氣候治理中的大國博弈及其對世界經(jīng)濟(jì)格局的影響研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-09 16:11
【摘要】：氣候變化問題是當(dāng)今世界各國最為關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)問題之一。經(jīng)過30余年的發(fā)展這個問題早已從單純的環(huán)境問題上升到了世界政治世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的高度,其牽涉國家之多,影響范圍之廣,是其他任何國際問題都無法比擬的,甚至可以說它還可能是一個關(guān)系到人類文明興衰存亡的問題。關(guān)于氣候變化問題,哪怕其中任何-個旁枝末節(jié),都是一個龐大的課題。本文的研究針對于世界大國在尋求氣候變化治理中的博弈行為,以及大國博弈對世界經(jīng)濟(jì)格局的影響。 首先本文從生產(chǎn)力的角度將氣候變化影響下產(chǎn)生的低碳革命與歷史上的三次科技革命進(jìn)行了對比研究,形成了以下觀點(diǎn)： ①氣候變化導(dǎo)致傳統(tǒng)生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展受到阻礙,若要實(shí)現(xiàn)生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展就必須發(fā)展低碳生產(chǎn)力。低碳生產(chǎn)力在生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展史上具有革命性的意義； ②低碳生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展,將帶來一系列革命性的科技成果,其影響不下于其他三次科技革命； ③以往的科技革命無一例外都帶來了世界經(jīng)濟(jì)格局的改變,因而我國應(yīng)當(dāng)抓住低碳革命的機(jī)會,提升我國未來的國際政治經(jīng)濟(jì)地位。 之后本文回顧了氣候治理的歷程,并用博弈論的分析方法,在囚徒困境、智豬博弈、斗雞博弈三個博弈圖式下,分析了氣候治理中各大國間的分歧。本文認(rèn)為： ①目前氣候治理的囚徒困境并不是不可打破的,關(guān)鍵是要建立一套權(quán)威的監(jiān)督機(jī)制； ②氣候談判“共同但有區(qū)別的責(zé)任”的原則,是解決氣候變化的最優(yōu)原則,是氣候談判中應(yīng)該堅(jiān)持的； ③氣候談判中的南北矛盾導(dǎo)致談判進(jìn)展緩慢,但事實(shí)上任何一方的讓步都能使談判獲得更多有實(shí)質(zhì)的進(jìn)展。 本文第三部分分析了氣候問題大國博弈對世界經(jīng)濟(jì)格局的影響,如碳金融的迅猛發(fā)展、碳稅在全球范圍的廣泛征收以及氣候博弈中中美歐的三足鼎立等。當(dāng)然,氣候變化對世界經(jīng)濟(jì)格局的影響還遠(yuǎn)不止于此。這更說明我們應(yīng)該重視氣候變化,以藉此影響世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展方向,使之朝有利于我國的方向發(fā)展。 最后本文針對氣候變化博弈的基本立場、談判平臺的選擇、低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)的建設(shè)提出了一些建議。認(rèn)為： ①基于“發(fā)展權(quán)”的談判立場與我國在氣候治理中的積極作為不匹配。樹立“可持續(xù)的發(fā)展權(quán)”的觀念,能使我國的合理發(fā)展得到國際社會充分的理解。 ②我國應(yīng)當(dāng)堅(jiān)持以COP平臺為主,以歐美主導(dǎo)的其他平臺為輔,積極參加氣候談判。在氣候談判歐美主導(dǎo)權(quán)的爭奪上,偏向歐盟更有利于我國,也有利于氣候治理的實(shí)現(xiàn)。 ③國內(nèi)低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)是我國參加氣候談判的最大后盾,我國應(yīng)以自有碳交易市場為基礎(chǔ),建設(shè)我國的碳金融市場；應(yīng)加強(qiáng)法律和社會監(jiān)督,形成廣泛的低碳意識；應(yīng)重視對國有企業(yè)外其他類型企業(yè)特別是民營企業(yè)減排行動的激勵；應(yīng)加快碳稅的制定與實(shí)施進(jìn)度。
[Abstract]:Climate change is one of the hottest issues in the world. After more than 30 years of development, the problem has already risen from a simple environmental problem to the height of world politics and world economy. It involves so many countries and has a wide range of influence that it is incomparable to any other international problem. It may even be a matter of the rise and fall of human civilization. The issue of climate change, if any, is a huge issue. This paper focuses on the game behavior of the world's great powers in seeking the governance of climate change, and the influence of the great power game on the world economic pattern. Firstly, this paper makes a comparative study between the low-carbon revolution under the influence of climate change and the three historical scientific and technological revolutions from the perspective of productivity. The following viewpoints are formed: 1 the development of traditional productivity is hindered by climate change. If you want to achieve the development of productivity, we must develop low-carbon productivity. The development of low carbon productivity will bring a series of revolutionary scientific and technological achievements, and its influence will not be less than the other three scientific and technological revolutions, and the development of low-carbon productivity will bring about a series of revolutionary scientific and technological achievements. The past scientific and technological revolution without exception has brought about the change of the world economic pattern, so our country should seize the opportunity of low-carbon revolution and promote our country's future international political and economic status. Then this paper reviews the course of climate governance and analyzes the differences between the big countries in climate governance under three game schemas: prisoner's dilemma intelligent pig game and cockfight game using the method of game theory. This paper holds that: (1) the prisoner's dilemma of climate governance is not unbreakable, the key is to establish an authoritative supervisory mechanism, and (2) the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" in climate negotiations, It is the best principle to solve climate change and should be adhered to in the climate negotiations. 3 the North-South contradiction in climate negotiations leads to the slow progress of the negotiations, but in fact the concessions of either side can lead to more substantial progress in the negotiations. The third part of this paper analyzes the influence of the climate problem big country game on the world economic pattern, such as the rapid development of carbon finance, the widespread collection of carbon tax in the global scope, and the triple stand between the United States and Europe in the climate game. Of course, the impact of climate change on the world economic landscape is much more than that. This shows that we should pay more attention to climate change in order to influence the development direction of the world economy and make it more favorable to our country. Finally, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the basic position of climate change game, the choice of negotiation platform and the construction of low carbon economy. It is concluded that: 1 the negotiating position based on the "right to development" does not match China's active action in climate governance. To establish the concept of "sustainable development right" can make the reasonable development of our country fully understood by the international community.2 our country should insist on the COP platform as the main platform and other platforms dominated by Europe and the United States as the supplement, and take an active part in the climate negotiations. In the scramble for the leading power of Europe and the United States in climate negotiations, favouring the European Union is more beneficial to China and also conducive to the realization of climate government.3 domestic low-carbon economic construction is the biggest backing for China's participation in climate negotiations. We should build our carbon finance market on the basis of our own carbon trading market, strengthen the legal and social supervision, form a wide sense of low carbon, pay attention to the incentives for other types of enterprises outside the state-owned enterprises, especially private enterprises, to reduce emissions. The development and implementation of carbon tax should be accelerated.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D815;X2;F113
本文編號：2174632
[Abstract]:Climate change is one of the hottest issues in the world. After more than 30 years of development, the problem has already risen from a simple environmental problem to the height of world politics and world economy. It involves so many countries and has a wide range of influence that it is incomparable to any other international problem. It may even be a matter of the rise and fall of human civilization. The issue of climate change, if any, is a huge issue. This paper focuses on the game behavior of the world's great powers in seeking the governance of climate change, and the influence of the great power game on the world economic pattern. Firstly, this paper makes a comparative study between the low-carbon revolution under the influence of climate change and the three historical scientific and technological revolutions from the perspective of productivity. The following viewpoints are formed: 1 the development of traditional productivity is hindered by climate change. If you want to achieve the development of productivity, we must develop low-carbon productivity. The development of low carbon productivity will bring a series of revolutionary scientific and technological achievements, and its influence will not be less than the other three scientific and technological revolutions, and the development of low-carbon productivity will bring about a series of revolutionary scientific and technological achievements. The past scientific and technological revolution without exception has brought about the change of the world economic pattern, so our country should seize the opportunity of low-carbon revolution and promote our country's future international political and economic status. Then this paper reviews the course of climate governance and analyzes the differences between the big countries in climate governance under three game schemas: prisoner's dilemma intelligent pig game and cockfight game using the method of game theory. This paper holds that: (1) the prisoner's dilemma of climate governance is not unbreakable, the key is to establish an authoritative supervisory mechanism, and (2) the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" in climate negotiations, It is the best principle to solve climate change and should be adhered to in the climate negotiations. 3 the North-South contradiction in climate negotiations leads to the slow progress of the negotiations, but in fact the concessions of either side can lead to more substantial progress in the negotiations. The third part of this paper analyzes the influence of the climate problem big country game on the world economic pattern, such as the rapid development of carbon finance, the widespread collection of carbon tax in the global scope, and the triple stand between the United States and Europe in the climate game. Of course, the impact of climate change on the world economic landscape is much more than that. This shows that we should pay more attention to climate change in order to influence the development direction of the world economy and make it more favorable to our country. Finally, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the basic position of climate change game, the choice of negotiation platform and the construction of low carbon economy. It is concluded that: 1 the negotiating position based on the "right to development" does not match China's active action in climate governance. To establish the concept of "sustainable development right" can make the reasonable development of our country fully understood by the international community.2 our country should insist on the COP platform as the main platform and other platforms dominated by Europe and the United States as the supplement, and take an active part in the climate negotiations. In the scramble for the leading power of Europe and the United States in climate negotiations, favouring the European Union is more beneficial to China and also conducive to the realization of climate government.3 domestic low-carbon economic construction is the biggest backing for China's participation in climate negotiations. We should build our carbon finance market on the basis of our own carbon trading market, strengthen the legal and social supervision, form a wide sense of low carbon, pay attention to the incentives for other types of enterprises outside the state-owned enterprises, especially private enterprises, to reduce emissions. The development and implementation of carbon tax should be accelerated.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D815;X2;F113
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