本文選題：本性共相　切入點(diǎn)：邏輯共相　出處：《世界哲學(xué)》2017年06期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：阿維森納提出的本性共相(即共有本性)是中世紀(jì)各大哲學(xué)傳統(tǒng)探討共相問題的共同出發(fā)點(diǎn)和中心議題。本性共相具有某種"中立"地位,既非一,又非多,既非普遍,又非特殊,既不存在于心外客觀世界,也不存在于靈魂之中。正是這種特性引發(fā)了哲學(xué)史上關(guān)于其本體論地位的長久爭論。本文旨在簡單梳理伊斯蘭哲學(xué)傳統(tǒng)中本性共相問題的提出、發(fā)展和演變,以及各學(xué)術(shù)派別的處理方式及基本立場。
[Abstract]:Avicenna put forward that the universal nature (that is, the common nature) is the common starting point and central topic of the philosophical tradition of the Middle Ages to discuss the problem of the common phase. The nature common phase has a certain "neutral" status, which is neither one, nor many, nor is it universal. It's not special, it doesn't exist in the outside world, Nor does it exist in the soul. It is this characteristic that has caused a long debate about its ontological status in the history of philosophy. As well as each academic school's processing method and the basic stand.
【作者單位】： 中國社會(huì)科學(xué)院世界宗教研究所;
【分類號(hào)】：B968

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