【摘要】：碳關(guān)稅是一國(guó)以保護(hù)環(huán)境、應(yīng)對(duì)全球氣候變暖的危機(jī)為由，對(duì)沒(méi)有溫室氣體減排限制的國(guó)家的高能耗出口產(chǎn)品在一般關(guān)稅的基礎(chǔ)上附加征收的一種特殊的環(huán)境稅，以此阻礙他國(guó)產(chǎn)品進(jìn)入本國(guó)市場(chǎng)，從而達(dá)到保護(hù)本國(guó)市場(chǎng)的目的。它最早由法國(guó)前總統(tǒng)雅克·希拉克提出，其用意是希望歐盟國(guó)家針對(duì)未遵守《京都協(xié)定書(shū)》的國(guó)家課征商品進(jìn)口稅，其實(shí)質(zhì)是一種綠色關(guān)稅，是一種廣義的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘�！疤缄P(guān)稅”深深根植于歐盟和美國(guó)曾經(jīng)一度極為盛行的“碳政治”理念與“低碳政治”思潮，它本身其實(shí)是在國(guó)際氣候變暖的大背景下所產(chǎn)生的一種與碳排放有關(guān)的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)博弈手段，尤其是在后金融危機(jī)時(shí)代以及歐洲債務(wù)危機(jī)時(shí)代的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)不景氣的態(tài)勢(shì)下，，被廣泛的應(yīng)用到各自的國(guó)家發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略與國(guó)家利益上。從本質(zhì)上來(lái)說(shuō)碳關(guān)稅問(wèn)題是一個(gè)國(guó)際政治經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題，其背后隱藏著復(fù)雜的戰(zhàn)略利益博弈。 本文首先分析碳關(guān)稅形成的社會(huì)基礎(chǔ)、政治基礎(chǔ)、經(jīng)濟(jì)技術(shù)基礎(chǔ)，然后提出其產(chǎn)生的相關(guān)法理依據(jù)，以“碳關(guān)稅”和“低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)”為切入點(diǎn)，從發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家之間的博弈、發(fā)展中國(guó)家之間的合作與利益訴求以及中國(guó)、美國(guó)、歐盟等國(guó)家之間在各個(gè)層面上的激烈博弈與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)展開(kāi)分析，主要基于國(guó)際關(guān)系理論中的公共選擇理論與國(guó)際機(jī)制論作為理論基礎(chǔ)，運(yùn)用博弈論的方法，深入分析上述博弈各方在其不同的“碳政治”理念下所主導(dǎo)的針對(duì)“碳關(guān)稅”與“低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)”問(wèn)題的不同立場(chǎng)，深刻揭示博弈各方在“碳關(guān)稅”背后所隱藏的復(fù)雜的國(guó)家利益。 最后，本文的落腳點(diǎn)就會(huì)回到“碳關(guān)稅”的征收可能帶給中國(guó)的影響方面，并且提出中國(guó)的應(yīng)對(duì)策略，目的是期望得到解決由全球氣候變暖所引發(fā)的一系列的國(guó)際利益博弈的有效辦法，最終尋找出適合中國(guó)自身低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的新路，在日趨激烈的國(guó)際“碳關(guān)稅”博弈上，最大程度的維護(hù)國(guó)家利益。
[Abstract]:A carbon tariff is a special environmental tax that a country imposes on high-energy exports of countries without greenhouse gas emission reduction restrictions on the basis of general tariffs to protect the environment and respond to the global warming crisis. In order to prevent the entry of other products into the domestic market, thus achieving the purpose of protecting the domestic market. It was first put forward by Jacques Chirac, the former French president, and its intention is to impose import duties on goods for countries that do not comply with the Kyoto Protocol. In essence, it is a green tariff and a broad technical barrier to trade. The "carbon tariff" is deeply rooted in the idea of "carbon politics" and the "low-carbon politics" that once prevailed in the European Union and the United States. In fact, it is a kind of political and economic game means related to carbon emissions under the background of international warming, especially in the post-financial crisis era and the global economic depression in the era of European debt crisis. Is widely applied to their respective national development strategies and national interests. In essence, carbon tariff is an international political and economic problem, which hides a complicated strategic interest game. This paper first analyzes the social basis, political basis, economic and technical basis of carbon tariff formation, and then puts forward the relevant legal basis for the formation of carbon tariff, taking "carbon tariff" and "low carbon economy" as the starting point, from the game between developed countries. The cooperation and interest demands among developing countries, as well as the fierce game and competition among China, the United States, the European Union and other countries at various levels are analyzed. Mainly based on the theory of public choice and the theory of international mechanism in the theory of international relations, using the method of game theory, This paper deeply analyzes the different positions of the above game parties on the issues of "carbon tariff" and "low carbon economy" under their different "carbon politics" concept, and deeply reveals the complicated national interests hidden behind the "carbon tariff" by all parties involved in the game. Finally, the conclusion of this paper will return to the possible impact of "carbon tariff" collection on China, and put forward China's countermeasures. The aim is to find an effective way to solve a series of international interest games caused by global warming, and finally to find a new way suitable for the development of China's own low-carbon economy, in the increasingly fierce international "carbon tariff" game. To maximize the protection of national interests.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D815;X2

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