發(fā)布時間：2018-06-18 04:39

  本文選題：大氣污染 + 區(qū)域聯(lián)控�。� 參考：《北方工業(yè)大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：污染排放具有公共物品屬性,而污染治理則具有正外部性,單靠一省一市無法解決根本問題,所以,污染聯(lián)控問題的解決是區(qū)域間環(huán)境保護、經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的關鍵。本文首先從中央政府的角度出發(fā),分析了污染治理的外部性會帶來市場的非效率,研究了地方政府污染聯(lián)控機制在占優(yōu)均衡與子博弈精煉納什均衡下的執(zhí)行問題。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):市場效率損失來源于私有信息與機制設計者的監(jiān)管力度不夠,得到了納什均衡下機制執(zhí)行的充分必要條件,并構建了一個動態(tài)機制來實現(xiàn)污染聯(lián)控問題,同時通過非對稱信息的引入,給出了占優(yōu)均衡下機制實現(xiàn)目標的方式。其次,考察了地方政府的異質性特征,構造了非獨裁和獨裁的社會福利函數(shù),給出了獨裁地方政府存在的必要條件,設計了不完全信息下獨裁和非獨裁地方政府污染聯(lián)控機制,通過該機制嘗試比較實踐中的污染政策和實證結果。研究結果表明:若中央政府不監(jiān)管,地方政府不能實現(xiàn)污染聯(lián)控;獨裁地方政府存在的必要條件是,他對社會福利的貢獻程度大于其他地方政府對社會福利貢獻程度的總和;非獨裁和獨裁地方政府污染聯(lián)控機制都是占優(yōu)策略可執(zhí)行的,且獨裁時的社會福利大于非獨裁時的社會福利。最后,研究了不同參與者私有信息相關時的污染聯(lián)控機制設計問題,討論了非合謀機制在完全信息和不完全信息下的執(zhí)行結果,并設計了防合謀機制,給出了不完全信息下機制執(zhí)行的條件。研究結果表明:完全信息下,企業(yè)購買污染排放權的邊際收益與中央政府污染治理的邊際成本相等;不完全信息下,中央政府在調控污染排放權資源配置上失靈,使得高污染類型企業(yè)獲得正的信息租金,為此達到減小該類型企業(yè)給政府帶來的信息成本的目的;防合謀機制下,高污染類型企業(yè)合謀時,中央政府提供的社會污染治理總量與最優(yōu)情形保持一致,低污染類型企業(yè)合謀時,中央政府污染治理的邊際成本與該合謀企業(yè)私有信息的相關性有關,相關性越高,邊際成本越小,防合謀難度越低。
[Abstract]:The pollution discharge has the attribute of public goods, but the pollution control has the positive externality, which can not solve the fundamental problem only by one province and one city. Therefore, the solution of the pollution joint control problem is the key to the interregional environmental protection and economic development. From the view of the central government, this paper analyzes the non-efficiency of the market caused by the externality of pollution control, and studies the implementation of the local government pollution control mechanism under the dominant equilibrium and the subgame refined Nash equilibrium. It is found that the loss of market efficiency comes from the insufficient supervision of private information and mechanism designers, and obtains the necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementation of the mechanism under Nash equilibrium, and constructs a dynamic mechanism to realize the problem of joint pollution control. At the same time, through the introduction of asymmetric information, the mechanism to achieve the goal under dominant equilibrium is given. Secondly, the heterogeneity of local government is investigated, the social welfare function of non-autocracy and dictatorship is constructed, the necessary conditions for the existence of autocratic local government are given, and the joint control mechanism of pollution between dictatorial and non-dictatorial local government is designed under incomplete information. Through this mechanism, we try to compare the pollution policy and empirical results in practice. The results show that if the central government does not regulate, the local government can not realize the pollution control, the necessary condition for the existence of authoritarian local government is that its contribution to social welfare is greater than the sum of the contribution of other local governments to social welfare. Non-autocratic and dictatorial local government pollution control mechanism is the dominant strategy can be carried out, and the social welfare of dictatorship is greater than that of non-dictatorship. Finally, this paper studies the design of the pollution control mechanism when the private information is related to different participants, discusses the implementation results of the non-collusion mechanism under the complete and incomplete information, and designs a mechanism to prevent collusion. The conditions of mechanism execution under incomplete information are given. The results show that under complete information, the marginal income of enterprises purchasing pollution emission rights is equal to the marginal cost of central government pollution control, and the central government fails to regulate and control the allocation of pollution emission rights resources under incomplete information. In order to reduce the cost of information brought to the government by the enterprises of high pollution type, the enterprises of high pollution type can obtain positive information rent. Under the mechanism of preventing collusion, when the enterprises of high pollution type collude with each other, The total amount of social pollution treatment provided by the central government is consistent with the optimal situation. When the enterprises of low pollution type collude, the marginal cost of the central government pollution treatment is related to the correlation of the private information of the collusion enterprise, and the higher the correlation is, The smaller the marginal cost, the lower the difficulty of preventing collusion.
【學位授予單位】：北方工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：X51

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