本文選題：清代審轉(zhuǎn)制度 + 規(guī)避策略　； 參考：《貴州大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：針對地方命盜重案,清代設(shè)計出了多重功能的審轉(zhuǎn)制度,以期達到控制地方司法權(quán),追求司法公正的目標。清代地方司法實踐運作的考察卻呈現(xiàn)出了另一幅圖景,清代地方審轉(zhuǎn)制度并沒有達到設(shè)計的預(yù)期,甚至產(chǎn)生了制度背離的現(xiàn)象,清代地方官在審轉(zhuǎn)制度下往往會采取一系列的規(guī)避策略,以擺脫制度的束縛。本文以清代審轉(zhuǎn)制度下地方官的規(guī)避策略作為研究對象,通過對相關(guān)典籍,檔案及案例資料的梳理,概括出地方官員采用的主要規(guī)避策略及其具體的實施手段,進一步分析其形成原因,最后則探討其現(xiàn)實意義。本文的內(nèi)容從結(jié)構(gòu)上分為五個部分。緒論部分,對于相關(guān)研究的學(xué)術(shù)史進行回顧和分析,同時對于本文使用的主要概念進行界定,介紹使用的基本史料及采取的研究路徑。第一章,對于清代審轉(zhuǎn)制度的制度設(shè)計及其理念進行論述。制度設(shè)計方面主要包括了審轉(zhuǎn)制度的歷史沿革以及清代審轉(zhuǎn)制度的具體規(guī)定。理念方面則從控權(quán)和慎刑兩個方面進行了討論,認為清代審轉(zhuǎn)制度的目的在于控制地方司法權(quán)與追求司法公正之間的平衡。第二章,對于清代審轉(zhuǎn)制度下地方官的規(guī)避策略進行論述。具體來看,其一是釜底抽薪的規(guī)避策略,即清代地方官會通過隱匿不報以及自行外結(jié)的手段,將案件排除于審轉(zhuǎn)制度之外或者掌控在地方權(quán)限范圍之內(nèi);其二是鍛煉彌縫的規(guī)避策略,即通過對于司法文書的精心制作,達到天衣無縫,駁無可駁;其三是上下勾連的規(guī)避策略,即通過多種渠道,形成利益共同體,尋求上級的回護。第三章,對于地方官采取規(guī)避策略的原因進行了博弈分析。通過引入博弈論的相關(guān)理論,分別對于制度設(shè)計及制度運行建立博弈模型并求解,認為由于制度初創(chuàng)時成本收益的失衡,導(dǎo)致了制度預(yù)期博弈均衡的偏離,產(chǎn)生了預(yù)期之外的均衡。制度運行中片面地提升懲處力度并不能有效降低官員采取規(guī)避策略的概率,而隨著懲處力度的不斷增加,反而加重了這種偏離。結(jié)語部分,對全文進行簡要回顧并論述了對于當代的啟示意義,認為制度的設(shè)計必須充分考慮人的社會人與經(jīng)濟人的雙重屬性,摒棄過于理想化的設(shè)計,通過合理的制度設(shè)計,引導(dǎo)法官將自利行為與司法公正融為一體,將制度規(guī)范內(nèi)化為法官的自主行為,從而最終實現(xiàn)制度與行動者的協(xié)調(diào)統(tǒng)一。
[Abstract]:In order to control the local judicial power and pursue the judicial justice, the Qing Dynasty designed a multi-function trial and transfer system in view of the serious case of local order theft. However, the investigation of the local judicial practice in the Qing Dynasty showed another picture. The local trial and transformation system in the Qing Dynasty did not meet the design expectations, and even produced the phenomenon of system deviation. Local officials in the Qing Dynasty often adopted a series of circumvention strategies in order to get rid of the shackles of the system. This paper takes the circumvention strategy of local officials under the system of trial and transfer in Qing Dynasty as the research object, through combing the relevant classics, archives and case data, summarizes the main circumvention strategies adopted by local officials and their specific means of implementation. Further analysis of the causes of its formation, and finally explore its practical significance. The content of this paper is divided into five parts from the structure. In the introduction part, the author reviews and analyzes the academic history of relevant research, defines the main concepts used in this paper, introduces the basic historical materials used and the research path adopted. The first chapter discusses the system design and concept of Qing Dynasty. The system design mainly includes the historical evolution of the system and the specific provisions of the system in the Qing Dynasty. On the other hand, the author discusses from two aspects of control power and careful punishment, and thinks that the purpose of the system of trial and transfer in Qing Dynasty is to control the balance between the local judicial power and the pursuit of judicial justice. The second chapter discusses the circumvention strategy of the local officials in the Qing Dynasty. Concretely, one is the strategy of evading the basic salary, that is, the local officials of the Qing Dynasty will exclude the case from the system of trial and transfer or control the scope of local jurisdiction through the means of hiding and not reporting. The second is the strategy of circumventing the training seam, that is, through the careful production of judicial documents, to achieve seamless, refutable; third, up and down the evasive strategy, that is, through a variety of channels to form a community of interests, to seek the protection of the superior. In the third chapter, game analysis is made on the reasons why local officials take circumvention strategy. By introducing the relevant theory of game theory, the game model of system design and system operation is established and solved, and it is considered that the imbalance of cost and income in the initial stage of institution leads to the deviation of institutional expected game equilibrium. An unexpected equilibrium is created. The one-sided increase of punishment in the operation of the system can not effectively reduce the probability of officials taking circumvention strategy, but with the increasing of punishment, the deviation is aggravated. In the conclusion part, the author briefly reviews the full text and discusses the enlightening significance for the contemporary era. The author thinks that the design of the system must fully consider the dual attributes of the social person and the economic person, and abandon the design that is too idealized, and adopt the reasonable system design. To guide judges to integrate self-interest behavior with judicial justice, and to internalize institutional norms as judges' autonomous behavior, so as to achieve the coordination and unification of institutions and actors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：貴州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：D929
，

本文編號：1931364