本文選題：WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制 + 司法經(jīng)濟(jì)��； 參考：《吉林大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制作為國(guó)際貿(mào)易糾紛解決的最主要機(jī)制之一，有準(zhǔn)司法性、權(quán)威性及中立性，已經(jīng)成為各國(guó)間在解決貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端方面最重要的方式。與GATT時(shí)期的爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制相比，現(xiàn)行的《關(guān)于爭(zhēng)端解決規(guī)則和程序的諒解》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱DSU）使得WTO框架下的爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制更趨完善和規(guī)范化。其中最典型的程序性變革就是在專家組程序之后增加了上訴審查程序，使?fàn)幎私鉀Q機(jī)制法院化。從WTO運(yùn)作至今，WTO的爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制作為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定的程序性保障在國(guó)際貿(mào)易的舞臺(tái)上發(fā)揮了重要的作用，成為多邊貿(mào)易的主要支柱，其對(duì)維護(hù)全球貿(mào)易秩序穩(wěn)定和推動(dòng)全球貿(mào)易的自由化所做出的貢獻(xiàn)有目共睹。 WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制對(duì)專家組報(bào)告采用的是“準(zhǔn)自動(dòng)通過”的通過方式，這在一定程度上增加了專家組報(bào)告出現(xiàn)法律錯(cuò)誤的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)性，而上訴機(jī)構(gòu)的設(shè)立則有效地緩解了此風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，這也是程序公正原則在貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端解決領(lǐng)域的一個(gè)很重要的表現(xiàn)。當(dāng)然上訴程序并不是盡善盡美，其中也有很多值得探討的爭(zhēng)議點(diǎn)。本文通過對(duì)專家組程序的分析概括，對(duì)上訴程序中的上訴機(jī)構(gòu)司法經(jīng)濟(jì)的運(yùn)用、上訴階段增加中期審查的必要性問題，以及上訴機(jī)構(gòu)的決策程序這三個(gè)方面的大問題做一個(gè)綜合性的理論和實(shí)證的探討，以期加深對(duì)上訴程序的理解，進(jìn)而能對(duì)上訴機(jī)構(gòu)的將來的發(fā)展方向做出一個(gè)有益的探索。 司法經(jīng)濟(jì)原則在WTO專家組階段已經(jīng)得到廣泛應(yīng)用，而將此原則應(yīng)用于上訴程序中也已經(jīng)被上訴機(jī)構(gòu)加以確認(rèn)并實(shí)踐。上訴機(jī)構(gòu)司法經(jīng)濟(jì)分為程序性司法經(jīng)濟(jì)和實(shí)體性司法經(jīng)濟(jì)。其中實(shí)體性司法經(jīng)濟(jì)包括兩種情況，即上訴機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)解決爭(zhēng)端沒有必要的訴請(qǐng)運(yùn)用司法經(jīng)濟(jì)以及作為司法回避的司法經(jīng)濟(jì)。上訴階段司法經(jīng)濟(jì)的運(yùn)用不僅能使上訴機(jī)構(gòu)節(jié)約大量的司法資源，而且具有一定的可行性。但需要指出的是，上訴機(jī)構(gòu)司法經(jīng)濟(jì)在現(xiàn)階段仍然被作為一項(xiàng)例外原則加以適用。 專家組階段中的中期審查程序?yàn)楫?dāng)事方提供了一個(gè)在專家組裁斷作出前提出意見以澄清案件事實(shí)的機(jī)會(huì)，增強(qiáng)了當(dāng)事方對(duì)爭(zhēng)端解決的過程控制，并且保證了專家組報(bào)告在事實(shí)和法律上的精確性，但同時(shí)也限制了上訴機(jī)構(gòu)的司法性和權(quán)威性，將上訴機(jī)構(gòu)置于一種不利的被動(dòng)境地中。不僅如此，中期審查程序的功能發(fā)揮因?yàn)榉N種原因受到限制。中期審查程序的功能之一是為當(dāng)事方在最終裁決作出前提供一個(gè)達(dá)成當(dāng)事雙方都滿意的解決方式的機(jī)會(huì)，但是基于案件現(xiàn)實(shí)以及本國(guó)利益考慮，當(dāng)事方達(dá)成這種意向的動(dòng)機(jī)并不強(qiáng)烈，以往的案例表明確實(shí)如此。此外，上訴程序的存在也使得中期審查程序澄清法律事實(shí)的功能受到限制，因?yàn)樯显V方可以在上訴程序中提出新的法律論證。因此，沒有必要在專家組階段繼續(xù)保留中期審查程序，更沒有必要將其擴(kuò)展適用于上訴程序。 上訴機(jī)構(gòu)決策程序堪稱合議制決策領(lǐng)域的完美典范，它不僅滿足了嚴(yán)格的時(shí)限，而且盡量避免分歧，保持了決策意見的高度統(tǒng)一。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和法學(xué)的民主決策分析方法以及美國(guó)最高法院的決策程序?yàn)槲覀兎治錾显V機(jī)構(gòu)決策程序提供了一定的思路。上訴機(jī)構(gòu)決策程序包括三人表決小組決策程序與意見交換程序。意見交換程序使得上訴機(jī)構(gòu)全體成員參與到案件審理中，盡管最終的決策由表決小組成員做出，但是基于非表決小組成員有提出異議的權(quán)利，，表決小組成員需要權(quán)衡各方面的考慮做出裁決，這在一定程度上保證了決策程序的客觀公正性。而最終的決策權(quán)仍然掌握在表決小組成員手中，從而保證了決策程序的高效性。上訴機(jī)構(gòu)決策程序以極低的成本實(shí)現(xiàn)了高效的決策，其中的技巧和策略值得我們借鑒。
[Abstract]:As one of the most important mechanisms for the settlement of international trade disputes, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has a quasi judicial, authoritative and neutral manner. It has become the most important way among countries to solve trade disputes. Compared with the dispute settlement mechanism of the GATT period, the existing understanding of the dispute resolution rules and procedures (hereinafter referred to as DSU) makes W The dispute settlement mechanism under the TO framework is more perfect and standardized. The most typical procedural change is the addition of the appeal review procedure after the expert group procedure and the court of the dispute settlement mechanism. Since the operation of WTO, the dispute settlement mechanism of WTO plays a procedural role as a procedural guarantee for global economic stability on the stage of international trade. The important role has become the main pillar of multilateral trade, and its contribution to maintaining the stability of the global trade order and promoting the liberalization of Global trade is obvious to all.
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism adopted a "quasi automatic passage" approach to the expert group's report, which, to some extent, increased the risk of legal errors in the panel's report, and the establishment of the appellate body effectively alleviated the risk, which was also an important table in the field of trade dispute settlement. Now, of course, the appeals procedure is not perfect, and there are many controversial points. Through the analysis and summary of the procedure of the expert group, the application of the judicial economy in appellate appellate bodies, the necessity of adding the medium-term review in the appeal stage, and the big problems in the three aspects of the decision procedure of the prosecution institution. A comprehensive theoretical and empirical study is made to deepen the understanding of the appellate procedure and to make a useful exploration for the future direction of the appellate body.
The principle of judicial economy has been widely used in the WTO expert group stage, and the application of this principle to the appellate procedure has also been confirmed and practiced by the appellate body. The judicial economy of the appellate organization is divided into procedural judicial economy and substantive judicial economy. The substantive judicial economy includes two cases, that is, the appellate body has a dispute over the dispute. It is not necessary to appeal to the judicial economy and the judicial economy as a judicial avoidance. The application of the judicial economy in the appeal stage not only saves the appellate body from a large number of judicial resources, but also has certain feasibility. However, it should be pointed out that the judicial economy of the Appellate Body is still being used as an exception at this stage. Use.
The mid-term review process in the group of experts provides the parties with an opportunity to clarify the facts of the case before the expert group's decision is made to clarify the facts of the case, enhance the process control of the parties to the dispute settlement, and ensure the factual and legal accuracy of the report of the expert group, but also restrict the judiciary of the appellate body and the legal nature of the appellate body. Authority, placing the Appellate Body in an unfavorable passive position. Not only that, the function of the mid-term review process is limited by various reasons. One of the functions of the mid-term review procedure is to provide the party with an opportunity to achieve a satisfactory solution to both parties before the final decision is made, but based on the reality of the case. As well as national interests, the motive of the intention of Fang Dacheng is not strong. The previous case shows that it is true. In addition, the existence of the appellate procedure limits the function of the medium-term review process to clarify the legal facts, because the appellant can make a new legal argument in the appellate procedure. Therefore, it is not necessary to be in the expert group. The mid-term review process will continue to be retained, and there is no need to extend it to the appeal procedure.
The decision procedure of the appellate body is a perfect model in the field of collegial decision-making. It not only satisfies the strict time limit, but also avoids disagreement and maintains a high unity of decision-making opinion. The democratic decision analysis method of economics and law and the decision procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States provide us with the analysis of the decision procedure of the appellate body. The decision procedure of the appellate body includes the three party voting group decision procedure and the opinion exchange procedure. The exchange procedure allows all members of the appellate body to participate in the trial, although the final decision is made by the members of the voting group, but the members of the non voting group have the right to dissenter, and the members of the voting group are required. The decision procedure is guaranteed to a certain extent on the consideration of all aspects of the decision, and the final decision-making power is still in the hands of the members of the voting group, thus ensuring the efficiency of the decision-making process. The appellate organization's decision-making process has achieved efficient decisions at a very low cost, and the skills and Strategies of the decision are worthy of me. We can use it for reference.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：D996.1

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