【摘要】：自2003年伍德沃德提出系統(tǒng)的介入主義因果理論以來(lái),許多非還原物理主義者企圖運(yùn)用該理論解決金在權(quán)的排斥問(wèn)題,為心靈因果性辯護(hù)。然而,鮑姆加特納質(zhì)疑道,心物隨附性和介入主義因果理論的前提相沖突,此沖突恰恰否定心靈因果性。伍德沃德作出回應(yīng),指出麥克沒(méi)有區(qū)分因果依賴(lài)和非因果依賴(lài)關(guān)系(包含隨附關(guān)系),并針對(duì)后者提出了新的因果定義,從而維護(hù)心靈因果性。作者針對(duì)該回應(yīng),闡明伍德沃德的新方案不適用于隨附性,解決排斥問(wèn)題還需另尋他法。
[Abstract]:Since Woodward put forward the systematic theory of interventional causality in 2003, many non-reductive physicists have tried to solve the exclusion of Jin Zaiquan and defend the causality of mind by using this theory. However, Baumgartner questioned the conflict between the attachment of the mind and the premise of the interventionist causality theory, which negates the mental causality. Woodward responded by pointing out that Mike did not distinguish between causality and non-causality (including attachment), and proposed a new definition of causality for the latter, thus preserving mental causality. In view of this response, the author clarifies that Woodward's new scheme is not applicable to the appurtenance, and another alternative method is needed to solve the problem of exclusion.
【作者單位】： 北京大學(xué)哲學(xué)系;
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：B712.59
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本文編號(hào)：2140013