【摘要】：按需分配是任何合理的分配正義理論都必須包含的一個(gè)重要原則。但是,按需分配的原則怎樣表述才是合理的,它如何才能得到證成,這兩個(gè)問(wèn)題歷來(lái)有不少爭(zhēng)論。威廉斯在其著名的論文《平等的觀念》中,區(qū)分開(kāi)兩種好處,并且認(rèn)為相應(yīng)于每種好處有其相干的分配理由,從而提出了他對(duì)按需分配原則的表述和證成。威廉斯提出的按需分配原則引來(lái)艾斯特爾兩方面的批評(píng):一,這個(gè)原則蘊(yùn)涵一些違反直觀的原則;二,即使可以較為同情地詮釋這個(gè)原則,它仍然會(huì)遇到另外三個(gè)困難:誘因的問(wèn)題、家長(zhǎng)主義和妒忌。我認(rèn)為艾斯特爾的這些批評(píng)都是不成立的,在文章中嘗試指出它們的問(wèn)題所在,從而為威廉斯的按需分配原則辯護(hù)。
[Abstract]:Distribution according to need is an important principle that any reasonable distributive justice theory must contain. However, how to express the principle of distribution according to need is reasonable and how it can be proved. Williams, in his famous paper the idea of Equality, distinguishes between two advantages, and thinks that each benefit has its own relevant distribution reason, and thus puts forward his statement and proof of the principle of distribution according to need. Williams' principle of distribution according to need drew criticism from Estelle from two aspects: first, it contained some principles that were contrary to intuition; and second, even if the principle could be interpreted more sympathetically, It still faces three other difficulties: the problem of inducement, paternalism and jealousy. I don't think these criticisms of Estelle are valid and try to point out their problems in order to defend Williams' principle of allocation according to need.
【作者單位】： 中山大學(xué)哲學(xué)系;
【基金】：中央高�；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)專(zhuān)項(xiàng)資金資助(項(xiàng)目名稱(chēng):“威廉斯與當(dāng)代倫理學(xué)”,項(xiàng)目編號(hào):1209054)
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D091

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