發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-06 23:25

  本文選題：天蘆名雅邛大戰(zhàn)役　切入點(diǎn)：張國燾　出處：《四川師范大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：1935年6月,紅一方面軍經(jīng)過長時(shí)間的征戰(zhàn)轉(zhuǎn)移,終于與紅四方面軍在懋功會(huì)師。但是從會(huì)師之初,紅四方面軍領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人張國燾就與中共中央的戰(zhàn)略意圖有所分歧,中共中央的戰(zhàn)略是北上陜甘,而張國燾則意圖率兵南下,并在川康邊建立革命根據(jù)地,赤化全川。這種分歧逐漸擴(kuò)大,最終發(fā)展為張國燾分裂紅軍,另立“中央”。另立“中央”之后,張國燾率兵南下并先后發(fā)動(dòng)了綏(靖)崇(化)丹(巴)懋(功)戰(zhàn)役和天(全)蘆(山)名(山)雅(安)邛(崍)大(邑)戰(zhàn)役(簡稱天蘆名雅邛大戰(zhàn)役,下同)。在天蘆名雅邛大戰(zhàn)役前期,紅軍取得了一些戰(zhàn)術(shù)上的勝利,但是由于敵我雙方在兵力、裝備上存在的差距及南下戰(zhàn)略的錯(cuò)誤,最終導(dǎo)致紅軍未能達(dá)到預(yù)期的戰(zhàn)略目的,被迫退往西康,天蘆名雅邛大戰(zhàn)役至此告終。張國燾率紅四方面軍南下作戰(zhàn)是經(jīng)過醞釀的,在一、四方面軍會(huì)師之前張國燾就有在川康地區(qū)建立根據(jù)地的想法,會(huì)師之后與中共中央在戰(zhàn)略上分歧擴(kuò)大,更使他執(zhí)意施行南下戰(zhàn)略。天蘆名雅邛大戰(zhàn)役的目的就是要赤化全川,建立根據(jù)地。為了贏得戰(zhàn)爭的勝利,張國燾在軍隊(duì)和地方都進(jìn)行了動(dòng)員,對軍隊(duì)作了相應(yīng)的部署,后勤方面也做了相應(yīng)的工作。面對紅軍南下攻勢,川軍企圖把紅軍阻止于山區(qū),盡可能使紅軍遠(yuǎn)離川軍的利益中心。蔣介石則希望紅軍與川軍兩敗俱傷,他坐收漁翁之利。1935年10月20日,張國燾發(fā)布《天蘆名雅邛大戰(zhàn)役計(jì)劃》,戰(zhàn)役正式開始。戰(zhàn)役第一階段是紅軍的猛烈攻勢期,紅軍很快占領(lǐng)了天全、蘆山,取得了一些戰(zhàn)術(shù)上的勝利。第二階段為雙方攻防拉鋸期,川軍、中央軍在百丈關(guān)一帶集結(jié)數(shù)倍于紅軍的兵力。在這期間,紅軍與敵人反復(fù)進(jìn)行攻防轉(zhuǎn)換,但是紅軍并沒有能夠?qū)?zhàn)線向前推進(jìn)。第三階段是川軍全面反攻,紅軍戰(zhàn)略退卻期。由于紅軍消耗過大,再戰(zhàn)下去將極其危險(xiǎn),于是逐漸退離天蘆名雅邛大地區(qū),戰(zhàn)役宣告失敗。天蘆名雅邛大戰(zhàn)役失敗的直接原因是由于紅軍在兵力數(shù)量、武器裝備上與敵人存在巨大差距。根本原因則是南下戰(zhàn)略忽略了當(dāng)時(shí)中日民族矛盾正逐漸上升為主要矛盾的這個(gè)因素,同時(shí)與蔣介石想要將四川建設(shè)成為抗日大后方的設(shè)想相沖突。天蘆名雅邛大戰(zhàn)役的失敗造成南下紅軍大量減員,張國燾也為他的錯(cuò)誤在政治上付出了代價(jià)。但是從客觀上來看,天蘆名雅邛大戰(zhàn)役牽制了數(shù)十萬國民黨軍,配合了毛澤東率領(lǐng)中共中央先行北上的行動(dòng),減輕了紅二、六軍團(tuán)的軍事壓力,在川康地區(qū)擴(kuò)大了中國共產(chǎn)黨的影響。對于川軍來說,天蘆名雅邛大戰(zhàn)役的勝利雖然暫時(shí)維持了他們在四川的統(tǒng)治,但是自身實(shí)力也受到了較大損失。國民黨中央勢力則趁機(jī)滲透到四川,為蔣介石以后控制四川打下了基礎(chǔ)。
[Abstract]:In June 1935, the Red Army finally joined forces with the fourth Front Army in Maogong after a long period of war.However, from the beginning of the meeting, the leader of the fourth Front Army, Zhang Guotao, differed from the strategic intention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The strategy of the CPC Central Committee was to go north to Shaanxi and Gansu provinces, while Zhang Guotao intended to lead troops to the south and establish a revolutionary base at the edge of Sichuan and Kang.The whole river is red.This divergence gradually widened and eventually developed into Zhang Guotao split the Red Army and set up a separate "Central Committee."After the establishment of the "Central Committee",Zhang Guotao led troops south and successively launched Sui (Jing) Chong (Hua) Dan (Ba) Mao (Gong) campaign and Tian (Quan) Lu (Shan) name (an) Qiong (Lai) campaign (abbreviated as Tianyu Mingya Qiongda campaign).The Red Army won some tactical victories in the early days of the Tien Lu-ming Ya-qiong campaign, but because of the difference in military strength and equipment between the enemy and us and the mistakes in the strategy of going south, the Red Army ultimately failed to achieve its expected strategic purpose.Forced to retreat to Xikang, the battle of TianluMingya Qiongda ended.Zhang Guotao led the fourth Front Army to fight south after a brewing process. Before the first and fourth Front Army joined forces, Zhang Guotao had the idea of establishing base areas in the Chuankang region. After that, the strategic differences between Zhang Guotao and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China widened.It made him stick to the strategy of going south.The aim of TianluMingya Qiong campaign was to turn the whole Sichuan into a base area.In order to win the war, Zhang Guotao mobilized the army and localities, made corresponding arrangements for the army, and did the corresponding work in the field of logistics.In the face of the Red Army's southward offensive, the Sichuan Army tried to stop the Red Army from the mountainous areas and to keep the Red Army as far away as possible from the interest center of the Sichuan Army.Jiang Jieshi hopes that both the Red Army and the Sichuan army will lose, and he will reap the benefits of fishing. On October 20, 1935, Zhang Guotao released the "Tien Ming Ya Qiong Battle Plan," and the campaign officially began.The first stage of the campaign was a fierce offensive by the Red Army, which quickly captured Tianquan and Lushan and achieved some tactical victories.The second stage was the period of attack and defense between the two sides, with the Sichuan Army and the Central Army massing several times the strength of the Red Army in the area of Baizhang Guan.During this period, the Red Army and the enemy repeatedly changed attack and defense, but the Red Army did not advance the front.The third stage was the full-scale counter-offensive of the Sichuan Army and the strategic retreat of the Red Army.As the Red Army was consuming too much, it would be extremely dangerous to fight again, so it gradually retreated from TianluMingya Qiongda and the battle was defeated.The direct reason for the defeat of TianluMingya Qiongda campaign is that the Red Army has a huge gap with the enemy in terms of the number of troops and the weapons and equipment.The fundamental reason is that the strategy of going south ignores the factor that the national contradiction between China and Japan was gradually rising into the main contradiction at that time, and at the same time conflicted with Jiang Jieshi's idea of building Sichuan into a major rear area against Japan.The defeat of TianluMingya Qiongda led to a great reduction in the Red Army, and Zhang Guotao paid a political price for his mistakes.From an objective point of view, however, the battle of TianluMingya Qiongda contained hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops, coordinated with the action of Mao Zedong leading the CPC Central Committee to advance northward, and alleviated the military pressure of the second and sixth Red Legion.The influence of the Communist Party of China has been expanded in the Chuan Kang area.For the Sichuan army, the victory of TianluMingya Qiongda has temporarily maintained their rule in Sichuan, but their own strength has also suffered a great loss.The Kuomintang Central Force took the opportunity to infiltrate Sichuan, laying the foundation for Jiang Jieshi to control Sichuan later.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：四川師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：K263

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