本文關鍵詞： 環(huán)境稅 委托代理模型 演化博弈　出處：《管理評論》2017年05期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：在環(huán)境稅制背景下,從微觀主體的收益函數(shù)出發(fā),本文構建了中央政府與地方政府的委托代理模型、政府與污染企業(yè)的演化博弈模型,并對三者的利益互動博弈關系進行了仿真模擬和深入分析,從中探究合理的環(huán)境稅征收的設計機制。研究結果表明:(1)在環(huán)境稅的監(jiān)管機制下,當政府補貼大于企業(yè)減排成本時,政府與污染企業(yè)的博弈穩(wěn)定策略實現(xiàn)了帕累托最優(yōu)。(2)隨著中央政府對地方政府稅收共享比例的提高,地方政府對污染企業(yè)的監(jiān)管力度也會加大,因此制定合理的環(huán)境稅共享比例有助于調(diào)動地方政府積極性,從而實現(xiàn)污染企業(yè)節(jié)能減排。(3)加大監(jiān)管力度和提高環(huán)境稅率將會促進污染企業(yè)減少排放,但是一旦監(jiān)管力度下降,即使提高環(huán)境稅率,污染企業(yè)不會全部采取減排策略。污染企業(yè)將出現(xiàn)兩極分化,一部分企業(yè)選擇不減排策略,另一部分企業(yè)選擇減排策略。因此制定嚴格的環(huán)境污染監(jiān)督機制勢必將推動污染企業(yè)積極減排、促進經(jīng)濟綠色發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Under the background of environmental tax system, this paper constructs the principal-agent model of central government and local government, and the evolutionary game model of government and polluting enterprise. Simulation and in-depth analysis of the relationship between the three benefits are carried out to explore the design mechanism of reasonable environmental tax collection. The research results show that under the supervision mechanism of environmental tax, when the government subsidy is larger than the cost of enterprise emission reduction, when the government subsidy is larger than the cost of enterprise emission reduction, The game stabilization strategy between the government and the polluting enterprises has realized the Pareto optimal. 2) as the central government increases the share of tax revenue to the local government, the local government will also strengthen the supervision of the polluting enterprises. Therefore, setting a reasonable share ratio of environmental tax will help to arouse the enthusiasm of local governments, thus realizing the energy saving and emission reduction of polluting enterprises.) strengthening the supervision and raising the environmental tax rate will promote the pollution enterprises to reduce their emissions, but once the supervision intensity drops, Even if the environmental tax rate is raised, polluting enterprises will not all adopt emission reduction strategies. Polluting enterprises will become polarized, and some enterprises will choose not to reduce emissions. The other part of the enterprises choose emission reduction strategies. Therefore, the establishment of strict environmental pollution monitoring mechanism will certainly promote the pollution enterprises to actively reduce emissions and promote the green development of the economy.
【作者單位】： 河南財經(jīng)政法大學經(jīng)濟學院/中原經(jīng)濟區(qū)"三化"協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展河南省協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中心;北京物資學院;
【基金】：國家社會科學基金重大項目(14ZDA072) 本文系河南省哲學社會科學規(guī)劃項目階段性成果(2016BJJ070) 河南省科技廳軟科學項目(172400410099) 河南財經(jīng)政法大學重點學科建設項目
【分類號】：F224.32;F812.45;X196

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