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互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用市場支配地位的法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究

發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-01-26 04:07

  本文關(guān)鍵詞: 互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè) 相關(guān)市場 濫用市場支配地位 法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究 出處:《西南政法大學(xué)》2016年博士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文


【摘要】:隨著中國經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)入新常態(tài),國民經(jīng)濟(jì)增長開始轉(zhuǎn)向依靠居民消費(fèi)和戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)。在這個(gè)背景下,一批具有廣泛影響力的中國互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)如BAT(百度、阿里巴巴、騰訊)已成為社會關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。一方面,占據(jù)市場支配地位的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)借助技術(shù)優(yōu)勢和成本優(yōu)勢,為用戶提供便利的交易環(huán)境,既降低了商品價(jià)格又降低了交易成本,還孵化出新型的商業(yè)模式。這種商業(yè)模式的特征是“網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)+雙邊市場效應(yīng)”。另一方面,具有市場支配地位的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)實(shí)施的某些行為對經(jīng)濟(jì)社會發(fā)展造成了實(shí)質(zhì)性損害。例如,在“3Q大戰(zhàn)”事件中,掌握市場領(lǐng)先優(yōu)勢的騰訊公司在即時(shí)通訊服務(wù)市場上,強(qiáng)迫QQ用戶卸載奇虎公司360殺毒軟件而安裝其提供的配套電腦軟件,對繼續(xù)使用360殺毒軟件的QQ用戶將不再得到公司的技術(shù)支持。騰訊公司采取的“二選一”行為,一定程度上損害了消費(fèi)者的自由選擇權(quán),對市場競爭秩序和社會福利造成了不良影響。考慮到互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用支配地位具有較強(qiáng)的隱蔽性,而且還具有一定的正當(dāng)性;ヂ(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)具有的規(guī)模效應(yīng)、網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)和雙邊市場效應(yīng),或?qū)⒊蔀槠錇E用市場支配地位行為的辯護(hù)理由。再考慮到各國反壟斷法的條條款款對互聯(lián)網(wǎng)相關(guān)市場界定、市場支配地位及濫用支配地位的認(rèn)定較為模糊,缺少具體的量化標(biāo)準(zhǔn),故而互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用支配地位行為容易逃脫反壟斷法的規(guī)制。依據(jù)法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論的預(yù)測,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)取得市場支配地位后,如果不受到反壟斷法有效規(guī)制,他們將采取排除或限制競爭的壟斷行為以攫取超額利潤。因而,在看到互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)提高經(jīng)濟(jì)效率、改善民生的同時(shí),不能忽視互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用市場支配地位行為已經(jīng)產(chǎn)生或者將要產(chǎn)生的實(shí)質(zhì)性損害;ヂ(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用市場支配地位的法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究,既要從實(shí)證分析的角度研究相關(guān)市場界定和市場支配地位認(rèn)定,又要從規(guī)范分析的角度研究濫用價(jià)格行為和濫用非價(jià)格行為的認(rèn)定,既要從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的視角研究濫用市場支配地位的危害性,又要從法學(xué)的視角研究濫用市場支配地位的違法性。具言之,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)的市場支配地位行為如果有悖于完全競爭理論和科斯定理,對市場公平競爭、資源配置效率、產(chǎn)品及技術(shù)創(chuàng)新、社會福利造成實(shí)質(zhì)性損害,它將成為反壟斷語境中的濫用支配地位行為,繼而應(yīng)當(dāng)受到反壟斷法的嚴(yán)厲規(guī)制。反之,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)實(shí)施的市場支配地位行為若符合經(jīng)濟(jì)社會發(fā)展的要求,在對其進(jìn)行反壟斷調(diào)查時(shí)應(yīng)當(dāng)持謹(jǐn)慎或?qū)捜莸膽B(tài)度;谶@樣的研究邏輯,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)和傳統(tǒng)企業(yè)之間的內(nèi)在差異,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用市場支配地位的概念和危害,法律界普遍采用的反壟斷規(guī)制原則,將成為本文首先要厘清的幾個(gè)基本問題。接著,論文闡述用于分析互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用市場支配地位的法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論如完全競爭理論、交易成本理論和芝加哥學(xué)派的反壟斷理論等。繼而,文章從反壟斷法律的條文出發(fā),考察互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)相關(guān)市場界定和市場支配地位認(rèn)定的影響因素和計(jì)算方法,從法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度研究互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)的市場支配地位行為對市場競爭、交易成本、資源配置效率造成的實(shí)質(zhì)性影響,并提出相應(yīng)的反壟斷規(guī)制選擇。最后,文章提出有效規(guī)制互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用市場支配地位的法律改革建議。全文共約13萬余字。除引言外,正文共包括以下六章內(nèi)容:第一章互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用市場支配地位的基本問題。本章研究的幾個(gè)基礎(chǔ)問題分別是互聯(lián)網(wǎng)及互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)的內(nèi)涵、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)日新月異的創(chuàng)新行為、用于規(guī)制互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用行為的基本原則。經(jīng)過系統(tǒng)梳理,本章認(rèn)為互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)是指借助互聯(lián)網(wǎng)經(jīng)營平臺、以提供電子信息和數(shù)據(jù)服務(wù)為主營業(yè)務(wù),以互聯(lián)網(wǎng)交易為主營收入的輕資產(chǎn)企業(yè)。互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新主要體現(xiàn)在產(chǎn)品服務(wù)創(chuàng)新和經(jīng)營模式創(chuàng)新。在現(xiàn)階段,規(guī)制互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用支配地位行為的法律原則主要適用于行為合理原則。第二章互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用市場支配地位的法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論。促進(jìn)市場競爭,提高經(jīng)濟(jì)效率,增進(jìn)社會福利是規(guī)制互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用行為的最終目標(biāo)。而新興互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)得以快速增長的主要原因在于,它能夠減少信息不對稱、降低交易成本、促進(jìn)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新。兩者的交集為完全競爭理論、交易成本理論和反壟斷理論。這三種理論在很大程度上互聯(lián)互通,如果互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)的行為滿足完全競爭理論的內(nèi)在要求,它既能夠降低交易成本、又不違背反壟斷法的禁止性規(guī)定,反之則反是。第三章互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)的相關(guān)市場界定和支配地位認(rèn)定。相關(guān)市場界定包括相關(guān)商品市場界定、相關(guān)地域市場界定,在反壟斷研究中界定相關(guān)市場是一個(gè)極為關(guān)鍵的問題。本章以“3q大戰(zhàn)”案件為例,詳細(xì)闡述替代分析法和假定壟斷者測試法,在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)零價(jià)格營銷模式下替代分析法更具適用性。經(jīng)研究后發(fā)現(xiàn),互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)相關(guān)市場界定具有很大爭議,不同法院的認(rèn)定范圍存在明顯差異。本章還論述了市場支配地位認(rèn)定的影響因素、方法選擇以及認(rèn)定結(jié)果的合理性。雖然市場份額推定分析法具有一定局限性,但不應(yīng)否定它在市場支配地位認(rèn)定中的基礎(chǔ)作用,就算互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)的市場份額出現(xiàn)劇烈變化也是如此。第四章互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用價(jià)格行為的法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析。本章首先從反壟斷法的角度考察壟斷定價(jià)、價(jià)格歧視和掠奪性定價(jià)三種濫用行為的法律認(rèn)定,以及它們是否對市場競爭、技術(shù)創(chuàng)新、經(jīng)濟(jì)效率及社會福利產(chǎn)生實(shí)質(zhì)性損害。接著再從法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度考察這三種濫用價(jià)格行為對市場公平競爭、交易成本和資源配置效率造成的影響,在此基礎(chǔ)上判斷是否應(yīng)該對它們進(jìn)行反壟斷規(guī)制。經(jīng)過研究,本章發(fā)現(xiàn)對壟斷定價(jià)、掠奪定價(jià)的反壟斷規(guī)制存在一定爭議,對價(jià)格歧視的反壟斷規(guī)制態(tài)度較為一致。第五章互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用非價(jià)格行為的法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析。本章首先從反壟斷法的角度考察搭配銷售、拒絕交易和限定交易三種非濫用行為的法律認(rèn)定,以及它們是否對市場競爭、技術(shù)創(chuàng)新、經(jīng)濟(jì)效率和社會福利產(chǎn)生實(shí)質(zhì)性損害。接著再從法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度考察這三種濫用非價(jià)格行為對競爭秩序和交易成本造成的影響,在此基礎(chǔ)上判斷是否應(yīng)該對它們進(jìn)行反壟斷規(guī)制。經(jīng)過研究,本章發(fā)現(xiàn)對搭售行為的反壟斷規(guī)制存在較大爭議,但是對拒絕交易和限定交易的反壟斷規(guī)制態(tài)度較為統(tǒng)一。第六章有效規(guī)制互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用市場支配地位的法律改革建議。本章圍繞相關(guān)市場準(zhǔn)入條件和濫用行為的反壟斷規(guī)制,詳細(xì)闡述有效規(guī)制互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用市場支配地位行為的法律措施。大幅增加同類經(jīng)營者的數(shù)量,可以從根源上預(yù)防和制止互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)濫用價(jià)格行為和非價(jià)格行為,因而應(yīng)該推行互聯(lián)網(wǎng)相關(guān)商品市場準(zhǔn)入的負(fù)面清單制度、相關(guān)地域市場準(zhǔn)入的負(fù)面清單制度。為了有效推行反壟斷執(zhí)法工作,應(yīng)當(dāng)建立反壟斷法律案例指導(dǎo)制度、完善三大反壟斷機(jī)構(gòu)出臺的規(guī)章制度,修訂《反壟斷法》司法解釋及相關(guān)律制度。
[Abstract]:With the Chinese economy has entered a new norm, economic growth began to rely on consumer spending and strategic emerging industries. In this context, a number of influential Chinese Internet companies such as BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) has become the focus of attention of the society. On the one hand, market dominant enterprises with technical superiority and the Internet the cost advantage, provide convenient trading environment for users, which reduces the price and reduces the transaction cost, but also spawned new business models. The characteristics of this business model is the "effect" network effect + bilateral market. On the other hand, has certain behaviors of market dominant position Internet enterprises caused substantial damage to the economic and social development. For example, in the "3Q war" event, grasp the market advantage of the Tencent Inc in the instant messaging market, forced Q Q users to uninstall antivirus software and installed 360 Qihoo provide supporting computer software, to continue to use the 360 antivirus software QQ users will no longer get the technical support of the company. The Tencent Inc to take the "one of two" behavior, a certain degree of damage to the freedom of choice for consumers, resulting in adverse effects on the market competition order and social welfare. Considering the Internet companies abuse of a dominant position with a strong concealment, but also has some validity. The scale effect of Internet companies with the network effect and the bilateral market effect, or will become the abuse of a dominant position. The definition of justification and considering the anti-monopoly law doctrines 189799 on the Internet the relevant market, market dominance and abuse of dominant position is vague, the lack of specific quantitative criteria, so that Internet companies abuse of dominant position Easy to escape the behavior regulation of the anti-monopoly law. According to the forecasting theory of law and economics, to achieve market dominance of Internet companies, if not subject to antitrust regulation, they will take a monopoly to exclude or restrict competition to seize the excess profit. Therefore, in the Internet to see enterprises to improve economic efficiency, improve the people's livelihood, essence damage can not ignore the Internet enterprise abusing the dominant market status has been or will be produced. The research of law and economics of Internet enterprises abuse of market dominance, both from the perspective of empirical analysis of the relevant market definition and market dominance of identification, but also from the Perspective of normative analysis identify the abuse of price behavior and abuse of non price behavior harm, not only from the perspective of Economics Research on abuse of market dominance, but also from the perspective of law on the abuse of the city The illegality of dominant position. That is, the Internet enterprise market dominant position if contrary to the theory of perfect competition and the Coase theorem, fair competition in the market, the efficiency of resource allocation, product and technology innovation, social welfare caused substantial damage, it will become a monopoly in the context of the abuse of a dominant position, and should be severely regulated by anti-monopoly law. On the other hand, the Internet enterprises to implement market dominance behavior if they meet the requirements of economic and social development, we should take a cautious or tolerant attitude in its antitrust investigation. This logic of the research based on the inherent difference between Internet companies and traditional companies, the concept and harm of Internet enterprise abusing the market the dominant principle of anti-monopoly regulation, commonly used by the legal profession, will become the first to clarify some basic problems. Then, the paper used In the analysis of Internet enterprises abuse of market dominance theory of law and economics such as complete competition theory, transaction cost theory and the Chicago School of antitrust theory. Then, the article from the anti-monopoly law, investigate the influencing factors and calculation methods that define the Internet enterprise related market and market dominance, from the angle of law and economics research the Internet enterprise market dominant position of market competition, transaction cost, substantial impact on resource allocation efficiency, and puts forward the choice of anti-monopoly regulation accordingly. Finally, the article put forward the legal reform suggestions for the effective regulation of Internet enterprise abusing market dominant position. The full text is about more than 13 words. Besides the introduction, the main text includes the following six chapters: the first chapter the basic problems of Internet enterprise abusing of dominant position. Several basic problems in this chapter are the Internet The connotation of network and Internet companies, Internet companies innovative behavior change rapidly, for the basic principles of regulation of Internet enterprise abusing. After systematically, this chapter thinks that the Internet enterprise refers to the use of the Internet business platform, to provide electronic information and data services for the main business, to Internet transactions for the main income asset light business innovation in the Internet. The enterprise is mainly reflected in the product innovation and business model innovation. At present, the regulation of the Internet enterprise abusing the legal principle of dominant behavior is mainly applicable to the rational principle. The theory of law and economics second chapter Internet enterprise abusing market dominant position. To promote market competition, improve economic efficiency, promote the social welfare is the ultimate goal of the regulation of the Internet enterprise abuse. While emerging Internet companies are the main reason for the rapid growth is that it can Enough to reduce information asymmetry, reduce transaction costs, promote technological innovation. The intersection of the two is the complete competition theory, transaction cost theory and antitrust theory. The three theories of Internet to a great extent if the Internet exchange, the behavior of enterprises meet the inherent requirements of the theory of perfect competition, it can reduce the transaction cost, and does not violate the anti antitrust prohibitions, vice versa. The definition and identification of relevant market dominant position in Internet companies. The third chapter includes the definition of relevant market definition of the relevant commodity market, define the relevant geographic market, the anti monopoly of the definition of the relevant market is a very important problem. In this chapter, the "3Q war" case for example, detailed analysis and replace the ssnip method in Internet enterprise marketing mode under zero price substitution approach is more applicable. The study found that Internet companies In the definition of relevant market has great controversy, there are obvious differences in different scope of the court. This chapter also discusses the influence factors of market dominant position recognition, methods and results of the determination of rationality. Although the presumption of market share analysis method has certain limitations, but it should not dominate the basic role in identifying the market. Even if the Internet companies' share of the market have changed dramatically as well. The fourth chapter law and economics analysis of Internet enterprise abusing the price behavior. This chapter from the perspective of anti-monopoly law on the monopoly pricing, price discrimination and predatory pricing of three kinds of abuse of legal identification, and whether they are on the market competition, technological innovation, have substantial damage to economic efficiency and social welfare. Then from the perspective of law and economics of these three kinds of abuse of fair competition in the market price behavior, transaction costs The efficiency of resource allocation and the impact, whether it should be judged on the basis of anti-monopoly regulation on them. After the study, this chapter of the monopoly pricing, there are some controversial antitrust regulation of predatory pricing, the attitude of antitrust regulation of price discrimination is consistent. The fifth chapter analyzes the abuse of non internet enterprise price behavior method economics. This chapter from the perspective of anti-monopoly law on collocation and limited transactions to sales, three non abuse of legal identification, and whether they are on the market competition, technological innovation, produce substantial damage to economic efficiency and social welfare. Then from the perspective of law and economics of the three kind of abuse of non price caused by the behavior of the competitive order and transaction cost, whether it should be judged on the basis of anti-monopoly regulation on them. After the study, this chapter found on tying behavior There is great controversy in the antitrust regulation, but the refusal to deal and limit the attitude of anti-monopoly regulation transactions unified law reform proposals of the sixth chapter. The effective regulation of Internet enterprise abusing market dominant position. The anti monopoly regulation of this chapter focuses on relevant market access conditions and the abuse of the legal measures in detail the effective regulation of Internet enterprise abusing the market dominant behavior. A substantial increase in the number of other operators, can from the source to prevent and stop the abuse of the Internet enterprise price behavior and non price behavior, so it should be the implementation of the Internet related commodity market access negative list system, the relevant geographic market access negative list system. In order to effectively implement the anti-monopoly law enforcement work, should establish the anti monopoly the legal case guidance system, perfect the three antitrust regulations, amendments to the anti-monopoly law > division method Interpretation and relevant law system.

【學(xué)位授予單位】:西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2016
【分類號】:D922.294


本文編號:1464629

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