本文選題：公務(wù)員 + 道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)��； 參考：《湖南師范大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：信息不對(duì)稱理論是現(xiàn)代信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的核心,它的主要觀點(diǎn)是：在社會(huì)活動(dòng)中,各類參與人員所掌握的信息是有差異的,一些參與人員擁有他人所不擁有的信息。信息不對(duì)稱現(xiàn)象最早是于1963年由肯尼斯·約瑟夫·阿羅首次提出。它涉及到逆向選擇、代理人問題以及道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)三個(gè)問題。從公務(wù)員角度來看,處于優(yōu)勢(shì)的是代理方、服務(wù)方,處于劣勢(shì)的是委托方、被服務(wù)方,在公眾同公務(wù)員的委托——代理關(guān)系中,公務(wù)員因其是權(quán)力的擁有和使用者,具有獨(dú)特的優(yōu)勢(shì)而幾乎壟斷了代理信息,造成了雙邊的信息不對(duì)稱。本文主要以信息不對(duì)稱理論為基礎(chǔ),來分析研究公務(wù)員履責(zé)過程中的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及其消減問題。 道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)指的是“從事經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的人在最大限度地增進(jìn)自身效用的同時(shí)做出不利于他人的行動(dòng)�！被蛘哒f是：當(dāng)簽約一方不完全承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)后果時(shí)所采取的自身效用最大化的自私行為。對(duì)于公務(wù)員來說,道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是指他們因利己目的的驅(qū)使,使用自己手中的公共權(quán)力來謀取個(gè)人利益的最大化,從而做出違反社會(huì)道德準(zhǔn)則的行為。 公務(wù)員履責(zé)過程的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)具有與商業(yè)行為不同的特點(diǎn),因而其消減也更艱難。首先,公務(wù)員履責(zé)過程引發(fā)道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的動(dòng)機(jī)更復(fù)雜。其次,公務(wù)員履責(zé)過程覆蓋道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的手段更隱蔽。復(fù)次,公務(wù)員履責(zé)過程造就道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的程度更劇烈。最后,公務(wù)員履責(zé)過程積就道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響更深遠(yuǎn)。 公務(wù)員履責(zé)過程的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)表現(xiàn)為消極不作為、積極作為不當(dāng)和積極不當(dāng)作為。 從客觀機(jī)會(huì)來看,公務(wù)員履責(zé)過程的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)首先來源于客觀上存在障礙,某些行政工作和行政工作的部分流程存在高難度和行政行為評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)存疑等,是造成公務(wù)員履責(zé)過程道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的客觀事實(shí)。 其次是某些現(xiàn)實(shí)條件又提供了公務(wù)員道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的免責(zé)可能,加劇了道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。信息不對(duì)稱、行為不可逆、滿意度模糊和制度不健全等,正由于存在這些條件,一旦公務(wù)員放松了對(duì)自己的道德要求,其道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的滋生就成為自然過程。從公務(wù)員角度來看,處于優(yōu)勢(shì)的是代理方、服務(wù)方,處于劣勢(shì)的是委托方、被服務(wù)方,在公務(wù)員同公眾的委托——代理關(guān)系中,公務(wù)員因其是權(quán)力的擁有和使用者,具有獨(dú)特的優(yōu)勢(shì)而幾乎壟斷了代理信息,造成了雙邊的信息不對(duì)稱。 我們基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制流程來考慮公務(wù)員履責(zé)過程的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)消減。由于道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是客觀誘因?qū)χ饔^偏好的不當(dāng)激發(fā),因此,消減公務(wù)員履責(zé)過程的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),主要任務(wù)是對(duì)客觀誘因的限制,培養(yǎng)主體堅(jiān)定意志的目的也在于限制客觀誘因的影響,以客觀誘因的失效為著力點(diǎn),我們認(rèn)為,以流程為邏輯,消減公務(wù)員履責(zé)過程道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的主要途徑可概括為以下幾個(gè)：提升道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)預(yù)估水平、提高道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)檢測(cè)頻率、厘定道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、實(shí)施道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)有效控制和預(yù)留道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)沖方式。
[Abstract]:The theory of information asymmetry is the core of modern information economics. Its main viewpoint is that in social activities, the information held by all kinds of participants is different, and some participants have information that others do not have. Information asymmetry was first proposed by Kenneth Joseph Arrow in 1963. It involves three problems: adverse selection, agent and moral hazard. From the perspective of civil servants, it is the agent, the service party and the client who are at a disadvantage. In the principal-agent relationship between the public and the civil servant, the civil servant is the owner and user of the power. It has a unique advantage and almost monopolizes agency information, resulting in bilateral information asymmetry. Based on the theory of asymmetric information, this paper analyzes and studies the moral hazard and its abatement in the process of civil servant's duty. Moral hazard refers to "people who engage in economic activities to maximize their own effectiveness while doing to the detriment of others." Or: selfishness of maximizing utility when the contracting party is not fully exposed to the consequences of risk. For civil servants, moral hazard means that they use their own public power to maximize their personal interests because of their self-interest, and thus act in violation of social moral norms. The moral hazard in the process of civil servant's duty is different from the business behavior, so it is more difficult to reduce the moral hazard. First, the motivation for moral hazard in the process of civil servants' duties is more complex. Second, the process of civil servants to cover the moral hazard of the means more hidden. Over and over again, the process of civil servants' duties creates a greater degree of moral hazard. Finally, the process of civil service accountability on the moral hazard of a more far-reaching impact. The moral hazard in the process of civil servant's duty is negative omission, positive improper behavior and positive improper action. From the perspective of objective opportunity, the moral hazard in the process of civil servants' duties comes from the obstacles objectively, some administrative work and part of the process of administrative work are difficult and the evaluation standard of administrative behavior is doubtful, and so on. It is an objective fact that causes moral hazard in the process of civil servant's duty. Secondly, some practical conditions provide civil servants with the possibility of exemption from moral hazard behavior, which exacerbates moral hazard. Information asymmetry, behavior irreversibility, fuzzy satisfaction and imperfect system, etc., because of the existence of these conditions, once civil servants relax their own moral requirements, the breeding of their moral hazard becomes a natural process. From the perspective of civil servants, it is the agent, the service party and the client who are at a disadvantage. In the principal-agent relationship between civil servants and the public, civil servants are the owners and users of power. It has a unique advantage and almost monopolizes agency information, resulting in bilateral information asymmetry. Based on the risk control process, we consider the moral hazard reduction of civil servants. Since moral hazard is the improper stimulation of subjective preference by objective inducement, therefore, the main task of reducing moral hazard in the process of civil servant's duty is to limit the objective inducement. The purpose of cultivating the firm will of the subject is also to limit the influence of the objective inducement and to focus on the invalidation of the objective inducement. We believe that the process is the logic. The main ways to reduce the moral hazard in the process of civil servants' duty can be summarized as follows: to raise the level of moral hazard prediction, to increase the frequency of moral hazard detection, and to determine the standard of moral hazard evaluation. To effectively control and reserve moral hazard hedging methods.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：D035

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本文編號(hào)：1891149