本文關(guān)鍵詞： WTO 報復(fù)水平 仲裁　出處：《山西大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：作為WTO爭端解決執(zhí)行程序中最后的、最強有力的強制措施,報復(fù)在爭端解決執(zhí)行程序中占有著非常重要的地位,它不僅強化了WTO執(zhí)行力度和執(zhí)行機制,同時還極大的提高了執(zhí)行機制的有效性和可靠性,爭端各方的利益也得到了重新平衡。然而報復(fù)必須被限定在一定范圍內(nèi),即報復(fù)水平與違法措施所造成的利益的喪失或損害必須相當(dāng)。在實踐中,WTO成員常常因為報復(fù)水平產(chǎn)生糾紛,從而訴諸WTO下的報復(fù)水平仲裁。另一方面,由于WTO相關(guān)規(guī)定的原則性,實踐中產(chǎn)生很多理解上的分歧和適用方面的困難。因此,以相關(guān)案件為基礎(chǔ),對報復(fù)水平仲裁進行專門研究,對國際貿(mào)易爭端的解決、經(jīng)濟秩序的穩(wěn)定和我國在國際貿(mào)易中合法權(quán)益的維護具有重要意義。 本文運用案例分析、文獻分析、比較分析等方法對WTO爭端解決機制中報復(fù)水平仲裁中涉及的程序問題和實體問題進行深入的探究,以期為我國充分、合理利用WTO爭端解決機制提供理論指導(dǎo)。 除引言和結(jié)論外,論文分為三個部分。 第一部分論述WTO體制下報復(fù)措施的特點及意義。WTO體制下的報復(fù)具有臨時性、最后性、非懲罰性和法定性等特點。實施報復(fù)需要滿足部門順序要求和程度要求。就部門順序而言,實施報復(fù)應(yīng)按照同部門、同協(xié)定和跨協(xié)定的順序?qū)嵤＞统潭纫蠖?實施報復(fù)的水平應(yīng)當(dāng)與利益喪失或損害的水平保持相當(dāng)。報復(fù)的實施不僅可以提高執(zhí)行效率,還能強化執(zhí)行力度,有利于爭端的積極解決。與一般的仲裁相比,報復(fù)水平仲裁有其自己獨有的特點,它僅存于執(zhí)行階段,具有特定性、臨時性、強制性等特點。 第二部分以DSU的相關(guān)規(guī)定為基礎(chǔ),結(jié)合爭端解決實踐中仲裁員對具體案件的解釋,全面分析報復(fù)水平仲裁的程序問題。具體包括：仲裁的申請、仲裁員的選定、仲裁員的職責(zé)、舉證責(zé)任、第三方權(quán)利、報復(fù)水平仲裁程序的中止、報復(fù)水平仲裁與裁決執(zhí)行復(fù)審程序之間的“順序問題”。 第三部分論述WTO體制下報復(fù)水平仲裁的實體問題,主要包括計算報復(fù)水平的起始日期和報復(fù)水平的計算方式。就報復(fù)水平的起始日期而言,DSU并沒有明確的規(guī)定,在報復(fù)水平仲裁的實踐中,往往依靠仲裁員綜合多方面因素進行確定。結(jié)合各成員對報復(fù)水平起始日期的提出改革建議,作者認(rèn)為應(yīng)將其確定為DSB通過上訴機構(gòu)或者專家組報告之日。關(guān)于報復(fù)水平的計算方式,DSU只有原則性的規(guī)定,僅起指導(dǎo)作用。作者在總結(jié)爭端解決實踐中的五種計算方式,即實際/反事實分析方式、等同方式、推算方式、經(jīng)濟模式方式、對等方式的基礎(chǔ)上,指出仲裁員和爭端方計算時應(yīng)根據(jù)案件的具體情況,選擇適當(dāng)?shù)挠嬎惴绞健?br/>[Abstract]:As the last and most powerful coercive measure in the WTO dispute settlement enforcement procedure, retaliation plays a very important role in the dispute settlement enforcement procedure. It not only strengthens the enforcement strength and mechanism of WTO, but also strengthens the enforcement mechanism of WTO. It also greatly improves the effectiveness and reliability of the enforcement mechanism and rebalances the interests of the parties to the dispute. However, retaliation must be limited to a certain extent. That is, the level of retaliation must be equal to the loss or damage to the interests caused by illegal measures. In practice, WTO members often have disputes over the level of retaliation, and thus resort to the level of retaliation arbitration under the WTO. On the other hand, Because of the principle of the relevant regulations of WTO, there are many differences in understanding and difficulties in application in practice. Therefore, based on the relevant cases, the arbitration of retaliation level has been specially studied, and the settlement of international trade disputes has been carried out. The stability of economic order and the protection of China's legitimate rights and interests in international trade are of great significance. In this paper, case analysis, literature analysis, comparative analysis and other methods are used to deeply explore the procedural and substantive issues involved in the level of retaliation arbitration in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, in order to make full use of it in our country. Reasonable use of WTO dispute settlement mechanism to provide theoretical guidance. In addition to the introduction and conclusions, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the characteristics and significance of the retaliatory measures under the WTO system. The retaliation under the WTO system is temporary and final. Characteristics such as non-punitive and statutory... the enforcement of retaliation requires the fulfilment of sectoral order and degree requirements... in terms of sectoral order, retaliation shall be carried out in the same sector, in the same agreement and in the order of cross-agreement... as far as the degree requirement is concerned, The level of retaliation should be equal to the level of loss of interest or damage. The enforcement of retaliation can not only improve the efficiency of enforcement, but also strengthen enforcement, which is conducive to the positive settlement of disputes. Retaliation level arbitration has its own unique characteristics, it only exists in the execution stage, it has the characteristics of specificity, temporary, mandatory and so on. The second part is based on the relevant provisions of DSU, combined with the arbitrators' interpretation of specific cases in the practice of dispute settlement, comprehensively analyzes the procedural issues of retaliation level arbitration, including: the application for arbitration, the selection of arbitrators, Duties of arbitrators, burden of proof, third-party rights, suspension of retaliation level arbitration proceedings, "order issues" between level of retaliation arbitration and award enforcement review proceedings. The third part discusses the substantive issues of the level of retaliation arbitration under the WTO system, mainly including the calculation of the starting date of the level of retaliation and the calculation method of the level of retaliation. There is no clear stipulation on the starting date of the level of retaliation. In the practice of retaliation level arbitration, the arbitrators often rely on the arbitrators to synthesize various factors for determination. In combination with the reform proposals made by the members on the starting date of the retaliation level, The author holds that it should be determined as the date on which the DSB is reported by the appellate body or the panel of experts. The calculation of the level of retaliation is only a matter of principle and only serves as a guide. The author has five methods of calculation in summing up the practice of dispute settlement. On the basis of actual / counterfactual analysis, equivalent, reckoning, economic model and equivalence, it is pointed out that the arbitrators and disputing parties should choose appropriate calculation methods according to the specific circumstances of the case.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D996.1

【引證文獻】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 謝宇;WTO跨協(xié)定交叉報復(fù)法律機制研究[D];西北大學(xué);2013年

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本文編號：1523452