本文選題：政府監(jiān)查 + 進(jìn)化穩(wěn)定策略��； 參考：《運(yùn)籌與管理》2017年02期

【摘要】：通過(guò)建立環(huán)境治理中地方政府與排污企業(yè)的進(jìn)化博弈模型,考察了參與者的決策演化過(guò)程,分析了參與者的進(jìn)化穩(wěn)定策略及其影響因素。研究表明,地方政府政績(jī)考核體系中環(huán)境指標(biāo)的權(quán)重系數(shù)、企業(yè)的排污量并不會(huì)影響博弈雙方的策略選擇。地方政府監(jiān)查行為和企業(yè)治污行為會(huì)受到包括系統(tǒng)初始狀態(tài)在內(nèi)的7種因素的影響。加大對(duì)企業(yè)不完全治污的處罰,降低企業(yè)的治污成本,盡管可以促使企業(yè)的策略選擇向完全治污的方向演化,但卻會(huì)不利于地方政府的策略選擇向嚴(yán)格監(jiān)查的方向演化;而中央政府提高對(duì)地方政府嚴(yán)格監(jiān)查的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì),加大對(duì)地方政府監(jiān)查不力的處罰,降低地方政府的監(jiān)查成本,以及降低企業(yè)利潤(rùn)對(duì)地方政府支付水平的影響系數(shù),既可以促使地方政府的策略選擇向嚴(yán)格監(jiān)查的方向演化,又能夠促使企業(yè)的策略選擇向完全治污的方向演化。
[Abstract]:By establishing an evolutionary game model between local government and sewage enterprises in environmental governance, the decision evolution process of participants was investigated, and the evolutionary stability strategy of participants and its influencing factors were analyzed. The study shows that the weight coefficient of environmental indicators and the amount of enterprise sewage in the performance assessment system of local government will not affect the strategic choice of both sides of the game. The behavior of local government supervision and enterprise pollution control is affected by seven factors, including the initial state of the system. Increasing the punishment of incomplete pollution control and reducing the cost of pollution control of enterprises can promote the strategy choice of enterprises to the direction of complete pollution control, but it will not benefit the local government in the direction of strict supervision and inspection. And the central government will increase incentives for strict supervision of local governments, increase penalties for inadequate supervision by local governments, reduce local government supervision costs, and reduce the coefficient of influence of enterprise profits on the level of payment by local governments. It can not only promote the local government's strategy choice to the direction of strict supervision, but also promote the enterprise's strategy choice to the direction of complete pollution control.
【作者單位】： 大連海事大學(xué)公共管理與人文學(xué)院;大連大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目(12AGL010) 國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金(61074133)
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F273;X322
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本文編號(hào)：1806443