本文選題：煤礦安全 + 國(guó)家監(jiān)察　； 參考：《中國(guó)礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2016年博士論文

【摘要】：在目前“國(guó)家監(jiān)察、地方監(jiān)管、企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)”的煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管工作格局下,存在中央政府、地方政府和煤礦企業(yè)間的多方博弈,且在這種多方博弈格局中,不同主體地位和談判能力,導(dǎo)致各主體間利益沖突趨于隱性化,影響煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管的效果,在一定程度上導(dǎo)致煤礦重大事故頻頻發(fā)生。論文針對(duì)煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管過(guò)程中各方利益沖突趨于隱性化且監(jiān)察監(jiān)管過(guò)程具有復(fù)雜動(dòng)態(tài)博弈和多方參與的特點(diǎn),以風(fēng)險(xiǎn)理論、信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)理論、外部性與內(nèi)部性理論、委托代理理論、利益相關(guān)理論、政府規(guī)制理論和博弈理論等為指導(dǎo),采取理論分析與情景模擬相結(jié)合、定性與定量方法相結(jié)合的模式探討中國(guó)煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管演化博弈與控制情景問(wèn)題。主要貢獻(xiàn)體現(xiàn)在以下幾個(gè)方面:(1)中國(guó)煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管的形成和發(fā)展,將建國(guó)66年來(lái)的煤礦安全政府監(jiān)察監(jiān)管歷程劃分為六個(gè)歷史階段:建國(guó)初的煤礦安全生產(chǎn)初創(chuàng)期、“大躍進(jìn)”及調(diào)整時(shí)期、“文化大革命”時(shí)期、改革開(kāi)放時(shí)期、開(kāi)始建立社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)期和新體制形成時(shí)期(國(guó)家監(jiān)察模式時(shí)期),并分析各個(gè)階段煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的變遷過(guò)程。然后,分析當(dāng)前煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管的現(xiàn)狀和特征,并對(duì)其有效性進(jìn)行分析,結(jié)果表明:2000年開(kāi)始逐步建立的新的煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu),從短期來(lái)看對(duì)于全國(guó)煤礦安全記錄的改善具有負(fù)面作用,其中鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)煤礦的負(fù)面作用程度最大,國(guó)有重點(diǎn)煤礦的負(fù)面作用程度最小;但從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)看來(lái)對(duì)全國(guó)煤礦安全記錄的改善具有顯著性的正面作用,其中鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)煤礦的改善效果最明顯,國(guó)有重點(diǎn)煤礦的改善效果最小;而后從1998年末關(guān)閉非法鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)小煤礦政策和現(xiàn)行煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的不足兩方面對(duì)回歸結(jié)果進(jìn)行分析。(2)針對(duì)煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)存在的不足和國(guó)內(nèi)外對(duì)煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管相關(guān)研究的缺陷,從煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管演化博弈視角進(jìn)行分析,將中國(guó)煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管的演化博弈劃分為單種群演化博弈、兩種群演化博弈和系統(tǒng)演化博弈。具體而言,單種群演化博弈包括:國(guó)家監(jiān)察機(jī)構(gòu)之間監(jiān)察行為的演化博弈、地方監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)之間監(jiān)管行為的演化博弈以及煤礦企業(yè)之間安全生產(chǎn)行為的演化博弈;兩種群演化博弈包括:國(guó)家監(jiān)察機(jī)構(gòu)與地方監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)之間的演化博弈、國(guó)家監(jiān)察機(jī)構(gòu)和煤礦企業(yè)之間的演化博弈以及地方監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)與煤礦企業(yè)之間的演化博弈;系統(tǒng)演化博弈則是指國(guó)家監(jiān)察機(jī)構(gòu)、地方監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和煤礦企業(yè)三個(gè)種群之間的系統(tǒng)性演化博弈。然后對(duì)上述煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管的單種群演化博弈模型、兩種群演化博弈模型和系統(tǒng)演化博弈模型進(jìn)行分析。結(jié)果表明:對(duì)于煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管的單種群演化博弈模型和雙種群演化博弈模型,可以通過(guò)分析均衡點(diǎn)時(shí)系統(tǒng)的雅可比矩陣的行列式值和跡值的符號(hào),判斷其均衡點(diǎn)的穩(wěn)定性;但是對(duì)于煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管的系統(tǒng)演化博弈模型,通過(guò)此方法理論上是可以做到的,但是計(jì)算量巨大繁瑣,且系統(tǒng)演化博弈過(guò)程具有復(fù)雜動(dòng)態(tài)性,對(duì)各局中人的策略也難以合理制定。因此,采用系統(tǒng)動(dòng)力學(xué)(SD)來(lái)研究煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管系統(tǒng)演化博弈的反饋結(jié)構(gòu),分析其系統(tǒng)演化博弈均衡點(diǎn)的穩(wěn)定性。從而構(gòu)建煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管的系統(tǒng)演化博弈SD模型,并對(duì)系統(tǒng)演化博弈的均衡點(diǎn)進(jìn)行仿真以分析其穩(wěn)定性,主要包括:純策略均衡解穩(wěn)定性分析、混合策略均衡解穩(wěn)定性分析和一般策略演化博弈穩(wěn)定性分析,結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):中國(guó)煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管的系統(tǒng)演化博弈過(guò)程出現(xiàn)反復(fù)波動(dòng)、震蕩發(fā)展的趨勢(shì),即演化博弈過(guò)程不存在演化穩(wěn)定策略均衡,這從一定程度上提供了解釋中國(guó)重大煤礦事故多年處于頻發(fā)態(tài)勢(shì)的一個(gè)主要客觀原因。(3)以提高煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管效果、降低煤礦企業(yè)違法行為為目標(biāo),針對(duì)上述不存在演化穩(wěn)定策略均衡的煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管系統(tǒng)演化博弈問(wèn)題進(jìn)行有效穩(wěn)定性控制情景研究,提出可以有效抑制系統(tǒng)演化博弈過(guò)程波動(dòng)性的控制情景,即動(dòng)態(tài)懲罰穩(wěn)定性控制情景,并對(duì)該情景下的系統(tǒng)演化博弈穩(wěn)定性進(jìn)行仿真分析與仿真結(jié)果理論證明。結(jié)果表明:在動(dòng)態(tài)懲罰穩(wěn)定性控制情景下系統(tǒng)演化博弈過(guò)程的波動(dòng)性得到有效控制,存在演化穩(wěn)定策略均衡,但是在此演化穩(wěn)定策略均衡狀態(tài)下,煤礦企業(yè)仍存在一定比率的選擇違法行為。因此,有必要對(duì)動(dòng)態(tài)懲罰穩(wěn)定性控制情景下演化穩(wěn)定策略的影響變量進(jìn)行分析與控制優(yōu)化,從而提出優(yōu)化動(dòng)態(tài)懲罰-激勵(lì)穩(wěn)定性控制情景,并對(duì)該情景下的系統(tǒng)演化博弈有效穩(wěn)定性進(jìn)行仿真分析與仿真結(jié)果理論證明。結(jié)果表明:優(yōu)化動(dòng)態(tài)懲罰-激勵(lì)穩(wěn)定性控制情景不僅能夠有效抑制系統(tǒng)演化博弈過(guò)程的波動(dòng)性,使系統(tǒng)演化博弈存在演化穩(wěn)定策略均衡,且在此演化穩(wěn)定均衡策略狀態(tài)下煤礦企業(yè)違法行為得到有效控制。最后,在上述對(duì)中國(guó)煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管的系統(tǒng)演化博弈分析與有效穩(wěn)定性控制情景研究的基礎(chǔ)上,提出中國(guó)煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的改善對(duì)策。
[Abstract]:Under the current pattern of coal mine safety supervision and supervision of "state supervision, local supervision and enterprise responsibility", there is a multi-party game between the central government, local government and coal mining enterprises. In this multi-party game, the different main body status and negotiation ability lead to the recessive conflict of interests among the owners, and affect the safety supervision of the coal mine. The effect of supervision, to a certain extent, leads to the frequent occurrence of major accidents in coal mines. The thesis aims at the recessive interests conflict of all parties in the process of supervision and supervision of coal mine safety supervision and the characteristics of complex dynamic game and multi party participation in supervision and supervision process, with the theory of risk, information mismatch theory, externality and internality theory, principal-agent The theory, the interest related theory, the government regulation theory and the game theory are guided by the combination of theoretical analysis and scenario simulation and the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to discuss the evolutionary game and control situation of China's coal mine safety supervision and supervision. The main contributions are as follows: (1) supervision and supervision of coal mine safety in China The formation and development of the supervision and supervision of the coal mine safety government in the past 66 years were divided into six historical stages: the initial period of coal mine safety production at the beginning of the founding of the people's Republic, the period of "great leap forward" and the period of adjustment, the period of "Cultural Revolution", the period of reform and opening up, and the establishment of the period of social main meaning market economy and the period of the formation of the new system. The change process of the coal mine safety supervision and supervision institutions in each stage is analyzed. Then, the present situation and characteristics of the current coal mine safety supervision and supervision are analyzed and its effectiveness is analyzed. The results show that the new coal mine safety supervision and supervision institution has been gradually established in 2000. The improvement of the record has the negative effect, among which the negative effect of the township coal mine is the biggest and the negative effect of the state key coal mine is the least; but in the long run, it has a significant positive effect on the improvement of the national coal mine safety record, among which the improvement effect of the township coal mine is the most obvious, the improvement effect of the state key coal mine is the least; and then the state key coal mine has the least improvement effect. From the end of 1998 to close the illegal Township small coal mine policy and the existing coal mine safety supervision and supervision institutions in two aspects of the results of the regression analysis. (2) in view of the shortcomings of the coal mine safety supervision and supervision institutions and the related research on coal mine safety supervision and supervision in and outside the country, from the perspective of the evolution game of coal mine safety supervision and supervision The evolutionary game of China's coal mine safety supervision and supervision is divided into single population evolutionary game, two population evolution game and system evolution game. The evolutionary game of the two population evolution game includes the evolutionary game between the state supervisory organization and the local regulatory agency, the evolutionary game between the state supervision organization and the coal mine enterprises, and the evolutionary game between the local supervision institutions and the coal enterprises; the system playing game refers to the national supervisory organization and the local regulatory machine. The systematic evolutionary game between three groups of coal mine enterprises. Then the single population evolution game model, two population evolution game model and the system evolution game model are analyzed. The results show that the single group evolutionary game model and the double population evolution game model for the coal mine safety supervision and supervision. The stability of the equilibrium point can be judged by analyzing the determinant value of the Jacobi matrix and the mark of trace value of the Jacobi matrix in the equilibrium point. However, the system evolution game model of coal mine safety supervision and supervision can be done theoretically by this method, but the amount of calculation is complicated and the process of system evolution game is complicated. Therefore, the system dynamics (SD) is used to study the feedback structure of the evolutionary game of the coal mine safety supervision and supervision system, and the stability of the equilibrium point of the system evolution game is analyzed. Thus, the system evolution game SD model of coal mine safety supervision and supervision is constructed, and the system evolution game is played. The equilibrium point is simulated to analyze its stability, mainly including the stability analysis of the pure strategy equilibrium solution, the stability analysis of the mixed strategy equilibrium solution and the stability analysis of the general strategy evolution game. The results show that the evolutionary game of the system evolution game of China's coal mine safety supervision and supervision has repeated fluctuations, the trend of the oscillation development, that is, the evolutionary game. There is no evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, which, to a certain extent, provides a major objective reason to explain the frequent occurrence of major coal mine accidents in China for many years. (3) in order to improve the effect of coal mine safety supervision and supervision, reduce the illegal behavior of coal mine enterprises as the target, the coal mine safety supervision, which does not exist in the equilibrium of the evolutionary stable strategy, is not existed. The evolution game of the supervisory system is carried out to study the effective stability control scenario, and the control scenario which can effectively suppress the volatility of the system evolution game is proposed, that is, the dynamic punishment stability control scenario, and the simulation analysis and simulation results are given to the stability of the system evolution game under this scenario. The results show that the dynamic punishment is punished by the dynamic punishment. Under the penalty stability control scenario, the volatility of the evolutionary game process is effectively controlled, and there is an evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium. However, under the equilibrium state of the evolutionary stable strategy, the coal mining enterprises still have a certain ratio of illegal behavior. Therefore, it is necessary to change the influence of the evolutionary stability strategy under the dynamic penalty stability control scenario. The dynamic penalty incentive stability control scenario is optimized and the dynamic stability of the system evolution game is analyzed and the simulation results are proved by the simulation results. The results show that the optimization of dynamic penalty and incentive stability control scenario can not only effectively suppress the evolutionary game process of the system. The volatility of the system evolution game has an evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, and the illegal behavior of coal mine enterprises is effectively controlled under the state of the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy. Finally, on the basis of the system evolution game analysis and the effective stability control scenario study of China's coal mine safety supervision and supervision, the coal mine safety is proposed. To monitor the improvement of the regulatory agency.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：TD79;F426.21
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本文編號(hào)：1902797