本文選題：稅收競爭 + 政府環(huán)保支出　； 參考：《財貿(mào)經(jīng)濟》2017年11期

【摘要】：本文基于一般均衡模型闡述了稅收競爭通過改變資本投入量及政府環(huán)保支出進而影響環(huán)境污染的作用機制,并使用2007-2014年中國28個省份數(shù)據(jù),運用動態(tài)空間杜賓及動態(tài)面板模型進行了實證檢驗。研究表明:外溢性污染物存在空間溢出效應(yīng);地方政府稅收競爭強度越大,地區(qū)環(huán)境質(zhì)量就越惡劣。究其原因,在于稅收競爭通過改變本地資本投入量及本地政府環(huán)保支出提高了外溢性污染物(二氧化硫)和非外溢性污染物(固體廢棄物)的排放量,而通過改變鄰近地區(qū)資本投入量及其環(huán)保支出降低了外溢性污染物(二氧化硫)的排放量。
[Abstract]:Based on the general equilibrium model, this paper expounds the mechanism of tax competition affecting environmental pollution by changing capital input and government environmental expenditure, and uses the data of 28 provinces in China from 2007 to 2014. Using dynamic space Doberman and dynamic panel model to carry on the empirical test. The results show that there exists spatial spillover effect of spillover pollutants, and the greater the tax competition intensity of local government, the worse the regional environmental quality. The reason is that tax competition increases the emissions of spillover pollutants (sulphur dioxide) and non-spillover pollutants (solid waste) by changing local capital input and local government environmental spending. By changing the amount of capital input and environmental expenditure in neighboring areas, the emission of spilled pollutants (SO2) is reduced.
【作者單位】： 西安交通大學(xué)經(jīng)濟與金融學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社會科學(xué)基金一般項目“產(chǎn)權(quán)制度及區(qū)域差異視角下的中國環(huán)境資源稅制研究”(14BJY168)
【分類號】：F812.42;X50
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本文編號：1884338