本文關(guān)鍵詞： 直接實(shí)在論 可廢止推理 知覺(jué)知識(shí)　出處：《山東大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：本文試圖通過(guò)論證知覺(jué)知識(shí)的可能性,來(lái)回應(yīng)關(guān)于知覺(jué)知識(shí)的懷疑論。知覺(jué)知識(shí)是指通過(guò)認(rèn)知者的感官獲取的,經(jīng)過(guò)一定的理性推理而形成的關(guān)于外部對(duì)象的物理屬性的知識(shí)。本文力圖通過(guò)對(duì)關(guān)于知覺(jué)知識(shí)的理論分析與比較,梳理出知覺(jué)知識(shí)可能性的理論資源,并以此辯護(hù)知覺(jué)知識(shí)的可能性,同時(shí)回應(yīng)懷疑論。關(guān)于知覺(jué)知識(shí)的懷疑論,主要聚焦一個(gè)問(wèn)題,即關(guān)于事物向我們的呈現(xiàn)方式的信念,能否形成關(guān)于事物真實(shí)情形的信念。懷疑論認(rèn)為,前者不能構(gòu)成演繹的理由,也不能構(gòu)成歸納的理由來(lái)辯護(hù)后者,因此知覺(jué)知識(shí)是不可能的。對(duì)此懷疑論的回應(yīng),可分為兩部分展開(kāi)。一是關(guān)于知覺(jué)信念的內(nèi)容,論證知覺(jué)知識(shí)的本質(zhì)及根據(jù);二是關(guān)于知覺(jué)知識(shí)的推理形式,以一種恰當(dāng)?shù)耐评硇问絹?lái)刻畫(huà)知覺(jué)知識(shí)的形成與修正的過(guò)程。關(guān)于第一點(diǎn),大致可分為兩種理論,一種是信念理論,另一種是非信念理論。本文主要分析信念理論中的基礎(chǔ)論與非信念理論中的直接實(shí)在論,結(jié)合這兩種理論資源,來(lái)論證知覺(jué)信念的本質(zhì)及根據(jù)�；A(chǔ)論主張?jiān)谥X(jué)知識(shí)中,關(guān)于外部對(duì)象向我們的呈現(xiàn)方式的信念是基礎(chǔ)信念,關(guān)于事物的真實(shí)情形的信念是非基礎(chǔ)信念,后者是在前者的基礎(chǔ)上,通過(guò)一定的推理形式形成的。其不足之處在于,沒(méi)有說(shuō)明關(guān)于外部對(duì)象的呈現(xiàn)方式的信念與外部世界的關(guān)聯(lián)。直接實(shí)在論回答了這一問(wèn)題。它主張認(rèn)知者是直接根據(jù)外部對(duì)對(duì)象向我們的呈現(xiàn)方式,來(lái)形成關(guān)于外部對(duì)象的呈現(xiàn)方式的信念的,即外部對(duì)象的呈現(xiàn)方式是知覺(jué)知識(shí)的根據(jù)。事物向我們的呈現(xiàn)方式,免于修正地辯護(hù)了關(guān)于事物向我們的呈現(xiàn)方式的信念;關(guān)于事物向我們的呈現(xiàn)方式的信念,構(gòu)成了一個(gè)初步的理由,可廢止地辯護(hù)了關(guān)于事物真實(shí)情形的信念。關(guān)于第二點(diǎn),可廢止推理,區(qū)別于演繹與歸納推理,恰當(dāng)?shù)乜坍?huà)了知覺(jué)知識(shí)的形成過(guò)程,本文將對(duì)其主要概念以及形式刻畫(huà)進(jìn)行說(shuō)明。直接實(shí)在論與可廢止推理都是約翰·波洛克提出的理論。綜上,以約翰·波洛克的直接實(shí)在論與可廢止推理作為理論資源,可以從信念內(nèi)容與推理形式兩方面回應(yīng)懷疑論,辯護(hù)知覺(jué)知識(shí)的可能性。
[Abstract]:This paper attempts to respond to the skepticism about perceptual knowledge by demonstrating the possibility of perceptual knowledge, which is acquired through the senses of the cognitive. This paper tries to sort out the theoretical resources of the possibility of perceptual knowledge through theoretical analysis and comparison of perceptual knowledge. And to defend the possibility of perceptual knowledge, and at the same time to respond to skepticism. The scepticism about perceptual knowledge focuses on one question, that is, the belief in the way things are presented to us. The skepticism holds that the former cannot constitute the reason of deduction or the reason of induction to defend the latter. The response to this skepticism can be divided into two parts: one is about the content of perceptual belief and the other is to demonstrate the essence and basis of perceptual knowledge; The second is about the reasoning form of perceptual knowledge, which describes the formation and correction of perceptual knowledge with an appropriate form of reasoning. On the first point, it can be roughly divided into two kinds of theories, one is belief theory. The other is non-belief theory. This paper mainly analyzes the basic theory of belief theory and the direct realism theory of non-belief theory, combining these two theoretical resources. The basic theory holds that in the perceptual knowledge, the belief about the way the external object presents to us is the basic belief, and the belief about the real situation of the thing is not the basic belief. The latter is based on the former, through a certain form of reasoning. Direct realism answers this question. It argues that the cognitive is the way the object is presented to us directly according to the external. To form a belief about the presentation of external objects, that is, the presentation of external objects is the basis of perceptual knowledge, and the way things are presented to us. The belief in the way things are presented to us is defended from revision; Belief in the way things are presented to us constitutes a preliminary reason for repealing beliefs about the true state of things. On the second point, reasoning can be annulled, as distinguished from deductive and inductive reasoning. The formation process of perceptual knowledge is properly described. This paper will explain its main concepts and forms. Direct realism and retractable reasoning are both theories put forward by John Pollock. With John Pollock's direct realism and retractable reasoning as theoretical resources, we can respond to skepticism from both the content of belief and the form of reasoning, defending the possibility of perceptual knowledge.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：B017

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