發(fā)布時間：2017-12-27 20:10

  本文關鍵詞：垃圾焚燒產(chǎn)業(yè)中鄰避效應的形成機理與治理政策　出處：《浙江財經(jīng)大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 鄰避效應 垃圾焚燒 信息不對稱

【摘要】：近年來,中國城市化發(fā)展進入新階段,人們對生活質(zhì)量的要求不斷增加。然而鄰避效應這一問題卻嚴重阻礙著彌補城市功能產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展,“鄰避”設施給全體民眾帶來福利的同時卻讓部分居民遭受損害,使得鄰避產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展受阻。在此背景下,我國面臨著引發(fā)大規(guī)模沖突、降低社會經(jīng)濟效率和破壞政府公信力的“鄰避”困局。而中國式“鄰避”沖突又極其猛烈和難以調(diào)和,獨具中國特色,不可照搬發(fā)達國家處理鄰避沖突的模式,需要我們對癥下藥。垃圾焚燒設施作為最典型的“鄰避”體,具有十足的代表性。對它的研究能夠幫助我們理清“鄰避”沖突的脈絡,探尋沖突中最核心的因子。本文旨在以垃圾焚燒設施為例,尋找出“鄰避”效應形成機理,再根據(jù)機理提出相關建議。本文在充分考慮了以往文獻中學者的研究成果之后,將信息缺乏作為“鄰避”效應機理的核心構建了主觀效用模型,運用博弈論方法解釋在“鄰避”沖突中,信息不對稱導致人們對環(huán)境損失評價的偏離。然后,運用案例分析方法,總結歸納十例典型垃圾焚燒產(chǎn)業(yè)“鄰避”沖突共因,得出“鄰避”沖突中普遍缺乏的是居民與建造者信息溝通,驗證了模型中核心的部分,即溝通不暢導致信息不對稱,以至于人們在博弈中對損失作出錯估,從而居民采取強硬的反抗策略,造成“鄰避”沖突。本文的研究論述中,將信息不對稱轉(zhuǎn)化為居民效用函數(shù)中主觀概率判斷的偏離,采用等級依賴效用函數(shù)來描述“鄰避”設施給居民帶來的損害,此模型將主觀概率判斷作為居民對損失評價的權重,將這種主觀判斷以“情緒”的形式表現(xiàn)出來。因此,本文將建造者與居民作為博弈雙方,談論信息不對稱下的決策行為。引用“鷹鴿”博弈中‘鷹’與‘鴿’的形態(tài)代表居民和建造者雙方所選擇的博弈決策:強硬和妥協(xié),對照現(xiàn)實中居民的強烈抵抗和政府的強制推行建設等行為。本文的重點在于引入信息不對稱因素,在案例分析中分析“鄰避”沖突過程的重點缺乏環(huán)節(jié),從結果來看,在頗具代表性的案例中選址、環(huán)評和建設監(jiān)督都缺少公眾參與,推斷“鄰避”沖突中信息溝通不暢乃關鍵因子。指出信息缺乏導致居民的情緒化,從而在博弈中帶有主觀色彩,導致反對“鄰避”建設的活動成為情緒的發(fā)泄,而不是心平氣和的商議解決方案。政府在處理“鄰避”問題上經(jīng)驗不足,因而與居民存在矛盾誤解,讓居民參與到“鄰避”項目的建設中來必然能夠解決“鄰避”沖突,消除信息不對稱即“鄰避”出路。通過對現(xiàn)有文獻的梳理,可以看出“鄰避”問題的研究還不成體系,“鄰避”補貼問題并沒有考慮到信息不對稱的因素,本文將行為學上的一些理論納入鄰避效應解釋中,具有一定的示范意義。并且現(xiàn)有研究使用價值不高,需要綜合分析“鄰避”的各種因素,才能不有失偏頗。本文系統(tǒng)構建了信息不對稱下“鄰避”效應模型,豐富了此類研究的相關文獻。本文使用等級依賴效用函數(shù),其中的情緒函數(shù)十分貼切的刻畫了居民和政府雙方的行為。主觀效用函數(shù)與博弈論說明雙方選擇對抗決策的原因和結果,與中國鄰避沖突現(xiàn)狀相符,將研究方法賦予了實踐的價值。縱觀全文,文章的研究在于解決類似垃圾焚燒此類“鄰避”設施對應產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展困局,而信息不對稱是其核心,處理問題的落腳點在于加強建造者居民雙方關于項目的溝通。這又涉及到公共政策的舊疾,所以“鄰避”沖突尚需在后續(xù)的研究中找到更成熟的解決之道。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the development of China's urbanization has entered a new stage, and people's demands for the quality of life have been increasing. However, the problem of the "near avoidance effect" has seriously hindered the development of the urban functional industry. The "near neighbor" facility has brought benefits to all the people, but at the same time, some residents have been damaged, making the development of the adjacent industry blocked. In this context, China is faced with a "neighbour" dilemma that triggers large-scale conflicts, reduces social and economic efficiency and destroys the public credibility of the government. The Chinese style "next to avoid" conflict is extremely fierce and difficult to reconcile. With Chinese characteristics, it cannot copy the pattern of the neighboring countries to deal with the "near neighbor conflict". We need to prescribe the right medicine. As the most typical "adjacent" body, garbage incineration facilities are full of representativeness. The study of it can help us clarify the context of the conflict and explore the most important factors in the conflict. The purpose of this paper is to find out the formation mechanism of the "adjacent avoidance" effect by taking the waste incineration facility as an example, and then put forward some relevant suggestions according to the mechanism. After considering the results of previous studies in the literature of the scholars, the lack of information as the core of "NIMBY effect mechanism construction of subjective utility model, by using the game theory to explain in NIMBY conflicts, information asymmetry lead to deviations from the evaluation of environmental loss. Then, using the method of case study, summarizing ten cases of typical industrial waste incineration NIMBY conflict is due to that, "O general lack of avoid conflict is to communicate with the residents of builders information, validation of the model in the core part, namely, poor communication leads to information asymmetry, so that people in the game to make a loss wrong, so residents to take tough resistance strategy, causing NIMBY conflict. This paper, from the information asymmetry into residents' subjective probability judgment in the utility function, the rank dependent utility function to describe the NIMBY facilities to the residents of the damage, the model will be judged as the residents of the weight loss evaluation of subjective probability, the subjective judgment in the form of "emotion" out. Therefore, in this paper, the builders and residents are used as two parties to discuss the decision-making behavior under asymmetric information. In the hawk dove game, the hawk and pigeon form represents the game decisions of the residents and Builders: tough and compromise, contrasting the strong resistance of the real residents and the compulsory implementation of the government. The focus of this paper is to introduce the information asymmetry factors, in the case of "focus on the analysis of NIMBY conflict process lack of links, from the results, the location, in a representative case of EIA and construction supervision are the lack of public participation, to infer the NIMBY conflict of interest is the key to CITIC communication factor. It is pointed out that the lack of information leads to the emotion of the residents, so that they are subjective in the game, which leads to the activity of opposing "neighbouring" construction, which is the outlet of emotion rather than the deliberate solution of peace. The government is lack of experience in dealing with the problem of "near and avoid". Therefore, there is a misunderstanding between residents and residents. If residents participate in the construction of "near and avoid" project, it will solve the "near neighbor" conflict and eliminate the information asymmetry, namely the way of "near and avoiding". Through the combing of the existing literature, we can see that the research on the "near neighbor" problem is not systematic. The "near neighbor" subsidy problem does not take into account the factors of information asymmetry. In this paper, some theories of behavior are included in the interpretation of the neighborhood avoidance effect, which has a certain exemplary significance. And the value of existing research is not high, it needs to analyze the various factors of "adjacent to avoid", so that it can not be biased. This paper systematically constructs the "adjacent avoidance" effect model under information asymmetry, which enriches the related literature of this kind of research. This paper uses a class dependent utility function, the emotional function of which depicts the behavior of both the residents and the government. The subjective utility function and game theory show that both sides choose the reason and result of decision making, which is consistent with the present situation of China's near future conflict, and the research method is endowed with the value of practice. Throughout the whole article, the research of this article is to solve the dilemma similar to garbage burning such "near neighbor" facilities corresponding to the industry, and the core of the problem is information asymmetry. This also involves public policy attention, so the NIMBY conflicts still need to find a solution to the more mature in subsequent research.
【學位授予單位】：浙江財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：X705;X32

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