本文選題：知識　切入點(diǎn)：證據(jù)　出處：《哲學(xué)分析》2017年03期

【摘要】：所有那些知識論上最牢固確立的論題之一是:知識不單純是一種真信念。如此這般被標(biāo)準(zhǔn)描述的知識,至少是一個(gè)知識論上得到確證的真信念,也許是通過作為好證據(jù)的確證。但是這個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的概念在知識論上比其應(yīng)當(dāng)所是得到更加牢固的確立。在一種知識極簡主義看來,知識樸素地是一種真信念。如果不被用作證據(jù),那么一個(gè)真信念的好證據(jù)就一無所是;并且,即使它作為證據(jù)而使用,這種用法也只需要被解釋為起到了一種原因的作用。這種作用可能是"從外部"產(chǎn)生知識——真信念。因此,這種證據(jù)也許不需要被視作"從內(nèi)部"導(dǎo)出結(jié)果的知識的一部分——它至少是得到確證的信念。
[Abstract]:One of the most firmly established theories of knowledge is that knowledge is not simply a true belief.The knowledge described in this way is at least a true belief corroborated in the theory of knowledge, perhaps by corroboration as good evidence.But the concept of this standard is more firmly established in the theory of knowledge than it is supposed to be.In a minimalist view of knowledge, knowledge is simply a true belief.If not used as evidence, the good evidence of a true belief is nothing; and, even if it is used as evidence, this usage only needs to be interpreted as a cause.This role may be to generate knowledge-true beliefs from the outside.Thus, such evidence may not need to be seen as part of the knowledge that results are derived "from within"-it is at least a corroborated belief.
【作者單位】： 澳大利亞新南威爾士大學(xué);上海社會(huì)科學(xué)院哲學(xué)研究所;
【分類號】：B848.4
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本文編號：1720818