“經(jīng)紀(jì)人”視角下的政府失信行為研究
發(fā)布時間：2019-02-28 16:10
【摘要】：根據(jù)馬克思主義的觀點,政府是一種公共權(quán)力受托機(jī)關(guān)或執(zhí)行機(jī)關(guān),政府公共權(quán)力受托的本質(zhì)在于政府代表著一種公共信任。我國當(dāng)代政府是唯一合法政府,其合法性在于其首先是一個取信于民的誠信政府。然而,在經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型期,由于各種原因的影響,政府誠信缺失不斷發(fā)生,成為久治不愈的頑疾,已經(jīng)嚴(yán)重阻礙了市場經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展,影響了政府形象,降低了政府公信力。市場經(jīng)濟(jì)是信用經(jīng)濟(jì),要求政府必須嚴(yán)格遵守誠信原則。同時,政府誠信在社會信用體系中起著重要的基礎(chǔ)性作用,是整個社會信用體系的基石。因此,政府誠信課題研究尤顯重要。 基于此,以“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”假設(shè)的基本理論為指導(dǎo),從政府誠信理論與行為假設(shè)入手,首先界定了誠信與政府的概念,采用實證分析和對比分析法分析了政府誠信機(jī)理、我國政府誠信的表象與誠信缺失所引發(fā)的社會效應(yīng),在對政府公職人員行為假設(shè)和政府組織等的前提假設(shè)基礎(chǔ)上,剖析了政府誠信缺失的一般原因和我國政府誠信缺失的特定原因,如政府公職人員進(jìn)行“成本——收益”的權(quán)衡、政府失靈以及轉(zhuǎn)型期的特定因素等。而后,以美國誠信建設(shè)實踐及我國上海防治政府失信行為的基本做法與例證為例,總結(jié)出對我國政府誠信建設(shè)有益的經(jīng)驗與啟示。最后,在此基礎(chǔ)上給出防治政府誠信缺失的路徑：正確定位行政人員角色、重塑政府角色、提升服務(wù)理念、實現(xiàn)道德變遷、完善激勵與約束規(guī)制、機(jī)制創(chuàng)新,等等。
[Abstract]:According to Marxism, government is a kind of public power trust organ or executive organ. The essence of government public power trust is that the government represents a kind of public trust. China's contemporary government is the only legitimate government, its legitimacy lies in its first is a trust in the people of the integrity of the government. However, in the economic transition period, due to the influence of various reasons, the lack of government integrity has been a persistent disease, which has seriously hindered the development of the market economy, affected the image of the government, and reduced the credibility of the government. Market economy is a credit economy, which requires the government to strictly abide by the principle of good faith. At the same time, government credit plays an important basic role in the social credit system and is the cornerstone of the whole social credit system. Therefore, the research on government integrity is especially important. Based on this, under the guidance of the basic theory of "economic man" hypothesis, starting with the government honesty theory and behavior hypothesis, this paper firstly defines the concepts of credit and government, and analyzes the mechanism of government honesty by means of empirical analysis and comparative analysis. The appearance of government honesty and the social effect caused by the lack of good faith in our country, on the basis of the assumption of the behavior of government public officials and the premise hypothesis of government organization and so on, This paper analyzes the general reasons for the lack of government integrity and the specific reasons for the lack of government integrity in China, such as the trade-off of "cost-benefit" by government public officials, the failure of the government and the specific factors in the transition period, and so on. Then, taking the practice of American honesty construction and the basic practices and examples of prevention and cure of government break-of-faith behavior in Shanghai as an example, this paper summarizes the beneficial experience and enlightenment to the construction of government integrity in our country. Finally, on this basis, we give the way to prevent and cure the lack of government integrity: correctly positioning the role of administrative personnel, reshaping the role of the government, promoting the concept of service, achieving moral change, perfecting incentive and restraint regulation, mechanism innovation, and so on.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D035
本文編號：2431953
[Abstract]:According to Marxism, government is a kind of public power trust organ or executive organ. The essence of government public power trust is that the government represents a kind of public trust. China's contemporary government is the only legitimate government, its legitimacy lies in its first is a trust in the people of the integrity of the government. However, in the economic transition period, due to the influence of various reasons, the lack of government integrity has been a persistent disease, which has seriously hindered the development of the market economy, affected the image of the government, and reduced the credibility of the government. Market economy is a credit economy, which requires the government to strictly abide by the principle of good faith. At the same time, government credit plays an important basic role in the social credit system and is the cornerstone of the whole social credit system. Therefore, the research on government integrity is especially important. Based on this, under the guidance of the basic theory of "economic man" hypothesis, starting with the government honesty theory and behavior hypothesis, this paper firstly defines the concepts of credit and government, and analyzes the mechanism of government honesty by means of empirical analysis and comparative analysis. The appearance of government honesty and the social effect caused by the lack of good faith in our country, on the basis of the assumption of the behavior of government public officials and the premise hypothesis of government organization and so on, This paper analyzes the general reasons for the lack of government integrity and the specific reasons for the lack of government integrity in China, such as the trade-off of "cost-benefit" by government public officials, the failure of the government and the specific factors in the transition period, and so on. Then, taking the practice of American honesty construction and the basic practices and examples of prevention and cure of government break-of-faith behavior in Shanghai as an example, this paper summarizes the beneficial experience and enlightenment to the construction of government integrity in our country. Finally, on this basis, we give the way to prevent and cure the lack of government integrity: correctly positioning the role of administrative personnel, reshaping the role of the government, promoting the concept of service, achieving moral change, perfecting incentive and restraint regulation, mechanism innovation, and so on.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D035
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，本文編號：2431953
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