霍維奇論意義、真與使用
發(fā)布時間:2018-06-27 03:41
本文選題:意義的使用理論 + 緊縮論; 參考:《自然辯證法研究》2012年10期
【摘要】:霍維奇在拒斥真之理論語義學(xué)的前提下提出傾向性的使用理論,他認為后者的優(yōu)勢在于能夠解釋意義與使用之間的密切聯(lián)系。在該理論中,意義被還原為心理學(xué)的而非語義學(xué)的傾向性接受概念。這種還原導(dǎo)致,它本身無法從語言的實際使用中區(qū)分出符合意義規(guī)范性的理想使用,以致無法對意義與使用的聯(lián)系做出令人滿意的說明,進而不能完全刻畫意義概念。由于訴諸心理學(xué)而非語義學(xué)的概念,霍維奇的使用理論還隱含著導(dǎo)致意義虛無化的嚴重危險。這些同時也說明了使用理論未必優(yōu)越于語義學(xué)理論。
[Abstract]:On the premise of rejecting the theoretical semantics of truth, Horvich put forward the tendentiousness theory of use, which, he believes, has the advantage of being able to explain the close relationship between meaning and use. In this theory, meaning is reduced to the concept of psychological rather than semantic tendentiousness. As a result of this kind of reduction, it can not distinguish the ideal use which accords with the meaning norm from the actual use of language, so that it can not give a satisfactory explanation of the relation between meaning and use, and then it can not completely depict the concept of meaning. By resorting to the concept of psychology rather than semantics, Horvich's theory of use implies a serious danger of nothingness. It also shows that the theory of use is not superior to the theory of semantics.
【作者單位】: 中南財經(jīng)政法大學(xué)哲學(xué)系;
【基金】:中南財經(jīng)政法大學(xué)科研基金(31541110114,語言哲學(xué)中的意義問題研究) 中國人民大學(xué)科學(xué)研究基金(10XNJ022,邏輯哲學(xué)若干重要問題研究)
【分類號】:H030
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本文編號:2072528
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