本文選題：最惠國待遇 + 投資爭端　； 參考：《河北法學(xué)》2010年01期

【摘要】：投資者是否可以根據(jù)基礎(chǔ)條約中的最惠國待遇條款主張?jiān)谌綏l約中的爭端解決條款是近年來國際投資仲裁實(shí)踐中產(chǎn)生的新問題。各仲裁庭對(duì)該問題的認(rèn)識(shí)雖不統(tǒng)一,但基本上都不否認(rèn)措辭寬泛的最惠國待遇條款可以應(yīng)用于爭端解決事項(xiàng)的可能性。問題的關(guān)鍵在于應(yīng)該在什么程度上限制最惠國待遇條款適用于爭端解決事項(xiàng)�？偟膩碚f,措辭含糊的最惠國待遇條款的適用不應(yīng)凌駕于投資條約締約方通過談判達(dá)成的明確表示其意圖的爭端解決條款之上,不能創(chuàng)造出本不存在的東道國提交仲裁的同意,亦不能用于規(guī)避基礎(chǔ)條約中規(guī)定提交仲裁的實(shí)質(zhì)性前置條件。
[Abstract]:Whether the investor can invoke the dispute settlement clause in the third party treaty according to the most-favoured-nation clause in the basic treaty is a new problem in the practice of international investment arbitration in recent years. Although different arbitral tribunals do not agree on this issue, they do not deny the possibility that the broad most-favoured-nation treatment clause can be applied to dispute settlement matters. The crux of the matter is the extent to which MFN clauses should apply to dispute settlement matters. In general, the application of the vaguely worded MFN clause should not override the dispute settlement clauses negotiated by the parties to the investment treaty and would not create the consent of the non-existent host State to submit to arbitration, Nor can it be used to circumvent the substantive preconditions stipulated in the underlying treaty for submission to arbitration.
【作者單位】： 深圳大學(xué)法學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：D996.4

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