【摘要】：知識(shí)論是當(dāng)代西方分析哲學(xué)研究的重要領(lǐng)域,傳統(tǒng)的知識(shí)定義是得到確證的真信念,但葛梯爾的反例卻說(shuō)明滿足這三個(gè)條件(真、信念、確證)不一定是知識(shí),因?yàn)榭赡苤皇桥既粸檎婊蛘呋糜X。因此,人們將研究重心集中在確證上,認(rèn)為使信念得到適當(dāng)?shù)拇_證比定義知識(shí)更為重要,我們所持有的信念必須是得到恰當(dāng)證據(jù)支持的。對(duì)知識(shí)的分析主要是從確證上入手的。證據(jù)主義作為當(dāng)代知識(shí)論流派中的一個(gè),強(qiáng)調(diào)知識(shí)的確證建立在證據(jù)與命題的合理聯(lián)系上。知識(shí)論中的“證據(jù)”一詞主要是來(lái)源于證據(jù)主義,齊碩姆將證據(jù)看做是為命題提供無(wú)可懷疑的認(rèn)知評(píng)價(jià),他把證據(jù)的確證狀態(tài)看做是“明證的”,其確證的程度介于真和確定之間,確證的證據(jù)是知覺命題。諾齊克也要求命題的確證在于證據(jù),只不過(guò)和齊碩姆不同,諾齊克強(qiáng)調(diào)證據(jù)是事實(shí)與命題之間的真實(shí)聯(lián)系,而不是“我想”、“我以為”之類的知覺命題。費(fèi)德曼和柯內(nèi)在齊碩姆和諾齊克的基礎(chǔ)上建立起了證據(jù)主義,它遵循的是傳統(tǒng)的知識(shí)分析理論,強(qiáng)調(diào)知識(shí)的確證因素集中在證據(jù)之上,認(rèn)知者的信念之所以是確證的,是由于具有與認(rèn)知者的信念態(tài)度相契合的證據(jù)。證據(jù)主義明確主張確證完全取決于證據(jù),認(rèn)為一信念在認(rèn)識(shí)上的確證,是由認(rèn)知者有關(guān)該信念的證據(jù)性質(zhì)所決定的。證據(jù)主義研究的主要內(nèi)容包括證據(jù)的界定,如何擁有證據(jù),證據(jù)與信念命題之間的關(guān)系,以及證據(jù)對(duì)信念命題的確證作用等。有關(guān)證據(jù)主義的研究主要是由齊碩姆、諾齊克、費(fèi)德曼等人做出的,齊碩姆的《知識(shí)論》、諾齊克的《哲學(xué)的解釋》和費(fèi)德曼的“證據(jù)主義”理論都對(duì)證據(jù)的上述內(nèi)容進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)說(shuō)明。本文對(duì)證據(jù)主義確證理論的思想來(lái)源、本質(zhì)內(nèi)涵、確證要素和認(rèn)知關(guān)系進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)梳理,給出了一些證據(jù)確證方案,但證據(jù)確證本身卻面臨著內(nèi)在主義和外在主義、基礎(chǔ)主義和一致主義,以及確證規(guī)范的困境。針對(duì)這些確證困難,費(fèi)德曼對(duì)確證理論的重構(gòu)、合理性解釋和蘇珊·哈克的證據(jù)向度說(shuō)明無(wú)疑具有較強(qiáng)的說(shuō)服力,但也有各自的不足,本文從實(shí)用確證和語(yǔ)境原則角度試圖給知識(shí)的證據(jù)確證理論提供一種可行的解決途徑,為知識(shí)的本質(zhì)與限度提供一種合理的解釋方式。
[Abstract]:The theory of knowledge is an important field in contemporary western analytical philosophy. The traditional definition of knowledge is a true belief, but Gertier's counterexample shows that meeting these three conditions (truth, belief, confirmation) is not necessarily knowledge. Because it may just happen to be true or hallucination. Therefore, people focus on corroboration and believe that it is more important to obtain proper corroboration than to define knowledge, and that our beliefs must be supported by appropriate evidence. The analysis of knowledge is mainly from corroboration. As one of the contemporary schools of knowledge theory, evidentialism emphasizes that the corroboration of knowledge is based on the reasonable connection between evidence and proposition. The word "evidence" in the theory of knowledge is mainly derived from evidentialism. He regards evidence as providing an unquestionable cognitive evaluation for propositions, and he regards the state of corroboration of evidence as "clear proof". The degree of corroboration is between truth and certainty, and the corroborating evidence is perceptual proposition. Nozick also requires that propositions be corroborated by evidence, except that unlike Zissem, Nozick emphasizes that evidence is a true link between facts and propositions, not perceptual propositions such as "I think" or "I think". Feidman and Coenzim and Nozick build up evidentialism, which follows the traditional theory of knowledge analysis and emphasizes that the corroboration of knowledge is concentrated on evidence, and the belief of the cognitive is corroborated. It is because of evidence that fits with the cognitive beliefs and attitudes. Evidential doctrine clearly claims that corroboration is entirely dependent on evidence, and believes that the corroboration of a belief in cognition is determined by the nature of the evidence of the belief. The main contents of evidential research include the definition of evidence, how to possess evidence, the relationship between evidence and belief proposition, and the corroboration effect of evidence on belief proposition. The research on evidential doctrine was mainly made by Zissem, Nozick, Feldman and others. Zissem's Knowledgeist, Nozick's philosophical explanation and Feldman's evidential theory all explain the above contents in detail. This paper makes a detailed analysis of the ideological source, essential connotation, confirmatory elements and cognitive relationship of the evidential corroboration theory, and gives some evidential confirmation schemes, but the evidential corroboration itself is confronted with both internalism and externalism. Foundationalism and concordance, and the dilemmas of corroborating norms. In view of these difficulties, Feldman's reconstruction of corroboration theory, the explanation of rationality and the direction of evidence of Susan Huck undoubtedly have strong persuasiveness, but they also have their own shortcomings. This paper attempts to provide a feasible solution to the theory of evidential confirmation of knowledge from the angle of practical confirmation and contextual principle, and to provide a reasonable way to explain the essence and limitation of knowledge.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：B017

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