本文選題：核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制 + 核擴(kuò)散行為��； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：國(guó)際核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制自成立以來(lái)已經(jīng)歷經(jīng)半個(gè)世紀(jì),在這段時(shí)期內(nèi)核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制為遏制核武器的擴(kuò)散和世界核裁軍做出了巨大貢獻(xiàn),為世界的和平和穩(wěn)定做出了巨大貢獻(xiàn)。國(guó)際核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制成立于冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期,冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后,國(guó)際格局發(fā)生重大轉(zhuǎn)變,核擴(kuò)散形勢(shì)也變得更加嚴(yán)峻,在后冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)代,如何讓國(guó)際核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制更好的發(fā)揮作用,是世界各國(guó)學(xué)者關(guān)注的重點(diǎn)。 本文主要研究國(guó)際核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制的約束力對(duì)核擴(kuò)散行為的約束限制作用。通過(guò)定性分析和定量分析來(lái)對(duì)核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制的約束力進(jìn)行研究。由于國(guó)家理性行為體的特性,國(guó)家行為體發(fā)展核武器是因?yàn)樵诤瞬粩U(kuò)散機(jī)制內(nèi)不能夠獲得足夠的收益,要使國(guó)際核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制擁有足夠的約束力,需要滿足以下條件:1、國(guó)家對(duì)核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制規(guī)則的遵守;2、國(guó)家得到機(jī)制內(nèi)成員國(guó)政治上的認(rèn)同;3、國(guó)家遵守規(guī)則而獲得經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的自由;4、國(guó)家安全得到保障。在這些條件中,國(guó)家安全的保障居于首位,權(quán)重系數(shù)最高。如果國(guó)家行為能夠在核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制內(nèi)得到以上條件的保障,約束力會(huì)對(duì)該國(guó)家的核擴(kuò)散行為產(chǎn)生約束作用。在以上幾個(gè)條件中,國(guó)家安全的保障是最重要的,如果國(guó)家安全的保障得不到滿足,縱然其他條件都具備,核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制的約束力仍然對(duì)核擴(kuò)散行為起不到應(yīng)有的作用。對(duì)國(guó)家來(lái)說(shuō),得不到國(guó)家安全的保障,發(fā)展核武器的收益要大于在核不擴(kuò)散機(jī)制內(nèi)的收益,國(guó)家理性行為體的特性會(huì)使國(guó)家做出選擇。 在對(duì)朝鮮核問(wèn)題的分析中,主要針對(duì)歷次六方會(huì)談進(jìn)行分析。盡管六方會(huì)談迄今為止已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了六輪,但是取得的成績(jī)卻乏善可陳。究其主要原因主要是在六方會(huì)談中,沒(méi)有觸及到最核心的問(wèn)題,也是朝鮮方面最為關(guān)切的問(wèn)題——朝鮮國(guó)家安全的保障問(wèn)題,如果朝鮮棄核,朝鮮的國(guó)家安全由誰(shuí)來(lái)保障,這一問(wèn)題得不到解決,朝鮮核問(wèn)題仍要走很長(zhǎng)的路。朝鮮之所以要發(fā)展核武器,主要源于其國(guó)家安全,半個(gè)多世紀(jì)以來(lái),美國(guó)在朝鮮半島的一側(cè)一直駐扎大量軍隊(duì),朝鮮人對(duì)朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的記憶依然深刻,心中仍然有深深的不安全感。在這種情況下,其最需要的就是安全。因此,這也是朝鮮發(fā)展核武器的一個(gè)最重要的原因。要想使六方會(huì)談對(duì)朝核問(wèn)題產(chǎn)生足夠使其放棄核武器的約束力,就要在國(guó)家安全、政治認(rèn)同以及經(jīng)濟(jì)自由等方面取得進(jìn)展,只有這樣朝核問(wèn)題才會(huì)有解決的可能。
[Abstract]:It has been half a century since the establishment of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. During this period, the nuclear non-proliferation regime has made great contributions to curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament in the world, and has made great contributions to world peace and stability. The international nuclear non-proliferation regime was established during the Cold War period. After the end of the Cold War, the international situation has undergone major changes, and the nuclear proliferation situation has become more serious. In the post-Cold War era, how to make the international nuclear non-proliferation regime play a better role, It is the focus of attention of scholars all over the world. This paper mainly studies the binding effect of international nuclear non-proliferation regime on nuclear proliferation behavior. The binding force of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is studied by qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. Owing to the nature of national rational actors, national actors develop nuclear weapons because they cannot reap sufficient benefits within the nuclear non-proliferation regime and make the international nuclear non-proliferation regime sufficiently binding, The following conditions need to be met: 1. State compliance with the rules of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The state is politically recognized by the members of the regime. The state is free to abide by the rules and gain economic activity. 4. National security is guaranteed. In these conditions, the national security in the first place, the highest weight coefficient. If the conduct of the State is guaranteed by the above conditions within the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the binding effect will be binding on the nuclear proliferation behavior of the State. In the above several conditions, the guarantee of national security is the most important. If the guarantee of national security is not satisfied, even if other conditions are available, the binding force of the nuclear non-proliferation regime still does not play its due role in the behavior of nuclear proliferation. For States, without national security guarantees, the benefits of the development of nuclear weapons are greater than those in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the characteristics of the rational actors of the State will make it possible for the State to make a choice. In the analysis of the North Korean nuclear issue, the six-party talks were analyzed. Despite six rounds of talks so far, little has been achieved. The main reason for this is that in the six-party talks, the core issue has not been touched upon, and it is also the most concerned issue on the part of the DPRK-the issue of safeguarding the national security of the DPRK. If the DPRK abandons its nuclear weapons, who will guarantee its national security? The issue remains unresolved, and the North Korean nuclear issue still has a long way to go. The reason why North Korea wants to develop nuclear weapons mainly stems from its national security. For more than half a century, the United States has stationed a large number of troops on the Korean Peninsula, and the Korean people still have a profound memory of the Korean War. There is still a deep sense of insecurity in my heart. In this case, what is most needed is security. Therefore, this is also one of the most important reasons for North Korea to develop nuclear weapons. If the six-party talks are to have enough binding force on the North Korean nuclear issue to give up nuclear weapons, progress must be made in the areas of national security, political identity and economic freedom. Only in this way can the North Korean nuclear issue be resolved.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D815.2

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前8條

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本文編號(hào)：1935712