本文選題：他心 + 認(rèn)識(shí)他心�。� 參考：《南京大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：他心問題是當(dāng)代心靈哲學(xué)中一個(gè)被廣為討論的問題。一般地,它至少需要回答兩個(gè)問題,即他心是否存在,以及如何認(rèn)識(shí)他心;在這兩個(gè)問題背后另一個(gè)問題是——他心是什么或者說心靈是什么。本文將這三類問題分別稱之為"存在問題","認(rèn)識(shí)問題",以及"本質(zhì)問題"。通過對(duì)他心問題進(jìn)行一個(gè)歷史的回顧,本文意圖表明現(xiàn)今這樣的"他心問題"是如何在哲學(xué)史中一步一步形成的。在古希臘懷疑論中這只是一個(gè)感覺的相對(duì)性問題;在奧古斯丁時(shí)期這是關(guān)涉于知識(shí)與意見——對(duì)其他心靈的認(rèn)識(shí)——的問題;在笛卡爾以懷疑論開始的近代哲學(xué)中,"其他心靈的存在"成了一個(gè)可以被質(zhì)疑的問題,雖然這類質(zhì)疑被近代大多數(shù)哲學(xué)家所有意無視,但是在后來卻成為了他心問題的焦點(diǎn);20世紀(jì)的哲學(xué)家,一面駁斥唯我論,一面嘗試給出認(rèn)識(shí)其他心靈的方案,但這些方案往往彼此排斥,使得目前的他心問題難以得到回答。在理清他心問題的歷史脈絡(luò)之后,本文逐次處理其中的三個(gè)問題。首先"他心是否存在",與其糾纏的是唯我論問題(包括懷疑論)。按照對(duì)"他心"質(zhì)疑的不同程度和方面,可分為存在論的唯我論,認(rèn)識(shí)論的唯我論和方法論的唯我論。在對(duì)各種不同唯我論的觀點(diǎn)進(jìn)行分析澄清后,本文認(rèn)為他心是否存在的問題一部分表現(xiàn)為無根據(jù)的形而上學(xué)唯我論(即存在論的),一部分表現(xiàn)為自相矛盾的認(rèn)識(shí)論唯我論,而剩下的一部分又可以被轉(zhuǎn)化為他心如何認(rèn)識(shí)的問題。對(duì)于第二個(gè)問題——"如何認(rèn)識(shí)他心",本文比較了當(dāng)代以來各種試圖解釋如何認(rèn)識(shí)他心的不同方式,維特根斯坦式的直接展現(xiàn)、胡塞爾式的同感理論和密爾以來的類比推理傳統(tǒng),以及大眾心理學(xué)的理論理論(TT)和模仿理論(ST,包括具身模仿EST),這些解決方案彼此駁斥,因此被認(rèn)為是不相容的和矛盾的。但通過從以下三個(gè)方面——認(rèn)識(shí)他心的可能性,認(rèn)識(shí)他心的方法,對(duì)他心的認(rèn)識(shí)屬于何種知識(shí)——對(duì)這些爭(zhēng)論進(jìn)行分析,結(jié)果表明它們的不同并不是相互矛盾,相反,他們之間具有內(nèi)在聯(lián)系,并且各自具有一定的合理性。原因有兩個(gè):其一是這些爭(zhēng)論并不在同一個(gè)層面上;其二是心靈內(nèi)容本身是多樣的——如感覺經(jīng)驗(yàn)、認(rèn)知概念、意愿等等。維特根斯坦式的直接展現(xiàn)論嘗試為認(rèn)識(shí)他心的可能性提出理由,以此拒絕懷疑論,而不是想提供一種認(rèn)識(shí)他心的方法。類比推理論證和TT對(duì)于認(rèn)識(shí)他人心靈的認(rèn)知概念比ST或EST更具解釋力;同感理論和ST或EST在解釋感覺類心靈狀態(tài)(如體驗(yàn))時(shí),比類比推理和TT更合理。而對(duì)其他心靈的認(rèn)識(shí)既可以是直接的也可以是間接的,這也與心靈的不同內(nèi)容有關(guān)。最后針對(duì)"心靈是什么"這個(gè)問題,當(dāng)代心靈哲學(xué)中各種心靈理論對(duì)心靈的解釋歸結(jié)起來有兩種傾向——還原論和主觀論,即或者將心靈還原為行為或物質(zhì)運(yùn)動(dòng),或者將心靈理解為主體特有的內(nèi)在經(jīng)驗(yàn),前者是消除了心靈,后者則是神秘化了心靈。從心靈這一概念在哲學(xué)史上的使用來看,造成當(dāng)代心靈理論的原因在于將心靈純粹視為活動(dòng)。在近代之前,心靈包括兩層意思:嚴(yán)格上僅僅指具有理智思維的東西;廣義上指包括感知、思維、欲望、意志等一系列活動(dòng)的東西。而近代哲學(xué)之后,心靈的意義從一個(gè)包含活動(dòng)的主體變成了活動(dòng)本身,即心靈指感覺活動(dòng)或理智活動(dòng)。就他心問題的背景而言,還原論和主觀論都是需要避免的,也即是說對(duì)"心靈"概念適當(dāng)?shù)睦斫鈶?yīng)該是包含理智和感覺等活動(dòng)的東西,而不能被還原為活動(dòng)本身。
[Abstract]:His heart problem is a widely discussed question in contemporary philosophy of mind. Generally, it needs to answer at least two questions, that is, whether his heart exists, and how to understand his heart; the other question behind the two questions is what his heart is or what the mind is. This article calls these three kinds of questions as "the problem of existence" respectively. Through a historical review of his heart problem, this article is intended to show how the "problem of his heart" is formed step by step in the history of philosophy. In the ancient Greek Skepticism, it was only a feeling of relativity; in the Augustin period it was related to knowledge and opinion - The question of the understanding of other souls; in Descartes's modern philosophy that began with scepticism, "the existence of other souls" became a question that could be questioned, although this kind of doubt was ignored by most modern philosophers, but later became the focus of his heart problem; the philosopher in twentieth Century refutes the only one. On the other hand, I try to give a solution to the understanding of other minds, but these schemes often exclude each other, making his current heart problem difficult to answer. After clarifying the historical context of his heart problem, this article deals with three of them one by one. First, "whether his heart exists or not" is a matter of our theory (including skepticism). According to the different degrees and aspects of the question of "his heart", it can be divided into the existentialism, the ontological theory and the methodology of the epistemology. After the analysis and clarification of various standpoints of different theories, this article holds that the question of whether his heart exists is a metaphysical theory of Metaphysics (that is, existentialism), a part of the theory of the existence of his heart. It shows a paradoxical Epistemological Rationalism, and the remaining part can be transformed into the question of how his heart knows. For the second question, "how to know his heart", this article compares the different ways of trying to explain how to understand his heart, the direct display of Wittgenstein's style, and the Husserl sense of the same sense. The theory of analogical reasoning and the theory of mass psychology (TT) and the theory of imitation (ST, including the imitation of EST), which are dismiscible and contradictory to each other, are considered incompatible and contradictory. But through the following three aspects: the possibility of understanding his heart, the method of understanding his heart, and the understanding of his heart What kind of knowledge - the analysis of these arguments shows that their differences are not conflicting. On the contrary, they have internal relations and have certain reasonableness. There are two reasons: one is that these arguments are not at the same level, and the other is the diversity of the spiritual content itself, such as sensory classics. Wittgenstein's theory of direct representation attempts to make a reason for the possibility of understanding his heart, so as to refuse scepticism, rather than to provide a way of understanding his heart. Analogical reasoning and TT are more explanatory to the cognitive concept of understanding others' minds than ST or EST; and the theory of sympathies and the solution of ST or EST in the solution. The mental state of the senses (like experience) is more reasonable than analogical reasoning and TT. The understanding of other minds can be both direct and indirect, which is also related to the different contents of the mind. Finally, there are two kinds of mental theories in the philosophy of the mind that come down to the question of "what is the mind". To the theory of reductionism and subjectivism, that is, to restore the mind to behavior or physical movement, or to understand the mind as the intrinsic experience of the subject, the former is the elimination of the mind, the latter is the mystery of the mind. From the use of the concept of the mind in the history of philosophy, the reason for the creation of contemporary psychic theory lies in the pure view of the mind. Before modern times, the mind includes two layers of meaning: it is strictly only something with rational thinking; in a broad sense it refers to a series of activities, such as perception, thinking, desire, and will. After modern philosophy, the meaning of the mind becomes the activity itself from the subject containing the activity, that is, the activity of the mind and the activity of reason. As far as the background of his heart problem is concerned, both reductionism and subjectivism need to be avoided, that is to say that the proper understanding of the concept of "mind" should be something that includes activities such as sense and sense, and can not be reduced to activity itself.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：B017

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