【摘要】：在整個(gè)公共政策的生命周期之中,政策終結(jié)是最后一環(huán),但也被認(rèn)為是承上啟下的一環(huán),對(duì)公共政策的更新與延續(xù)至關(guān)重要。利益博弈是研究公共政策問(wèn)題極為重要的視角之一,對(duì)一項(xiàng)公共政策的終結(jié)必然涉及原有利益格局的重新調(diào)整與分配,與此相關(guān)的利益主體也必然會(huì)圍繞政策進(jìn)行利益博弈來(lái)影響公共政策的有效終結(jié)。在我國(guó),各級(jí)政府和部門作為公共政策終結(jié)的主體,公共政策的終結(jié)也會(huì)影響到政府間的利益分配,也必然產(chǎn)生政府間的利益博弈,而政府間利益博弈導(dǎo)致的政策終結(jié)問(wèn)題遠(yuǎn)比其他利益主體間利益博弈的影響要大的多,實(shí)踐中也因政府間的利益博弈產(chǎn)生政策終結(jié)的障礙。因此,研究公共政策終結(jié)中的政府利益博弈問(wèn)題,具有十分重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文以利益博弈為視角,分析了公共政策終結(jié)中的政府利益博弈的表現(xiàn)和原因,并提出了公共政策終結(jié)中政府之間的利益優(yōu)化途徑。 文章共分為五個(gè)部分:第一部分為緒論,主要敘述了論文研究的背景與意義、國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀述評(píng)、研究的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)與難點(diǎn)、研究的思路和方法等。第二部分探討了公共政策終結(jié)與政府利益博弈的相關(guān)概念與理論。第三部分論述了公共政策終結(jié)中政府之間利益博弈的表現(xiàn),主要有中央政府與地方政府之間、地方政府之間、政府部門之間的利益博弈。第四部分分析了公共政策終結(jié)中政府之間利益博弈的原因,這些原因包括表層原因、深層原因和行政人格化層面原因。第五部分是本文的落腳點(diǎn),主要闡述了公共政策終結(jié)中政府之間的利益優(yōu)化途徑,即政策終結(jié)的認(rèn)同、多元利益的協(xié)調(diào)、行政倫理的建設(shè)。通過(guò)公共政策終結(jié)中政府間的利益優(yōu)化,促進(jìn)公共政策的有效終結(jié),最終達(dá)到政策系統(tǒng)優(yōu)化的目的。
[Abstract]:In the whole life cycle of public policy, the end of policy is the last link, but it is also regarded as the link between the preceding and the following, which is of great importance to the renewal and continuation of public policy. The game of interests is one of the most important perspectives to study the problem of public policy. The end of a public policy must involve the readjustment and distribution of the original pattern of interests. The relevant stakeholders will inevitably play an interest game around the policy to influence the effective end of the public policy. In our country, governments and departments at all levels as the main body of the end of public policy, the end of public policy will also affect the distribution of interests among governments, and will inevitably result in a game of interests between governments. The problem of policy termination caused by inter-governmental interest game is much greater than that of other stakeholders. In practice, there are obstacles to the end of policy because of inter-government interest game. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the game of government interests in the end of public policy. From the perspective of interest game, this paper analyzes the performance and reasons of the government interest game in the end of public policy, and puts forward the ways to optimize the interests of the government in the end of public policy. The paper is divided into five parts: the first part is the introduction, which mainly describes the background and significance of the research, the current situation of research at home and abroad, the innovative points and difficulties of the research, the ideas and methods of the research, etc. The second part discusses the concept and theory of the game between the end of public policy and government interests. The third part discusses the performance of interest game between governments in the end of public policy, mainly between central government and local government, and between government departments. The fourth part analyzes the reasons of the interest game between the governments in the end of public policy. These reasons include the superficial reasons, the deep reasons and the reasons of administrative personalization. The fifth part is the foothold of this article, mainly elaborated the public policy termination between the government benefit optimization way, namely the policy terminates the identification, the multivariate benefit coordination, the administrative ethics construction. Through the benefit optimization between governments in the end of public policy, it promotes the effective end of public policy, and finally achieves the goal of policy system optimization.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D035

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 謝慶奎;中國(guó)政府的府際關(guān)系研究[J];北京大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2000年01期

2 劉祖華;;公共政策終結(jié)的動(dòng)力學(xué)分析——以取消農(nóng)業(yè)稅為考察對(duì)象[J];成都行政學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2008年01期

3 吳桂韓;;公共選擇視角下的非常態(tài)政策終結(jié)及其“三化”演繹[J];上海城市管理職業(yè)技術(shù)學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2007年05期

4 龐明川;中央與地方政府間博弈的形成機(jī)理及其演進(jìn)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)問(wèn)題研究;2004年12期

5 劉東杰;;破解政策終結(jié)困境的有利因素分析[J];重慶行政;2006年06期

6 吳桂韓;;從公共選擇理論視角透視非常態(tài)式的政策終結(jié)——兼論我國(guó)公共政策終結(jié)的科學(xué)化、民主化與法制化[J];廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2007年03期

7 張康之;范紹慶;;從公共政策運(yùn)動(dòng)到公共政策終結(jié)問(wèn)題研究[J];東南學(xué)術(shù);2009年01期

8 聶元軍;我國(guó)公共政策終結(jié)的現(xiàn)狀、障礙及對(duì)策選擇[J];廣東行政學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2002年06期

9 郭麗;論政策終結(jié)的障礙與措施[J];貴陽(yáng)市委黨校學(xué)報(bào);2004年03期

10 岑乾明;科學(xué)評(píng)估與制度化——政策終結(jié)的關(guān)鍵[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)與社會(huì)發(fā)展;2005年07期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 謝煒;中國(guó)公共政策執(zhí)行過(guò)程中的利益博弈[D];華東師范大學(xué);2007年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 鐘小容;重慶市地方政府政策執(zhí)行力研究[D];重慶大學(xué);2006年

，

本文編號(hào)：2311105