本文選題：功利 + 權(quán)利　； 參考：《吉林大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文

【摘要】： 功利主義和權(quán)利論(契約論)在自由主義發(fā)展史上地位極為特殊,二者都曾長(zhǎng)期地占據(jù)英美政治哲學(xué)和法律哲學(xué)舞臺(tái)的中心,它們之間的爭(zhēng)論和沖突也最激烈、最引人注目。功利主義認(rèn)為:如果一個(gè)社會(huì)的主要制度能夠使最大多數(shù)人獲得最大幸福,這個(gè)社會(huì)就是善的,因而也是正義的。但是,功利主義具有一個(gè)固有的理論缺陷,其認(rèn)為對(duì)人類(lèi)福祉的追求比維護(hù)個(gè)人的權(quán)利具有優(yōu)先性。羅爾斯緊緊抓住功利主義的這個(gè)缺陷,展開(kāi)了對(duì)功利主義的批判。在其早期的兩篇論文中,羅爾斯辨明了概括規(guī)則觀、實(shí)踐規(guī)則觀與功利主義的內(nèi)在關(guān)聯(lián),指出功利主義把正義問(wèn)題變成一個(gè)管理決策問(wèn)題,忽視了人們之間的道德聯(lián)系。羅爾斯對(duì)功利主義的批判在《正義論》中基本定型,在《作為公平的正義——正義新論》中繼續(xù)深化。在《正義論》中羅爾斯主要從目的論與義務(wù)論的關(guān)系、個(gè)人選擇原則與社會(huì)選擇原則的關(guān)系角度展開(kāi)對(duì)功利主義的批判;隨著后期的理論轉(zhuǎn)型,他更注重從穩(wěn)定性的角度深化對(duì)功利主義的批判。本文追隨羅爾斯的理論進(jìn)程,詳細(xì)地探究其批判功利主義所依憑的各種理?yè)?jù)以及不同理?yè)?jù)之間的邏輯演進(jìn)關(guān)系,為我們進(jìn)一步探討羅爾斯正義理論奠定了基礎(chǔ),也為我們反觀中國(guó)學(xué)界的權(quán)利研究提供了一個(gè)參照標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。后兩個(gè)問(wèn)題與中國(guó)現(xiàn)實(shí)更具相關(guān)性,不過(guò)因文章篇幅和個(gè)人能力所限,在本文中無(wú)法深入展開(kāi),只能待今后繼續(xù)研究。
[Abstract]:Utilitarianism and right theory (contract theory) have a special position in the history of liberalism. Both of them have occupied the center of the political philosophy and legal philosophy of Anglo-American for a long time. Utilitarianism holds that if the main system of a society can maximize the happiness of the most people, the society is good and therefore just. However, utilitarianism has an inherent theoretical flaw, it thinks that the pursuit of human welfare has priority over defending individual rights. Rawls grasped the defect of utilitarianism and criticized utilitarianism. In his early two papers, Rawls identified the internal relationship between the general rule view, the practical rule view and the utilitarianism, and pointed out that utilitarianism turned the justice problem into a management decision problem and ignored the moral relationship between people. Rawls' criticism of utilitarianism is basically stereotyped in Justice and deepened in New Theory of Justice as Fairness. In Justice, Rawls criticizes utilitarianism from the point of view of the relationship between teleology and obligation, individual choice principle and social choice principle. He pays more attention to deepen the criticism of utilitarianism from the angle of stability. Following Rawls' theoretical process, this paper explores in detail the various justifications on which Rawls relies for his criticism of utilitarianism and the logical evolution of different motivations, which lays a foundation for us to further explore Rawls' theory of justice. It also provides a reference standard for us to study the rights of Chinese academic circles. The latter two problems are more relevant to the reality of China, but due to the limitations of the length of the article and the ability of individuals, they cannot be further developed in this paper, and can only be further studied in the future.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D091

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本文編號(hào)：2099122