本文選題：相機(jī)授權(quán)體制 + 央地政府間博弈　； 參考：《浙江財經(jīng)學(xué)院》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：中央和地方政府間關(guān)系歷來是政治學(xué)、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究的重點問題之一。我國自改革開放以來,中央地方政府間關(guān)系出現(xiàn)了各種復(fù)雜的變化。一方面,中央作為全國整體的治理者,必須要調(diào)動地方的積極性,同時要保證地方對國家的忠誠;另一方面,隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革序幕的拉開,尤其是在財政體制改革的推動下,地方自主性不斷增強(qiáng),各地方之間競爭不斷加劇的過程中,地方政府和中央政府展開的各種形式的博弈。政府之間的博弈形式實質(zhì)上是一種正常的關(guān)系行為,通過博弈行為能夠取得雙方在既定規(guī)則下可能的最大化預(yù)期。目前各國政府間博弈無論是在理論上還是在實踐上都已存在應(yīng)趨向發(fā)展成熟。然而,在我國中央和地方政府之間的博弈過程中卻存在著各種不利于各個政府通過博弈達(dá)到一種穩(wěn)定的均衡狀態(tài)的問題。 相機(jī)授權(quán)體制是經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革以后中央政府處理政府間關(guān)系的一種體制,是指中央政府在處理與地方政府的關(guān)系中,以中央的總體目標(biāo)為標(biāo)準(zhǔn),根據(jù)不同時機(jī)、不同事件、不同對象所作出的不同授權(quán)以達(dá)到調(diào)控央地政府間關(guān)系的一種體制。相機(jī)授權(quán)體制本身的產(chǎn)生和發(fā)展所形成的固有的特點對我國中央和地方政府間關(guān)系以及不通過地方政府間關(guān)系都產(chǎn)生了深刻的影響。相機(jī)授權(quán)體制是央地政府間潛規(guī)則化博弈現(xiàn)象的體制根源。相機(jī)授權(quán)體制的形成是基于國家改革過程中的一種嘗試性結(jié)果,而我國在國家治理過程中的預(yù)算軟約束、信息不對稱以及監(jiān)督機(jī)制不規(guī)范也加劇了相機(jī)授權(quán)體制在改革步入正軌后對國家治理所產(chǎn)生的不良后果。相機(jī)授權(quán)體制的不規(guī)范性、不公平性、不透明性的特點改變了央地政府間的關(guān)系模式,使中央和地方政府間以及不同地方政府之間在處理各自關(guān)系時產(chǎn)生了各種潛規(guī)則的博弈現(xiàn)象。中央和地方之間的潛規(guī)則是在雙方多次互動博弈過程中通過理性的計算所形成的一種隱藏于正式制度之下的非正式約定,本質(zhì)是對公權(quán)力如何運用和公共利于處置方式的約定。這種非正式約定以獲取各自利益為共同目標(biāo),通過正式制度的激勵機(jī)制和懲處機(jī)制對雙方形成約束,并通過雙方互動過程中的各種行為表現(xiàn)出來。地方政府針對中央政府實行的財權(quán)上收,事權(quán)下放、“鞭打快牛”、晉升錦標(biāo)賽、“行政化”調(diào)控及單方面改變游戲規(guī)則等相機(jī)授權(quán)下的博弈行為對中央展開分別展開“財源最大化”、“藏富于民”、“勤于跑部”、政策“選擇性”執(zhí)行等與中央展開博弈的行為。 這些潛規(guī)則化的博弈行為在我國政府與市場職能劃分不清晰的前提下產(chǎn)生了各種惡劣的影響,一方面侵蝕著國家和人民的利益,制造著各種腐敗現(xiàn)象,另一方面啃食著國家政府之間關(guān)系的正常和健康發(fā)展的基礎(chǔ)。要確保我國中央和地方政府間關(guān)系的正常和健康發(fā)展,使中央和地方政府在博弈中形成穩(wěn)定的均衡關(guān)系,就要對央地政府間的潛規(guī)則化博弈現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行研究。針對目前央地關(guān)系中潛規(guī)則化博弈現(xiàn)象產(chǎn)生的體制根源,要使央地之間的博弈行為健康化,必須要祛除相機(jī)授權(quán)體制的不規(guī)范性、不透明性和不公平性。 首先要以制度化分權(quán)取代相機(jī)授權(quán),此外,還要對目前我國央地政府間關(guān)系的其他問題進(jìn)行改革。例如對預(yù)算制度的改革、對信息公開制度的改革以及對監(jiān)督機(jī)制的改革等。不僅要切除不規(guī)范存在的根源,還要取消不規(guī)范生長的空間。只有這樣,才能保證央地政府間關(guān)系博弈關(guān)系的正常、健康發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:The relationship between the central government and the local government has always been one of the key issues of political and economic research. Since China's reform and opening up, the relationship between the central and local governments has undergone various complicated changes. On the one hand, the central government, as a whole country, must mobilize the local polarity and ensure the loyalty of the local government to the state; On the other hand, with the opening of the reform of the economic system, especially in the promotion of the reform of the financial system, the local autonomy is constantly enhanced and the competition between the local governments and the central government are playing a variety of forms in the process of increasing competition. The game form between the governments is essentially a normal relationship behavior, through a blog. Game behavior can achieve the maximum expectation of both parties under the established rules. At present, the game between governments in each country should be mature, both in theory and in practice. However, there is a variety of governments in the game between the central and local governments which are not conducive to the stability of each government through game. The problem of the equilibrium state.
The camera authorization system is a system for the central government to deal with the Intergovernmental Relations after the reform of the economic system. It refers to the central government, in dealing with the local government, with the overall goal of the central government as the standard, according to the different authorizations made by different machines, different events and different objects in order to control the relationship between the central government. The inherent characteristics of the production and development of the camera authorizing system itself have a profound influence on the intergovernmental relations between the central and local governments and the relationship between the local governments. The camera authorization system is the institutional source of the phenomenon of the latent regularization of the central government. The formation of the phase machine authorization system is based on the state reform. A tentative result in the process of leather process, and the soft constraints of budget in the process of national governance, asymmetric information and unregulated supervision mechanism also aggravate the adverse consequences of the camera authorization system on the national governance after the reform is on the right track. The characteristics of the unstandard, unfairness, and opaque nature of the camera authorization system change The relationship mode between the central government and the central government makes the game between the central and local governments and the different local governments in dealing with their relations. The hidden rules between the central and the local governments are a kind of hidden in the formal system, which is formed by the rational calculation in the process of interactive game between the two sides. Formally agreed, the essence is the agreement on the use of public power and the way of public disposal. This informal agreement is the common goal of obtaining the respective interests. It is bound by the incentive mechanism and punishing mechanism of the formal system, and shows through the various acts in the process of mutual interaction. The local government aims at the central government. The financial power collection, the decentralization of the power, the "whip the fast cattle", the Promotion Tournament, the "administrative" regulation and the change of the game rules under the camera authorization are carried out to the Central Committee to expand the "financial resources maximization", "hide the people rich in the people", "be diligent in the running Department", "selective" implementation and other games with the central government. Yes.
Under the precondition that our government and market function are not clearly divided, these submersible game behavior has a variety of bad effects. On the one hand, it erodes the interests of the country and the people, makes various corruption, and on the other hand, nibbling on the basis of the normal and healthy development of the relations between the state governments. The normal and healthy development of the relations between the governments will make the central and local governments form a stable equilibrium relationship in the game. It is necessary to study the phenomenon of the latent regular game between the central and local governments. In view of the institutional causes of the phenomenon of the latent regularization game in the relationship between the central and local areas, the game behavior between the central and local governments should be made healthy and must be dispel. In addition to the non-standard, opaque and unfair nature of the camera authorization system.
First of all, we should replace the authority of the camera with institutionalized decentralization. In addition, we should also reform the other issues of intergovernmental relations between China and the central region. For example, the reform of the budget system, the reform of the information disclosure system and the reform of the supervision mechanism, we should not only remove the root causes of the non standard existence, but also have to cancel the space for the non standard growth. Only in this way can we ensure the normal and healthy development of the game relationship between the central government and the government.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財經(jīng)學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D035;F224.32

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