本文選題：地方政府　切入點(diǎn)：晉升激勵(lì)　出處：《上海海洋大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著陸地資源的日漸匱乏,世界各沿海國(guó)家都將經(jīng)濟(jì)戰(zhàn)略重心轉(zhuǎn)向了海洋。無(wú)論是海洋的國(guó)土資源還是生物資源,今后都將成為沿海國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)命脈。然而,由于海洋資源開(kāi)發(fā)的便利性及所帶來(lái)利益的可觀性,導(dǎo)致現(xiàn)代海洋經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展速度之迅猛。與此同時(shí),非規(guī)劃性甚至毀滅性的海洋開(kāi)發(fā)活動(dòng)也對(duì)海洋環(huán)境的承載能力提出了極大的要求,并對(duì)其造成嚴(yán)重的損害,以至于影響海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境的生態(tài)平衡,進(jìn)而制約、阻礙海洋漁業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康發(fā)展。因此,為了確保海洋漁業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展,防止海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境問(wèn)題的發(fā)生及蔓延,必須對(duì)海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境進(jìn)行保護(hù)。作為公共物品的海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)問(wèn)題,由于其自身的公共性及外部性等經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)屬性特征,使政府干預(yù)成為了必然。而地方政府則承擔(dān)了海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)相關(guān)工作的實(shí)際執(zhí)行者的角色,其是否作為將成為海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)成與否的關(guān)鍵。根據(jù)公共選擇理論所述,要了解作為“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”的地方政府的行為選擇,就必須先了解其行為動(dòng)機(jī)及所處的激勵(lì)環(huán)境。因此,完善關(guān)乎沿海地方官員切身利益的晉升激勵(lì)機(jī)制是首要解決的問(wèn)題。本文以公共管理學(xué)、政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論為指導(dǎo),結(jié)合我國(guó)當(dāng)前海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)行為異化的現(xiàn)狀,通過(guò)分析我國(guó)政治晉升激勵(lì)機(jī)制中存在的不足,提出相應(yīng)的優(yōu)化建議。本文共分為七個(gè)部分:第一部分為引言部分。主要交代了研究目的與意義、國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀,并闡述了本文的研究?jī)?nèi)容和方法及技術(shù)路線。第二部分為理論基礎(chǔ)及概念界定。主要介紹了公共選擇理論、行政組織理論、政治晉升錦標(biāo)賽模式,并闡述了海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)屬性及對(duì)地方政府海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)異化行為的界定。第三部分為我國(guó)地方政府海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)行為異化的主要表現(xiàn)。根據(jù)海洋局、環(huán)保部等發(fā)布的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),依次闡明我國(guó)沿海地方政府存在過(guò)度使用海洋資源、缺乏對(duì)海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)的投入、放縱大型涉海企業(yè)污染的行為、懈怠海洋環(huán)境污染事件的處理等異化行為。第四部分為我國(guó)地方政府海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)異化行為的實(shí)證分析。運(yùn)用logistic回歸模型,對(duì)沿海地區(qū)地方官員晉升情況與地方經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平、環(huán)境污染治理投入、海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)投入及成效之間的相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn)。第五部分為我國(guó)地方政府海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)異化行為的理論分析。通過(guò)分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)造成其異化行為的原因主要是由于中國(guó)式分權(quán)的弊端、地方行政首長(zhǎng)的權(quán)力失衡、地方官員考核機(jī)制的不合理、激勵(lì)目標(biāo)的偏離所導(dǎo)致。第六部分為優(yōu)化我國(guó)地方政府海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)行為的對(duì)策及建議。通過(guò)對(duì)現(xiàn)狀、問(wèn)題及原因的綜合分析,提出完善我國(guó)官員晉升激勵(lì)機(jī)制的相關(guān)建議,如使晉升考核主體的多元化、完善官員升遷的考核制度、落實(shí)地方官員環(huán)境責(zé)任終生制等。第七部分為總結(jié)。本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)在于:研究對(duì)象與當(dāng)前的現(xiàn)實(shí)問(wèn)題及學(xué)術(shù)熱點(diǎn)相結(jié)合。現(xiàn)有關(guān)于政治晉升激勵(lì)的研究多集中于關(guān)注官員升遷與地方經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展之間存在的聯(lián)系,近些年,相關(guān)的研究雖然進(jìn)一步拓展到了官員的晉升除了與地方經(jīng)濟(jì)指標(biāo)有關(guān)以外是否還與地方公共物品的供給有關(guān),如社保、醫(yī)療等,以及其他公共物品的供給是否會(huì)影響其發(fā)展地方經(jīng)濟(jì),但直接研究官員的晉升與其他公共物品的供給之間的關(guān)聯(lián)則相對(duì)較少。因此,本文針對(duì)現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)材料及政府相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),選取海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境為研究對(duì)象,結(jié)合政治晉升激勵(lì)相關(guān)的理論,來(lái)探討我國(guó)地方政府在執(zhí)行海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境保護(hù)工作中是否會(huì)因?yàn)閭�(gè)人晉升的需求而存在異化行為,如果存在,那么是何原因所致,從而為我國(guó)亟需解決的改善海洋漁業(yè)環(huán)境問(wèn)題作出參考。
[Abstract]:With the growing scarcity of land resources, the coastal countries around the world will be economic strategic focus to the ocean. Both land and resources or marine biological resources, will become the coastal economic lifeline of the country in the future. However, due to the considerable convenience of marine resources and bring about benefit, leading to rapid development speed of modern marine the economy. At the same time, made great demands of non planning and destructive ocean development activities have on the marine environment carrying capacity, and caused serious damage to the ecological balance, so that the influence of marine fishery environment and restrict and hinder the healthy development of marine fishery economy. Therefore, in order to ensure the sustainable development of marine fishery the economy, to prevent marine fishery environment problem occurrence and spread, must protect the marine fishery environment. As marine fisheries environmental public goods. The support problem, because of the public nature and the external economic attributes of its own characteristics, so that government intervention has become inevitable. While the local government assumed the marine fishery environmental protection work related to the actual executive role, whether it will become the marine fishery environment protection as the key whether or not. According to the theory of public choice to understand, as the "economic man" behavior of the local government, we must first understand the motivations and the incentive environment. Therefore, the perfect incentive mechanism for promotion of the vital interests of the coastal local officials is the primary problem. In this paper, with the public administration, the theory of political economics as a guide, combined with the present situation in the current environmental protection behavior of marine fishery alienation, through the analysis of China's political promotion problems existed in the incentive mechanism, put forward corresponding suggestions. This paper is divided into seven parts: Part Part one is the introduction part. It introduces the research purpose and significance, research status at home and abroad, and introduces the research contents and methods and technical route. The second part is the theoretical basis and the definition. Mainly introduces the public choice theory, theory of administrative organization, political promotion tournament mode, and expounds the economic attributes of the environment marine fishery protection and the definition of local government environmental protection of marine fishery alienation behavior. The third part mainly for the local government of our country marine fishery environmental protection behaviors. According to the Bureau, the relevant data released by the Ministry of environmental protection, in order to clarify the local government along the coastal areas of China there is excessive use of marine resources, the lack of Marine Fisheries the protection of investment, large enterprises involved in sea pollution indulgent behavior, behavior treatment and alienation slack pollution of the marine environment events. The fourth part is our country An empirical analysis of government environmental protection of marine fishery alienation behavior. The application of logistic regression model for local officials in coastal areas and the promotion of local economic development level, investment in environmental pollution control, correlation test between the marine fisheries investment in environmental protection and effectiveness. The fifth part is the analysis of China's local government marine fishery environmental protection behavior dissimilation theory. By analyzing the reasons that caused the alienation of behavior is mainly due to defects of China decentralization, local chief executive power imbalance, the assessment mechanism of local officials is not reasonable, incentive target deviation caused. The sixth part is the countermeasures and suggestions to optimize the local government of our country marine fishery environmental protection behavior. Through analyzing the present situation. Comprehensive analysis of problems and reasons, proposed consummates our country officials suggest promotion incentive mechanism, such as the diversification of the main promotion assessment The official promotion, improve the appraisal system, the implementation of environmental responsibility of local officials lifetime. The seventh part is the conclusion. The innovation of this paper is: the research object and the current problems of practical and academic focus. The combination of existing research on the political promotion incentive mainly exists between concerned officials promotion and development of the local economy, in recent years the related research, although further extended to the officials' promotion is not only related to local economic indicators and whether the supply of local public goods, such as social security, medical care, and whether other public goods supply will affect the development of the local economy, but the association between the direct study of officials' promotion and other public goods supply is relatively small. Therefore, this paper aims at the existing literature materials and relevant government data, selection of marine fishery environment as the research object, combined with political promotion The incentive related theory, to explore whether the execution of the local government in our country because of personal promotion needs exist alienation, will the environmental protection work of marine fishery if it exists, then what is the reason, make reference to improve marine fishery environment so as to China's urgent need to solve.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海海洋大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F326.4;X322

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 ;黨政領(lǐng)導(dǎo)干部生態(tài)環(huán)境損害責(zé)任追究辦法(試行)[J];甘肅林業(yè);2015年06期

2 張為杰;鄭尚植;;公共選擇視角下中國(guó)地方政府競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與環(huán)境規(guī)制政策執(zhí)行機(jī)制[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2015年06期

3 周黎安;劉沖;厲行;翁翕;;“層層加碼”與官員激勵(lì)[J];世界經(jīng)濟(jì)文匯;2015年01期

4 袁凱華;李后建;林章悅;;約束性考核促進(jìn)了官員的減排激勵(lì)嗎[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué);2014年06期

5 肖俊奇;;地方政府集體行動(dòng)能力提升之徑——以Z市干部考評(píng)體系創(chuàng)新為分析對(duì)象[J];甘肅行政學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2013年03期

6 孫海婧;;任期限制與地方環(huán)境規(guī)制中的短期行為——基于代際的視角[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理評(píng)論;2013年03期

7 郭志儀;鄭周勝;;財(cái)政分權(quán)、晉升激勵(lì)與環(huán)境污染:基于1997～2010年省級(jí)面板數(shù)據(jù)分析[J];西南民族大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(人文社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2013年03期

8 孫曉偉;;財(cái)政分權(quán)、地方政府行為與環(huán)境規(guī)制失靈[J];廣西社會(huì)科學(xué);2012年08期

9 李云雁;;財(cái)政分權(quán)、環(huán)境管制與污染治理[J];學(xué)術(shù)月刊;2012年06期

10 郁建興;高翔;;地方發(fā)展型政府的行為邏輯及制度基礎(chǔ)[J];中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué);2012年05期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 秦緒娜;經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展與地方政府行為研究[D];浙江大學(xué);2011年

2 逯元堂;中央財(cái)政環(huán)境保護(hù)預(yù)算支出政策優(yōu)化研究[D];財(cái)政部財(cái)政科學(xué)研究所;2011年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 張舒;海上溢油事故風(fēng)險(xiǎn)概率實(shí)用計(jì)算方法的研究[D];大連海事大學(xué);2011年

2 姚文平;軟預(yù)算約束與我國(guó)地方政府投資行為異化研究[D];天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2010年

，

本文編號(hào)：1636323