【摘要】：領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人如何進(jìn)行危機(jī)決策?現(xiàn)有的四種模型——官僚政治模型、組織行為模型、理性選擇模型、"刺激—反應(yīng)"模型——僅提供部分解釋,對該問題的研究在理論上仍存在不足。為弄清決策者在危機(jī)中的決策模式,形成"從動機(jī)到行為再到對策"的邏輯鏈條,本文在既有研究的基礎(chǔ)上,從多元啟發(fā)理論視角出發(fā),結(jié)合博弈分析,進(jìn)一步完善了從認(rèn)知到理性分析兩階段式的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人危機(jī)決策模型。論文選擇第一次和第三次朝核危機(jī)中的朝美談判為案例,驗(yàn)證了提出的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人危機(jī)決策模型。對兩次朝核危機(jī)中領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人決策的分析與比較,揭示了朝美領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的博弈行為所表現(xiàn)出的一些特征,這有助于我們理解和判斷朝核問題的走向。
[Abstract]:How do leaders make crisis decisions? The existing four models-bureaucracy model, organizational behavior model, rational choice model, stimulus-response model-only provide some explanations, but the research on this problem is still insufficient in theory. In order to make clear the decision mode of the decision maker in the crisis and form the logical chain of "from motive to behavior to countermeasure", this paper, on the basis of the existing research and from the angle of multiple heuristic theory, combines the game analysis. Further improved the two-stage leadership crisis decision-making model from cognition to rational analysis. In this paper, the DPRK-US negotiation in the first and third North Korean nuclear crisis is selected as a case to verify the proposed leadership crisis decision-making model. The analysis and comparison of the leaders' decision-making in the two North Korean nuclear crises reveals some characteristics of the game behavior of the leaders of the DPRK and the United States, which is helpful for us to understand and judge the trend of the North Korean nuclear issue.
【作者單位】： 南開大學(xué)周恩來政府管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社會科學(xué)基金重大項(xiàng)目(項(xiàng)目編號:13&ZD049)的資助
【分類號】：D815.2

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本文編號：2310074