策導向,已經逐步發(fā)展成為標新立異的標桿,體現出整個刑事政策導向和傳統思想方法的徹底轉換。與傳統刑事政策通過對準犯罪行為和行為人來打擊犯罪收效甚微相同,傳統軍控政策將控制目標對準主權國家和特定武器也不存在有效落實政策、控制擴散的空間和余地�，F代科技的迅猛發(fā)展和信息傳播的高效快捷,使得核生化武器技術、原料、零件的獲取、研發(fā)和交易遠比想象中要方便快捷,使得直接消滅武器獲取的物質和技術基礎成為空想。大量的原材料存儲、原料管理的無序混亂、逐步降低的技術門檻、設備原料的多性用特征、頻繁流動的科研人員,都為恐怖組織謀求大規(guī)模毀滅性武器大開方便之門。已經發(fā)生的核生化恐怖襲擊和大量的刑事統計信息已經表明,部分恐怖組織已經具備了運用大規(guī)模毀滅性武器實施恐怖襲擊的能力。這就給國際社會留下了一個嚴峻的問題：各國究竟應當如何防止愈演愈烈、猖獗泛濫并給人類社會帶來巨大危險的大規(guī)模毀滅性武器的擴散?反洗錢金融行動特別工作組(Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering)英文縮寫"FATF")立足于反洗錢的刑事政策立場,為國際社會指明了打擊大規(guī)模毀滅性武器擴散的新方法——目標金融制裁。與傳統軍控思想方法不同,目標金融制裁不再沿襲傳統政策著眼于武器擴散本身這一上位目標的防范；而是從下位行為入手,對準恐怖組織購買大規(guī)模毀滅性武器的巨額資金、對準擁有巨大財力和融資能力的恐怖組織,通過凍結和沒收這兩種嚴厲的金融制裁措施,在經濟上對武器購買集團進行嚴厲封鎖,在資金融通上對擴散融資進行嚴厲遏制,從而摧毀其獲得武器的經濟能量。可以說,目標金融制裁是在“均勢平衡”與“武力威嚇”之外的第三種控制大規(guī)模毀滅性武器擴散的政策路徑。與國際社會的研究方法不盡相同的是,我國理論界長期以來將各類嚴重刑事犯罪的研究集中在規(guī)范學的范圍之內,“以現行刑法為基礎的注釋性刑法理論研究已經形成空前繁榮的局面”,①對特定反社會行為的現象學研究,存在較大的理論空白。有鑒于此,立足于反洗錢刑事政策,開展通過反洗錢框架下的目標金融制裁措施來遏制大規(guī)模毀滅性武器擴散融資的交叉研究,有著積極的理論價值和實踐意義。全文共分為六章。第一章全面闡述大規(guī)模毀滅性武器及其私有化擴散現象。第一節(jié)對大規(guī)模毀滅性武器的巨大殺傷性能進行介紹。大規(guī)模毀滅性武器主要包括核武器、生物武器、化學武器,及其運載工具——導彈。不同于冷戰(zhàn)期間此類武器在主權國家間擴散,在后冷戰(zhàn)時代,此類武器的獲取和研發(fā)門檻降低,非國家行為體(恐怖組織、跨國有組織犯罪集團等)也積極參與到武器交易當中。第二節(jié)解讀大規(guī)模毀滅性武器私有化、恐怖組織化的擴散現象。指出恐怖組織與恐怖武器相結合是歷史必然,其獲取武器渠道包括：自行研制或改造、走私和黑市交易、主權國家提供、主權國家散落民間、盜竊等。第二章分析評價反大規(guī)模毀滅性武器擴散傳統機制。第一節(jié)回顧傳統反擴散機制的演進,指出其在兩次世界大戰(zhàn)期間、冷戰(zhàn)階段、冷戰(zhàn)后至今不同特點；介紹支撐傳統反擴散機制的軍控理論；剖析以不擴散核武器條約、禁止化學武器公約、禁止生物武器公約為支柱的傳統反擴散法律體系及傳統的反擴散措施；第二節(jié)分析指出傳統反擴散機制的積極作用和存在不足——在應對當代大規(guī)模毀滅性武器私有化擴散問題上,其自身缺陷不斷被放大和利用,歷史局限性進一步凸顯。第三章研究預測通過反洗錢刑事政策遏制大規(guī)模毀滅性武器擴散的思想方法、現實依據和理論可行性。第一節(jié)總結反洗錢形成的歷史背景及其形成和發(fā)展過程,以及其所具備的的刑事政策功能。第二節(jié)論述反洗錢政策功能在應對恐怖主義融資中的拓展。第三節(jié)闡述運用反洗錢刑事政策控制大規(guī)模毀滅性武器擴散的可行性。第四章全面剖析目標金融制裁的基本原理,構建反大規(guī)模毀滅性武器擴散融資行動中的“制裁名單”判斷機制。該章從“如何懷疑”、“如何相信”到“如何救濟”三個步驟設計。第一節(jié)宏觀分析目標金融制裁的基本定義、法律性質和主要類型。第二節(jié)依據一般思維方式確立“臨時名單”和“最終名單”兩個遞進層次,分別對應“有理由懷疑”和“證據優(yōu)先”的證明要求；提出對于最終列名對象,法律應當允許推定其交易目的。第三節(jié)考察相關案例和信息,設計“臨時名單”的確定依據——交易的異常性指標,而后設計出武器交易的發(fā)現途徑。第四節(jié)構建“最終名單”的確定方法。第五章全面闡述反洗錢框架下遏制大規(guī)模毀滅性武器擴散融資的措施——凍結和沒收。第一節(jié)、第二節(jié)分別論述目標金融制裁的核心措施——凍結和最終目標——沒收。第三節(jié)設計制裁對象的權利救濟措施體系。第四節(jié)結合反恐融資實踐,分析運用目標金融制裁打擊特定反社會經濟力量的國際實踐。第六章對目標金融制裁的發(fā)展趨勢進行預測。第一節(jié)討論大規(guī)模毀滅性武器擴散融資的國際犯罪化可能。第二節(jié)在論述反社會非國家行為體相互間的經濟馳援形成強大融資能力的基礎上,預測通過目標金融制裁遏制大規(guī)模毀滅性武器擴散融資的政策功能。第三節(jié)結合目標金融制裁這一措施所蘊含的新危險犯觀念,預測目標金融制裁將成為國際刑事司法應對犯罪的基本制裁方法。
[Abstract]:Weapons of mass destruction, with their great destructive power, have pushed the cruelty and destructiveness of human wars to the extreme. During the cold war, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was mainly concentrated in the scope of the two camps. Based on the inherent deterrent power of the opposing camps, the scope and path of proliferation were relatively narrow. With the development of opposing bilateralism into unipolarism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has not been effectively controlled, on the contrary, the scope of proliferation has appeared and the path of proliferation has been expanding. The two superpowers and two military camps gradually established a balance between nuclear deterrence and nuclear terrorism in the sharp confrontation, avoiding the outbreak of nuclear war and maintaining the stability of the world weapons strategy. However, since the 1990s, international terrorism has pursued the maximum lethal effect. As a result of the intersection of the enormous lethality of weapons of mass destruction, a series of transnational organized criminal groups controlled or infiltrated by terrorist organizations, even transnational corporations and natural persons, are involved in the trade in weapons of mass destruction technology, components, equipment and raw materials. This phenomenon has led to terrorist organizations and terrorist weapons. The trend toward integration is becoming increasingly clear. Based on sound organizational structures, strong financial and financing capabilities, multiple weapons purchasing channels, and the enormous real dangers of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism, most countries in the world are affected. In this sense, contemporary human life is built between civilizations and volcanoes. The proliferation of arms privatization shows a series of new characteristics and laws, such as multi-participants, multi-financing channels, multi-trading methods and multi-sources of weapons, which are totally different from the situation of arms proliferation among sovereign states. In the Post-Cold War era when nuclear, biochemical and terrorism was rampant, the control logic of "bilateral", "symmetrical" and "deterrent" lost its basic space for implementation, quickly became vulnerable and even completely subverted. Without stable inhabitants and fixed territory, there is no need to worry about an unsustainable retaliatory strike after a terrorist attack. The nuclear states and the international community as a whole are unable to deter, negotiate or respond to this threat, which is outside the scope of traditional arms control mechanisms. All parties are sovereign states, the subjects of obligations are sovereign states, and the control measures are only between countries with sovereign states as their units. This leaves room for trade and regulatory gaps in the vertical cross-proliferation of weapons from sovereign states to non-state actors, and the privatization and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to a considerable extent. In addition, more and more countries "embrace nuclear self-protection" under the shadow of the "nuclear deterrence" of big powers, and become the "potential source of proliferation" of terrorist weapons, making "the international nuclear black market has reached an all-inclusive level". The smuggling of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons is far more serious than people think. All these make the traditional arms control thought and method, which is a kind of expediency, become more and more difficult to control the private ownership of weapons with the traditional arms control policy from the angle of control and counter-control. Similar to the phenomena of chemical diffusion, the traditional criminal policy is faced with the same difficulties and dilemmas in curbing crime. Crime in contemporary society tends to have the opposite development trend with the purpose of the traditional criminal policy. The higher the intensity of penalty, the more serious the crime is; the wider the scope of criminal penalty, the more involved in the field of crime. At present, the average global crime rate has risen to more than 3000/100000, while the crime rate in some North American countries has been maintained at more than 7000/100000 for a long time. However, since the 1980s, criminal policy has promptly put forward the idea of changing policy orientation, changing policy path, repositioning control objectives, and finding a new way out - anti-money laundering. Concerns about the deteriorating spread of crimes committed for the purpose of obtaining huge profits or requiring huge sums of money have led criminal policy to realize that the real destructive power of a particular crime in the international community lies not in the crime itself, but in the tremendous destructive power hidden behind the total amount of money laundering exceeding $3 trillion annually. Therefore, in a short period of 20 years, anti-money laundering has shifted the focus of the traditional criminal policy against crime from the perpetrator to the criminal proceeds, and then expanded from monitoring illegal sources of funds to monitoring the flow of specific funds and specific beneficiaries. The evolution of anti-money laundering tells us that the international community has concluded a large number of anti-money laundering conventions, including This policy orientation has gradually evolved into a benchmark for innovation, reflecting the whole process. The traditional criminal policy has little effect on combating crime by targeting criminals and perpetrators. The traditional arms control policy aims at sovereign states and specific weapons, and there is no room for effective implementation of the policy and control of proliferation. The rapid development of modern science and technology With the rapid and efficient development and dissemination of information, the acquisition, R&D and trading of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons technology, raw materials and parts are far more convenient and efficient than expected, making it a dream to eliminate the material and technical basis of weapons acquisition directly. Sexual characteristics and frequent flow of scientific researchers have opened the door for terrorist organizations to seek weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear, biochemical and biological terrorist attacks and a large number of criminal statistics have shown that some terrorist organizations have the ability to use weapons of mass destruction to carry out terrorist attacks. A serious question remains: how should countries prevent the proliferation of increasingly rampant, rampant and dangerous weapons of mass destruction? The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) is based on anti-money laundering criminal policy. Different from the traditional arms control ideology, the target financial sanctions no longer follow the traditional policy of focusing on the prevention of weapons proliferation itself, but start from the subordinate behavior and purchase large-scale against terrorist organizations. The enormous funds of weapons of destruction, targeted at terrorist organizations with enormous financial and financing capabilities, impose severe economic blockades on arms purchasing groups by freezing and confiscating these two severe financial sanctions, and severely curb proliferation financing in the financing of funds, thereby destroying the economic energy of weapons acquisition. It is said that target financial sanctions are the third policy path to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in addition to "balance of power" and "threat of force". The annotated criminal law theory based on the law has formed an unprecedented prosperous situation. "(1) There is a big theoretical gap in the phenomenological study of specific anti-social behavior. In view of this, based on the anti-money laundering criminal policy, we should carry out targeted financial sanctions to curb the financing of weapons of mass destruction proliferation through the anti-money laundering framework. The paper is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 gives a comprehensive account of weapons of mass destruction and their privatization and proliferation. Section 1 introduces the enormous lethality of weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of mass destruction mainly include nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons and so on. Unlike the proliferation of such weapons between sovereign states during the cold war, the threshold for acquisition and R&D of such weapons has been lowered in the Post-Cold War era, and non-state actors (terrorist organizations, transnational organized criminal groups, etc.) have been actively involved in the arms trade. It is pointed out that the combination of terrorist organizations and terrorist weapons is a historical necessity. The channels of acquiring weapons include self-development or transformation, smuggling and black market trade, supply by sovereign states, dispersal of sovereign states among the people, and theft. The evolution of the traditional anti-proliferation mechanism points out its different characteristics during the two world wars, during the cold war period and since the cold war; introduces the arms control theory supporting the traditional anti-proliferation mechanism; analyzes the traditional anti-proliferation legal system and the traditional anti-proliferation legal system supported by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons. The second section points out the positive role and shortcomings of the traditional anti-proliferation mechanism. In dealing with the problem of the privatization and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, its own shortcomings are constantly amplified and utilized, and its historical limitations are further highlighted. The first section summarizes the historical background of the formation of anti-money laundering and its formation and development process, as well as its criminal policy functions. The second section discusses the expansion of anti-money laundering policy functions in dealing with terrorism financing. The third section describes the use of anti-money laundering criminal policy control. Chapter IV analyzes the basic principles of targeted financial sanctions and establishes a "sanctions list" judgment mechanism in financing operations against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The chapter is designed from "how to doubt", "how to believe" to "how to remedy". Section 2 establishes two progressive levels of "provisional list" and "final list" according to the general thinking mode, which correspond to the proof requirements of "reasonable suspicion" and "evidence priority"; and proposes that the law should allow the presumption of the transaction purpose of the final listed object. Section III examines relevant cases and information, designs the basis for determining the "temporary list" - the abnormal indicators of transactions, and then designs the way to discover arms transactions. Section IV establishes the method for determining the "final list". Chapter V comprehensively expounds the measures to curb the financing of weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation under the framework of anti-money laundering - freezing. Settlement and confiscation. Section I and Section II discuss the core measures of targeted financial sanctions - freezing and ultimate goal - confiscation.
【學位授予單位】：復旦大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D99
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本文編號：2244805