意識研究的第一人稱方法論探究
發(fā)布時間：2018-09-05 12:09
【摘要】：意識的覺知感是人最親熟、最不可懷疑的實在,但這種實在是主體性的。主體性使得對意識的認識和研究不可避免地要采取和包含第一人稱的視角。然而,與科學(xué)史上得到充分發(fā)展并受到極度尊崇的對象化的或客觀化的(objectified)第三人稱研究方法相比,意識的第一人稱研究只在最近20-30年間,藉由意識科學(xué)的建立,才緩慢地在科學(xué)界取得了合法性。本文正是以意識科學(xué)這20-30年的發(fā)展為背景,力圖系統(tǒng)地考察意識的第一人稱方法論的諸方面。首先,在第一章,本文論述了為什么必須對意識的第一人稱方法進行考察。由于意識體驗的主體性,意識科學(xué)從一開始就遇到了一個障礙,即"難問題"。"難問題"所帶來的第一和第三人稱視角之間的"解釋鴻溝",使得意識科學(xué),即使拋開意識的存在論問題(即心-身問題)不論,也仍然面臨著一個方法論問題。事實上,在意識科學(xué)試圖確立意識體驗的相關(guān)可觀察的物理事實(這些事實可能是神經(jīng)的,也可能是量子的)之前,我們首先要對意識體驗是什么(即體驗的類型、結(jié)構(gòu)和內(nèi)容)有一個清晰、恰當(dāng)?shù)拿枋觥Ｍǔ?科學(xué)方法要求對物理事件的實驗、觀察、描述和分析需要達到主體和交互主體(inter-subject)的可重復(fù)驗證;現(xiàn)在當(dāng)要實驗、觀察、描述和分析的對象變?yōu)橐庾R體驗本身時,我們需要依靠主體對自身意識體驗的自我揭示(self-disclose)和報告。如果說觀察物理事件被認為是第三人稱的,那么這種體驗的自我揭示和報告就是第一人稱的。研究意識狀態(tài)的好的心理學(xué)、現(xiàn)象學(xué)和認知科學(xué)都需要依賴好的第一人稱方法。因此,意識科學(xué)研究的一個基本環(huán)節(jié)就是對第一人稱方法論做系統(tǒng)的辯護和論證。本文余下章節(jié)的論述思路循如下四個方面展開:(1)第一人稱方法的意識理論基礎(chǔ)。既然第一人稱方法的內(nèi)容是關(guān)于意識體驗的自我揭示和報告,因此一個需要回答的問題是意識體驗何以能夠自我揭示和報告,換言之,意識體驗的自我揭示和報告的基礎(chǔ)是什么?在第二章中,為從理論上回應(yīng)這一問題,我們考察了諸如"反思"、"注意"、"無意識"、"自身覺知"等諸多意識結(jié)構(gòu)的相關(guān)理論。我們認為,意識的單一水平的"自身覺知"特性,從意識結(jié)構(gòu)上給出了意識體驗自我揭示的基礎(chǔ)。在這方面,佛教傳統(tǒng)的心智理論和"自證分"、"自證現(xiàn)量"、"瑜伽現(xiàn)量"等理論也為我們提供了豐富的理論資源。(2)第一人稱方法的種類及其相應(yīng)問題。第一人稱方法有哪些種類?如何開展第一人稱方法?第一人稱方法實踐中存在哪些困難?在第三章中,我們主要考察了心理學(xué)內(nèi)省、現(xiàn)象學(xué)還原與懸擱、佛教禪定訓(xùn)練和第二人稱訪談技巧這些第一人稱方法,并試圖明晰這些方法的具體操作程序,以及探討實踐操作中的困難。例如,瓦雷拉用"變得覺知"的模型描述了"懸擱"的操作程序;我們也試圖嘗試了明晰佛教禪修實踐最一般的范式——"止"、"觀"的操作模型。(3)第一人稱方法下產(chǎn)生的第一人稱報告的效度問題。作為一種科學(xué)的方法,我們需要為第一人稱報告的有效性方面做出辯護;以及如何評價第一人稱方法的科學(xué)效度,即它的有效性、穩(wěn)定性和準確性?在第四章中,首先我們辯護了第一人稱報告的有效性�，F(xiàn)象學(xué)的"生活世界"與后現(xiàn)代從社會、文化的視角對認知的理解,已經(jīng)打破了"唯我論"對意識研究的禁錮一一我們的心智本質(zhì)上就是主體間性在先的。其次,庫恩之后,一種絕對中立的觀察已不復(fù)存在,知識的有效性從一種"無主體"的客觀性轉(zhuǎn)換為了一種"陳述行為一致性"的有效性。加之體驗類和體驗報告具有可重復(fù)性和可公共通達性,第一人稱報告的有效性能夠得以"正名"。在第一人稱數(shù)據(jù)的效度方面,我們則需要提供更多促進第一人稱報告準確表達的手段,例如研究者需要擁有一個熟諳第一人稱方法操作程序及其體驗的第二人稱視角,設(shè)計良好的相關(guān)問題列表,減小實驗偏差,以及實現(xiàn)體驗報告的"主體間-神經(jīng)-現(xiàn)象學(xué)"相互驗證等。(4)第一人稱方法的應(yīng)用與研究的現(xiàn)狀、展望。在第五章中,我們展示了根據(jù)第一人稱方法,利用第一人稱專門知識,在禪修的神經(jīng)科學(xué)研究、神經(jīng)現(xiàn)象學(xué)研究等方面,如何更好地實現(xiàn)了對體驗的神經(jīng)對應(yīng)物的研究。在第六章中,我們簡要對比和評估了各種第一人稱方法,并概述了這個領(lǐng)域研究的現(xiàn)狀和未來趨勢。意識科學(xué)的第一人稱方法論研究的興起是在一個跨學(xué)科(哲學(xué)與科學(xué))和跨傳統(tǒng)(東方與西方)的背景下展開的,盡管我們在本文中盡力建構(gòu)一個全面的框架,但仍然有許多細節(jié)研究有待補充。意識科學(xué)的第一人稱方法論的未來研究空間是廣闊的。
[Abstract]:Consciousness is the most intimate and unquestionable reality, but it is subjectivity. Subjectivity inevitably leads to the adoption and inclusion of a first-person perspective in the understanding and study of consciousness. However, it is objectified or objectified, which has been fully developed and highly respected in the history of science. Compared with the method of person study, the first person study of consciousness has only slowly gained its legitimacy in the scientific circles in the last 20-30 years. This paper is based on the development of consciousness science in the past 20-30 years, trying to systematically examine various aspects of the first person methodology of consciousness. Because of the subjectivity of consciousness experience, consciousness science encounters an obstacle from the very beginning, that is, the "difficult problem". The "explanatory gap" between the first and third person perspectives brought about by the "difficult problem" makes consciousness science, even if the ontological problem of consciousness (i.e. mind-body) is put aside. In fact, before conscious science attempts to establish observable physical facts about conscious experience, which may be neurological or quantum, we must first have a clear and appropriate understanding of what conscious experience is (i.e. the type, structure and content of experience). Normally, scientific methods require that experiments, observations, descriptions, and analyses of physical events be re-validated by the subject and the inter-subject; now, when the object of experiment, observation, description and analysis becomes the conscious experience itself, we need to rely on the subject's self-disclosure of the conscious experience. If observing physical events is considered to be a third person, the self-disclosure and reporting of such experiences is the first person. Good psychology, phenomenology, and cognitive science of the state of consciousness all rely on good first-person methods. Methodologies are systematically defended and demonstrated. The ideas discussed in the remaining chapters of this paper are as follows: (1) the theoretical basis of consciousness in the first person method. In other words, what is the basis for self-disclosure and reporting of conscious experience? In Chapter 2, in order to theoretically respond to this question, we examine a number of relevant theories about the structure of consciousness, such as "reflection", "attention", "unconsciousness" and "self-awareness". We believe that the "self-awareness" characteristic of a single level of consciousness is structurally related to the structure of consciousness. In this respect, the traditional Buddhist theories of mind and self-identification, self-identification, and Yoga also provide us with abundant theoretical resources. (2) The types of first-person methods and their corresponding problems. In Chapter 3, we examine the first-person methods of introspection, phenomenological reduction and suspension, Buddhist meditation training and second-person interview techniques, and try to clarify the specific operating procedures of these methods, as well as explore the difficulties in practical operation. For example, Valera uses "change" The model of perception describes the operating procedure of "suspension"; we also attempt to clarify the operating model of "stop" and "view", the most common paradigm of Buddhist meditation practice. (3) The validity of the first-person report arising from the first-person approach. As a scientific approach, we need to address the validity of the first-person report. In Chapter Four, we first defend the validity of the first-person report. Phenomenological "life world" and postmodern understanding of cognition from a social and cultural perspective have broken the "solipsism" of consciousness research. Secondly, after Kuhn, an absolutely neutral observation ceases to exist, and the validity of knowledge is transformed from the objectivity of a "non-subject" to the validity of a "consistency of declarative behavior". Moreover, experience and experience reports are repeatable and publicly available. In terms of the validity of the first-person data, we need to provide more means to promote the accurate expression of the first-person report. For example, researchers need to have a second-person perspective familiar with the first-person method operation procedures and their experience, and well-designed related issues. In the fifth chapter, we show the application and research status of the first-person method, using the first-person expertise in the study of meditative neuroscience and neurophenomenology. In Chapter 6, we briefly compare and evaluate various first-person methods, and outline the current situation and future trends in this field. The rise of the first-person methodology in consciousness science is in an interdisciplinary (philosophical and scientific) and intertraditional (oriental). In the context of the West, although we try to construct a comprehensive framework in this paper, there are still many details to be added. The future research space of the first-person methodology of consciousness science is vast.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：B016.9
，
本文編號：2224222
[Abstract]:Consciousness is the most intimate and unquestionable reality, but it is subjectivity. Subjectivity inevitably leads to the adoption and inclusion of a first-person perspective in the understanding and study of consciousness. However, it is objectified or objectified, which has been fully developed and highly respected in the history of science. Compared with the method of person study, the first person study of consciousness has only slowly gained its legitimacy in the scientific circles in the last 20-30 years. This paper is based on the development of consciousness science in the past 20-30 years, trying to systematically examine various aspects of the first person methodology of consciousness. Because of the subjectivity of consciousness experience, consciousness science encounters an obstacle from the very beginning, that is, the "difficult problem". The "explanatory gap" between the first and third person perspectives brought about by the "difficult problem" makes consciousness science, even if the ontological problem of consciousness (i.e. mind-body) is put aside. In fact, before conscious science attempts to establish observable physical facts about conscious experience, which may be neurological or quantum, we must first have a clear and appropriate understanding of what conscious experience is (i.e. the type, structure and content of experience). Normally, scientific methods require that experiments, observations, descriptions, and analyses of physical events be re-validated by the subject and the inter-subject; now, when the object of experiment, observation, description and analysis becomes the conscious experience itself, we need to rely on the subject's self-disclosure of the conscious experience. If observing physical events is considered to be a third person, the self-disclosure and reporting of such experiences is the first person. Good psychology, phenomenology, and cognitive science of the state of consciousness all rely on good first-person methods. Methodologies are systematically defended and demonstrated. The ideas discussed in the remaining chapters of this paper are as follows: (1) the theoretical basis of consciousness in the first person method. In other words, what is the basis for self-disclosure and reporting of conscious experience? In Chapter 2, in order to theoretically respond to this question, we examine a number of relevant theories about the structure of consciousness, such as "reflection", "attention", "unconsciousness" and "self-awareness". We believe that the "self-awareness" characteristic of a single level of consciousness is structurally related to the structure of consciousness. In this respect, the traditional Buddhist theories of mind and self-identification, self-identification, and Yoga also provide us with abundant theoretical resources. (2) The types of first-person methods and their corresponding problems. In Chapter 3, we examine the first-person methods of introspection, phenomenological reduction and suspension, Buddhist meditation training and second-person interview techniques, and try to clarify the specific operating procedures of these methods, as well as explore the difficulties in practical operation. For example, Valera uses "change" The model of perception describes the operating procedure of "suspension"; we also attempt to clarify the operating model of "stop" and "view", the most common paradigm of Buddhist meditation practice. (3) The validity of the first-person report arising from the first-person approach. As a scientific approach, we need to address the validity of the first-person report. In Chapter Four, we first defend the validity of the first-person report. Phenomenological "life world" and postmodern understanding of cognition from a social and cultural perspective have broken the "solipsism" of consciousness research. Secondly, after Kuhn, an absolutely neutral observation ceases to exist, and the validity of knowledge is transformed from the objectivity of a "non-subject" to the validity of a "consistency of declarative behavior". Moreover, experience and experience reports are repeatable and publicly available. In terms of the validity of the first-person data, we need to provide more means to promote the accurate expression of the first-person report. For example, researchers need to have a second-person perspective familiar with the first-person method operation procedures and their experience, and well-designed related issues. In the fifth chapter, we show the application and research status of the first-person method, using the first-person expertise in the study of meditative neuroscience and neurophenomenology. In Chapter 6, we briefly compare and evaluate various first-person methods, and outline the current situation and future trends in this field. The rise of the first-person methodology in consciousness science is in an interdisciplinary (philosophical and scientific) and intertraditional (oriental). In the context of the West, although we try to construct a comprehensive framework in this paper, there are still many details to be added. The future research space of the first-person methodology of consciousness science is vast.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：B016.9
，
本文編號：2224222
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/zhexuezongjiaolunwen/2224222.html
