選舉領導者和任命領導者對人們合作及收益的影響
發(fā)布時間：2019-01-27 16:36
【摘要】：研究目的:在公共物品游戲的實驗情境下,系統(tǒng)探究不同的領導者產生方式對組織合作水平和收益水平的影響以及領導者獎懲行為傾向的影響;進一步引入領導者補償這一重要因素,探究物質激勵對不同領導者的行為和領導者所在組織的合作情況是否存在影響。研究方法:研究使用公共物品游戲的博弈范式對領導者行為及組織合作情況進行探索,共分為四部分。研究一:探究不同領導者產生方式對組織合作的影響,包括選舉-無補償和任命-無補償處理組,觀察和比較選舉與任命領導者所在組織的合作、收益以及領導者獎懲行為傾向的差異;研究二:探究在有領導者補償?shù)那榫诚?不同領導者產生方式對組織合作的影響,包括選舉-補償和任命-補償處理組,觀察和比較領導者所在組織的合作、收益以及領導者獎懲行為傾向的差異;研究三:在研究一、二的基礎上探究領導者補償分別對選舉和任命領導者的獎懲行為及對組織合作的影響;研究四:采用問卷調查探討領導者以及組織成員的態(tài)度和主觀感受。研究結果:(1)選舉-無補償組和任命-無補償組中組織的合作水平、收益水平以及領導者的獎懲行為傾向均不存在顯著差異;選舉-補償組和任命-補償組中組織的合作水平、收益水平以及領導者的獎懲行為傾向也不存在顯著差異。(2)任命-補償組與任命-無補償組中組織合作水平和收益水平均不存在顯著差異;選舉-補償組和選舉-無補償組在組織合作水平方面無顯著差異,但補償組的收益水平顯著高于無補償組的收益水平。(3)選舉-補償組與選舉-無補償組相比,領導者獎懲行為的次數(shù)分布、懲罰行為的平均力度以及在團隊管理方面的行為總力度都有顯著提高;而任命-補償組與任命-無補償組相比,領導者只有懲罰行為的平均力度有顯著改變。(4)在所有處理組中,領導者和一般組織成員對獎勵引起正面情緒的題目評分均高于一般水平,領導者對于更喜歡使用獎勵對組織進行管理的項目得分也均高于一般水平,且處理組間不存在顯著差異。(5)在領導者集體利益的主觀問卷中,選舉產生的領導者評分均高于任命產生的領導者,且選舉-補償組中領導者的評分顯著高于任命-補償組領導者的評分。研究結論:(1)決定人們之間合作水平和收益的因素是規(guī)范制度,而不是領導者的產生方式。(2)選舉產生和任命產生的領導者都具有相比較懲罰更偏好獎勵的特點,因為獎勵更能夠鼓勵人們的合作,這種行為特點可能是人類社會行為進化的結果。(3)采用選舉方式產生領導者可以激發(fā)他們的成就動機,使其更愿意與組織實現(xiàn)互惠,從而更好地實現(xiàn)人們之間的合作。(4)他人的認可對于選舉產生的領導者的行為有更好規(guī)范作用,相比較而言,任命產生的領導者沒有這種行為規(guī)范。
[Abstract]:The purpose of this study is to systematically explore the influence of different leaders' ways on the level of cooperation and income of organizations and the tendency of leaders to reward and punish in the context of public goods games. Furthermore, the important factor of leader compensation is introduced to explore whether the material incentive has influence on the behavior of different leaders and the cooperation of the organization in which the leader belongs. Methods: the study uses the game paradigm of public goods game to explore the leader's behavior and organizational cooperation, which is divided into four parts. Study I: explore the impact of different ways of producing leaders on organizational cooperation, including election-no-compensation and appointed-no-compensation processing groups, and observe and compare the cooperation between the election and the organization in which the leader is appointed. The difference of the benefit and the behavior tendency of leader's reward and punishment; Study 2: explore the impact of different ways of producing leaders on organizational cooperation in the context of leadership compensation, including election-compensation and appointed-compensation processing groups, and observe and compare the cooperation of the organizations in which the leaders belong. The difference of the benefit and the behavior tendency of leader's reward and punishment; Research three: on the basis of study 1 and 2, the paper explores the effect of leader compensation on the behavior of rewards and punishments and organizational cooperation in the election and appointment of leaders, and studies 4: using questionnaires to explore the attitude and subjective feelings of leaders and members of the organization. The results are as follows: (1) there is no significant difference in the level of cooperation, the level of income and the behavior tendency of the leaders in the election-no-compensation group and the appointed-no-compensation group; The level of cooperation between the organizations in the election-compensation group and the nomination-compensation group, There is no significant difference in the income level and the behavior tendency of the leader. (2) there is no significant difference in the organizational cooperation level and the income level between the appointed-compensation group and the appointed-no-compensation group; There was no significant difference in the level of organizational cooperation between election-compensation group and election-no-compensation group, but the income level of compensation group was significantly higher than that of non-compensation group. (3) compared with election-compensation group, election-compensation group was higher than election-no-compensation group. The frequency distribution of leader's behavior of reward and punishment, the average intensity of punishment behavior and the total strength of behavior in team management were significantly improved. However, compared with the appointed-compensation group, the leaders only had significant changes in the average intensity of punishment behavior. (4) in all the treatment groups, Both the leaders and the average organization members scored higher than the average on the positive emotion caused by the rewards, and the leaders scored higher than the average for the items that preferred the use of rewards to manage the organization. There was no significant difference between the treatment groups. (5) in the subjective questionnaire of the collective interests of leaders, the scores of elected leaders were higher than those of appointed leaders. The leaders in the election-compensation group were significantly higher than those in the appointed-compensation group. The conclusions are as follows: (1) the factors that determine the level and benefits of cooperation among people are the normative system, not the way leaders are formed. (2) both elected and appointed leaders have the characteristics of preference for rewards over punishment. Because incentives are more likely to encourage people to cooperate, such behavior traits may be the result of the evolution of human social behaviour. (3) the use of election to produce leaders inspires their motivation for achievement and makes them more willing to reciprocate with the organization. In order to achieve better cooperation between people. (4) the approval of others has a better normative effect on the behavior of elected leaders, compared with the appointed leaders do not have such a code of conduct.
【學位授予單位】：浙江理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：B842
本文編號：2416462
[Abstract]:The purpose of this study is to systematically explore the influence of different leaders' ways on the level of cooperation and income of organizations and the tendency of leaders to reward and punish in the context of public goods games. Furthermore, the important factor of leader compensation is introduced to explore whether the material incentive has influence on the behavior of different leaders and the cooperation of the organization in which the leader belongs. Methods: the study uses the game paradigm of public goods game to explore the leader's behavior and organizational cooperation, which is divided into four parts. Study I: explore the impact of different ways of producing leaders on organizational cooperation, including election-no-compensation and appointed-no-compensation processing groups, and observe and compare the cooperation between the election and the organization in which the leader is appointed. The difference of the benefit and the behavior tendency of leader's reward and punishment; Study 2: explore the impact of different ways of producing leaders on organizational cooperation in the context of leadership compensation, including election-compensation and appointed-compensation processing groups, and observe and compare the cooperation of the organizations in which the leaders belong. The difference of the benefit and the behavior tendency of leader's reward and punishment; Research three: on the basis of study 1 and 2, the paper explores the effect of leader compensation on the behavior of rewards and punishments and organizational cooperation in the election and appointment of leaders, and studies 4: using questionnaires to explore the attitude and subjective feelings of leaders and members of the organization. The results are as follows: (1) there is no significant difference in the level of cooperation, the level of income and the behavior tendency of the leaders in the election-no-compensation group and the appointed-no-compensation group; The level of cooperation between the organizations in the election-compensation group and the nomination-compensation group, There is no significant difference in the income level and the behavior tendency of the leader. (2) there is no significant difference in the organizational cooperation level and the income level between the appointed-compensation group and the appointed-no-compensation group; There was no significant difference in the level of organizational cooperation between election-compensation group and election-no-compensation group, but the income level of compensation group was significantly higher than that of non-compensation group. (3) compared with election-compensation group, election-compensation group was higher than election-no-compensation group. The frequency distribution of leader's behavior of reward and punishment, the average intensity of punishment behavior and the total strength of behavior in team management were significantly improved. However, compared with the appointed-compensation group, the leaders only had significant changes in the average intensity of punishment behavior. (4) in all the treatment groups, Both the leaders and the average organization members scored higher than the average on the positive emotion caused by the rewards, and the leaders scored higher than the average for the items that preferred the use of rewards to manage the organization. There was no significant difference between the treatment groups. (5) in the subjective questionnaire of the collective interests of leaders, the scores of elected leaders were higher than those of appointed leaders. The leaders in the election-compensation group were significantly higher than those in the appointed-compensation group. The conclusions are as follows: (1) the factors that determine the level and benefits of cooperation among people are the normative system, not the way leaders are formed. (2) both elected and appointed leaders have the characteristics of preference for rewards over punishment. Because incentives are more likely to encourage people to cooperate, such behavior traits may be the result of the evolution of human social behaviour. (3) the use of election to produce leaders inspires their motivation for achievement and makes them more willing to reciprocate with the organization. In order to achieve better cooperation between people. (4) the approval of others has a better normative effect on the behavior of elected leaders, compared with the appointed leaders do not have such a code of conduct.
【學位授予單位】：浙江理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：B842
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