本文選題：WTO + 報復(fù)制度��； 參考：《華東政法大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：當(dāng)下正處于世界經(jīng)濟快速發(fā)展的時代，不同國家之間日益頻繁的貿(mào)易往來，不僅從微觀上給各國帶來了經(jīng)濟上的利益和文化上的傳播，而且從宏觀上更好地分配了全球的有限資源，往往使得各方達(dá)到互惠互利的結(jié)果。這也是為什么各國希望能夠加入WTO組織，希望能夠通過這種相互約束的方式來促進(jìn)和維持世界貿(mào)易的有序進(jìn)行。但各國在貿(mào)易往來之中，也不免出于各種國內(nèi)利益的需求或國際環(huán)境的考慮而采取破環(huán)國際貿(mào)易往來平衡的貿(mào)易措施，從而引起兩個或多個國家之間的紛爭。當(dāng)這種紛爭出現(xiàn)在WTO涵蓋的協(xié)定范圍內(nèi)時，，往往有一方被認(rèn)為是違反了WTO的涵蓋協(xié)定，而因這種違反協(xié)定的行為而蒙受損失一方則可以求助于WTO爭端解決機制下的爭端解決機制，在爭端解決機制的專家組、上訴機構(gòu)作出報告，而“敗訴方”拒絕執(zhí)行，“勝訴方”可以向WTO爭端解決機構(gòu)申請報復(fù)授權(quán)，以此制止違反協(xié)定方的行為，同時可從中或多或少的獲得一些補償。由此可知，WTO爭端解決機制下的報復(fù)制度在維護(hù)世界貿(mào)易秩序方面起著很重要的作用。該制度的存在對解決爭端方的紛爭、重新平衡國際貿(mào)易秩序確實起到了一定的積極效果。但隨著不同爭端案例的出現(xiàn)，在報復(fù)制度越來越多次的實踐應(yīng)用過程中，WTO的專家組成員、各成員國和學(xué)者逐漸發(fā)現(xiàn)了一些該報復(fù)制度的不足之處，這些不足點往往使得報復(fù)制度在應(yīng)對一些違反協(xié)定的措施時顯得無能為力。為此，各方紛紛從自己或整個國際經(jīng)濟的角度考慮，提出相關(guān)改善WTO下報復(fù)制度的意見。本文在闡述WTO爭端解決機制下報復(fù)制度的不足的基礎(chǔ)上，進(jìn)一步探討改進(jìn)和完善WTO下報復(fù)制度的提議，并以WTO報復(fù)制度的價值目標(biāo)為導(dǎo)向，分析這些提議的合理性和不合理性。 本文的引言部分將報復(fù)制度的地位和作用做了初步的介紹，并凸顯出WTO爭端解決機制下報復(fù)制度的獨特之處。正文分為三個部分，第一部分對從總體概念、程序和實體角度對WTO爭端解決機制下的報復(fù)制度進(jìn)行了簡略的說明。第二部分則對WTO下報復(fù)制度的主要價值目標(biāo)進(jìn)行了分析，認(rèn)為其當(dāng)下主要的價值目標(biāo)為督促違反協(xié)定方執(zhí)行建議和裁決，并附帶其他次要價值目標(biāo)。第三部分，在分析一些案例并闡述各成員國提出的完善報復(fù)制度的提議的前提下，以第二部分認(rèn)定的報復(fù)制度的價值目標(biāo)為導(dǎo)向，分析各種提議的合理性與否，同時表達(dá)一些自己的看法，以此試圖找到完善WTO爭端解決機制下報復(fù)制度的方式方法。
[Abstract]:At present, with the rapid development of the world economy, the increasingly frequent trade exchanges between different countries have not only brought economic benefits and cultural dissemination to all countries from a micro perspective,Moreover, the global limited resources are better allocated macroscopically, which makes the parties achieve mutually beneficial results.This is why countries want to join the WTO and hope to promote and maintain the orderly conduct of world trade in this mutually binding way.However, in the course of trade, countries can not avoid taking the trade measures of breaking the balance of international trade out of the needs of various domestic interests or the consideration of international environment, thus causing disputes between two or more countries.When such disputes arise within the scope of the agreement covered by the WTO, one party is often considered to have violated the WTO's coverage agreement.A party who has suffered a loss as a result of this violation of the agreement may resort to the dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, where the panel of experts of the dispute settlement mechanism makes a report to the appellate body and the "losing party" refuses to implement it.The "winning party" may apply to the WTO dispute settlement body for an authorization to retaliate in order to stop the breach of the agreement and to obtain more or less some compensation from it.Therefore, the retaliation system under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism plays an important role in maintaining the world trade order.The existence of this system does play a positive role in resolving disputes and rebalancing the international trade order.However, with the emergence of different dispute cases, in the course of more and more practical application of the retaliation system, members of the WTO expert group, member States and scholars have gradually discovered some deficiencies of the retaliation system.These shortcomings often make the retaliation system seem powerless to deal with some measures that violate the agreement.Therefore, from the point of view of their own international economy or the whole international economy, the parties put forward some suggestions on how to improve the retaliation system under WTO.On the basis of expounding the deficiency of the retaliation system under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, this paper further discusses the proposals to improve and perfect the retaliation system under the WTO, and analyses the rationality and irrationality of these proposals, guided by the value goal of the WTO retaliation system.The introduction of this paper introduces the status and function of retaliation system, and highlights the unique features of revenge system under WTO dispute settlement mechanism.The text is divided into three parts. The first part briefly explains the retaliation system under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism from the overall concept, procedure and entity.The second part analyzes the main value goals of the retaliation system under WTO, and holds that its main value goal is to urge the violators to carry out the recommendations and rulings, and to attach other secondary value objectives.The third part, on the premise of analyzing some cases and expounding the proposal of perfecting the retaliation system put forward by each member country, taking the value target of the retaliation system recognized in the second part as the guidance, analyzing the rationality or not of the various proposals.At the same time, this paper tries to find ways and means to perfect the retaliation system under the dispute settlement mechanism of WTO.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D996.1

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本文編號：1732509